POLICY DIFFUSION:
NEW CONSTRAINTS, NEW REALITIES

Proceedings of the II International Conference
on Policy Diffusion and Development Cooperation

EDITED BY
OSMANY PORTO DE OLIVEIRA

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Preface

In a supreme irony, the 2021 ICPDDC was dedicated to discussing how policy travels – when people themselves could not. The College of Public Policy at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar was honoured to support ICPDDC this year, but the success of the conference was due entirely to the hard work of Osmany Porto de Oliveira, and his team at the Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning and the Federal University of São Paulo. They literally had to invent the format and the infrastructure to support an international conference with participants and presentations from around the world in multiple time zones. The legacy of these efforts, in the form of this book and on-line resources, is remarkable, and will nourish research in the field for years.

Shift happens. The pandemic will likely have tectonic effects on policy diffusion, some of which will facilitate, and some of which might hinder and limit it. I mention only four here, two for each possible direction. First is the power of digital networks to spread ideas. The ICPDDC was itself an example, and of course research has for years relied on the concept of networks in policy diffusion. However, when the pandemic made travel impossible for over a year, everyone (including transfer agents) began Zooming. Whereas pre-pandemic there might have been *N* on-site meetings (local as well as international), in a Zoom world this became *2xN* or even *3xN*. There was an almost palpable acceleration and proliferation in international policy meetings, forums, panels, workshops, and conferences. Without air travel and hotels, meeting costs dropped to almost zero, and public intellectuals and NGOs took to the Zoom-waves. Twitter and other social media exploded in all directions, some good and many bad. Post-pandemic, it is likely that networked communication will complement and, in some cases, even eclipse the traditional forms of face-to-face diffusion and transfer. This matters – digital networks are fast, wide, constant, and accessible. The tool has been there for

several years, but was under-exploited. More flexible and fluid platforms may dramatically increase the channels for policy diffusion.

A second facilitator of diffusion post-pandemic might be the drive to "build back better" around a small cluster of surprisingly settled policy priorities: climate change, the SDGs, inequality, racism, global inequality, gender, and technology. From Doha to Davos, from the Gaidar Forum to Jackson Hole, there is a remarkable, self-flagellating consensus among global elites. It may just be lip-syncing to social justice memes, but rhetoric creates commitments, and commitments gel into institutions, and institutions thrive on objectives and targets and ultimately justify themselves through ever-expanding agendas. Climate change and the SDGs illustrate this perfectly. The next climate change conference, in Glasgow in November 2021, will be the *26th* COP. The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) "works closely with United Nations agencies, multilateral financing institutions, the private sector, and civil society" and has 40 national and regional networks. It is important to note that climate change + SDGs amount to an almost complete and inexhaustible suite of policy initiatives – nothing is left out – and so a global commitment to "build back better" just on these two vectors will generate immense pressures for policy coordination and ultimately diffusion and transfer.

The pandemic also may hinder or hobble policy diffusion in two ways. One is its impact on the global South. A recent development in diffusion research was noting South-South diffusion, and growing cases of South-North diffusion. Though it is too early to tell what the long-term effects of the pandemic might be, the economic, social and health impacts may linger in countries in the global South. India and Indonesia were grappling with soaring cases in mid-2021, even as vaccination rates in the top OECD countries were approaching 50% of their populations. It may take years for some of these countries to get back on their feet, and during that period they are not likely to be sources of policy emulation or borrowing, except perhaps in a negative sense.

The other is the possible corrosion of the "West," and particularly of the US, as models for public policy. The pandemic performance of the US in 2020 under the Trump administration was among the worst in the world. BLM and George Floyd sparked demonstrations against racism around the world, highlighting not just historical injustices but current, systemic racism, white privilege, and embedded colonialism. The attack on the US Capitol and the vicious partisanship of American politics seem like symptoms not just of American decline, but of pathologies in democracy itself, magnified by the failures of many of them to confront the logistical challenges of the pandemic. Why

drink from a poisoned well? The G-7 meeting in June 2021 confronted this explicitly. The communiqué stated that the countries were united as "open societies and economies and guided by our shared values of democracy, freedom, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights" and that they had "revitalised our G7 partnership." They might succeed, but the sheen of western superiority is certainly dimmed in the face of COVID policy failures and challenge of China.

These are simply a few suggestions of new constraints and new realities. The best guide to this shadowy terrain is in your hands.

Leslie A. Pal
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Presentation and Acknowledgments

The policy diffusion and development cooperation communities came together to share their most recent research in 2021 for the third time. The first event gathering these communities was in 2016 when a small group of scholars convened for three days in a workshop to discuss the cutting-edge topics of policy diffusion at the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (Cebrap) and at the Federal University of São Paulo (Unifesp). The group counted on scholars such as Leslie Pal, Cecilia Osorio, Patrick Hassenteufel, Cristiane Kerches da Silva Leite, and Kurt Weyland (see photos in the gallery). The vibrant debates and the high level of internationalization of the participants stimulated us to organize another event. Two years later, in 2018, a second meeting was held in São Paulo with more than 250 participants, gaining the status of a conference and a title that explicitly included the area of development cooperation. The conference was the stage for insightful discussions and an opportunity to advance the research questions and challenges of the time, with the participation of prestigious scholars such as Diane Stone, David Dolowitz, Magdaléna Hadjiisky, Jacint Jordana, Jennifer Robinson, and Carlos Milani (see photos in the gallery). The conference has become the largest international meeting on policy diffusion and development cooperation, forming a network of around half a thousand researchers working in the topic. The community's growing interest in areas such as public policy, international relations, and human geography led to the decision to organize another conference, to be held two years later.

Thus, the International Conference on Policy Diffusion and Development Cooperation was scheduled for the end of May 2020. The organization received more than 100 proposals from highly qualified researchers from all over the world. However, the Covid-19 pandemic, forced the organization to reschedule the event a few weeks before the planned date. The first idea was to delay the event and still prepare an in-person conference. However,

the pandemic's aggravation and the increasing number of Covid-19 cases in Brazil and around the world showed that hosting a physical meeting in the short— to medium—term would not be possible. These difficult circumstances, which have affected the entire world, have been a huge challenge for the conference. Recognizing the value of sharing knowledge on policy diffusion and development cooperation, the organization considered it essential to maintain the event. This has involved ten more months of work in addition to all that has been prepared since 2019. For several weeks, we worked hard to reschedule and design an innovative form of the international academic conference within the context of the pandemic, adapting the previously designed in-person event and seeking to offer a digital conference even though we had no experience with the format.

It was a learning opportunity, and we are very happy with the result! More than 70 participants from all over the world joined together in over 20 sessions (see photos in the gallery). This was the first online event in our area of research. The International Conference on Policy Diffusion has become a global hub for academics to share their groundbreaking research and work in progress. It is a pluralistic space of discussion, which welcomes scholars from the most varied epistemological and ontological perspectives about how policies travel and countries cooperate. It is also where global South and North academics can share their findings and engage in mutual learning. The main purpose of this community is to foster knowledge production and innovation and further our interpretations of policy diffusion and development cooperation.

The International Conference on Policy Diffusion and Development Cooperation became an eclectic global meeting bringing together researchers from all over the world to discuss the various dynamics of these policies in movement. The 2020/2021 edition of the event would not have been possible without the assistance of various people and organizations. First, I would like to thank the College of Public Policy of Hamad Bin Khalifa University and its Dean Professor Leslie Pal, for supporting the conference. Professor Leslie Pal has been a key figure who has offered advice on various stages of this event. Second, I would like to thank the Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning and its staff for hosting the conference, as well as all other conference partners: the Federal University of São Paulo (Unifesp) and the Laboratory of International Public Policies (Laboppi), as well as Edward Elgar, Routledge and Palgrave Macmillan. Third, I am grateful to allthe colleagues who have worked on convening this event, the scientific committee, panel organizers, and speakers: Cecilia Osorio, Christopher Walker, Patrick Hassenteufel, Raul Pacheco-Vega, Giulia Romano, Eugene McCann, Olivier Nay, Natália Koga,

Rômulo Paes Souza, Danielle Rached, Amanda Shriwise, Camila Saraiva, Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto, Johanna Kuhlmann, Juliana Costa, Kidjie Saguin, Manuela Trindade Viana, Melissa Pomeroy, Michelle Morais de Sa e Silva, Monica Herz, Ulrike Zeigermann, Alex Moulis, Amanda Shriwise, Magdalèna Hadjiisky, David Dlolwitz. They have been invaluable partners, whose commitment to the conference during these turbulent times has been fundamental to making it happen. I would also like to thank the conference staff, and finally, all our paper and poster presenters for their trust in the conference and our work. In this book, the reader will find some of the main discussions held in the conference's panels. I wish you a pleasant read.

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São Paulo, June 2021

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PHOTO GALLERY

International Seminar on Policy Diffusion

The International Seminar on Policy Diffusion was supported by Capes and Fapesp

I International Conference on Policy Diffusion and Development Cooperation



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II International Conference on Policy Diffusion and Development Cooperation



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Introduction

From Policy Diffusion and Development Cooperation to Policies Beyond Borders

Osmany Porto de Oliveira

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the progressive intensity of globalization in the nineties opened up an unprecedented exchange of policy ideas, knowledge, and models among governments worldwide. Different research traditions in social sciences followed this empirical movement providing important explanations for these processes. The literature on the international circulation of public policies (Stone et al., 2019; Porto de Oliveira & Pimenta de Faria, 2017) informs us that these days such processes occur in many different ways (Hadjiisky, Pal, Walker, 2017), involving a plethora of agents (Pal, 2012; Stone, 2008), with diverse narratives (Cabral et al., 2013), operating in multiple arenas (Baker, Walker, 2019), with unequal power relationships (Dolowitz, Plugaru, and Saurugger 2019), within dynamics of competition and cooperation (Mawdsley, 2017), following different directions (Osorio, 2018) and geographies (Milhorance, 2018) in distinct time periods (Peck, Theodore, 2015; Wood, 2015), generating heterogeneous effects including bricolages (Stone, 2017) and translations (Hassenteufel et al. 2017). Despite this mosaic of knowledge produced and accumulated over the past few years, there are still past and present empirical settings, theoretical questions, and methodological issues that require deeper study to help us explain these phenomena with greater precision.

Among the most cutting-edge questions in the field are: How does state capacity affect policy transfers? How does the geopolitical distribution of power affect the international policy transfers and cooperation among governments? Which causal mechanisms facilitate or constrain policy diffusion

beyond coercion, learning, competition, and emulation? What are the implications of the contemporary changes in South-South cooperation on policy transfers? How can social network analysis improve our understanding of policy circulation? What is the role of digital technology and internet knowledge hubs, learning communities, and transfer platforms in the circulation of governmental and administration ideas, models, and techniques? What is the pandemic's impact on policy transfer empirics and analysis? These are some of the issues that the II International Conference on Policy Diffusion and Development Cooperation addressed in 2020 and 2021.

In this book, the reader will find part of the papers presented at the conference.[1] This introduction was written in the form of a *mémoir*e of the main topics discussed in the past three events of policy diffusion held in Brazil. The chapter is divided into four parts. In the first, the evolution of the debate throughout the events is presented. In the second, reflections on policy diffusion in the context of the global pandemic are synthesized, drawing on the webinars held during the conference. The third section outlines the new realities and constraints to policy diffusion brought by the chapters of this book. Finally, a conclusion arguing the necessity of consolidating an area of "public policy beyond borders" will be presented as one of the major results of the cycle of events on policy diffusion.

Policy diffusion and development cooperation: A Brief Evolution of the Past Events

Over the past five years, we have discussed different issues of the reality of policy diffusion in three different events. When we first started this cycle of events with the "International Seminar on Policy Diffusion" in 2016, we were concerned about the concepts and approaches to policy transfer and diffusion. It was the 20th "anniversary" of the first article published by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) outlining their policy transfer approach. These two decades allowed the rise of a significant body of research using the framework to guide their studies and critiques coming from different scholars (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012; Peck, 2011), inviting us to expand our understanding of the policies moving across borders phenomena. It was time to revisit the area and organize it better, in the face of rising cleavages among scholars discussing the same phenomena through different labels and research traditions, namely: policy transfer, diffusion, mobilities, and circulation (Porto de Oliveira and Pimenta de Faria, 2017).

In 2016 we were seeking new directions and dynamics of policy transfer. These concerns were summarized in a special issue organized by Osmany

1. For different reasons, not all of the participants intended to publish their work in the book.

Porto de Oliveira and Leslie Pal (2018) for the Brazilian Public Administration Review, in which new avenues for research were outlined, including the role of the private sector, arenas, translation, domestic coalitions, and resistances. This article also brought to attention the need to investigate more about South-South/North policy transfer. This was a particular topic of discussion during the event, with different papers presenting the Latin American experiences and, in particular, cases from Brazil where policy transfers were strictly connected to South-South cooperation. In the past years, the Brazilian strategy of development cooperation has been to offer technical assistance to the areas of the country expertise and share knowledge on the successful social policy innovations, such as *inter alia*, conditional cash transfers, food and security policies, milk banks. From the discussions at the event, it was possible to realize that policy transfer and development cooperation research communities were discussing similar issues with different analytical lenses and concepts. Development cooperation scholars were academically closer to the International Relations field, but their research objects were directly associated with policy transfer. The Seminar was also the starting point of a reflection on how Latin American countries moved from importing nations of global North ideas and models to sources of policy innovations, which were exported elsewhere. This argument was summarized afterward in the book "Latin America and Policy Diffusion: From Import to Export" (Porto de Oliveira et al., 2019). The discussions held in the 2016 meeting opened the door to the second event, where we started to bring both elements together.

The combination of policy diffusion and development cooperation helped to increase the audience of the event. At this point, an international community of policy transfer was more consolidated, with scholars from both Global South and North collaborating to bring new ideas, approaches, and empirical evidence to the discussion. The book organized by Hadjiisky, Pal, and Walker (2017), had just been released and was serving as a compass for this new generation of studies.[2] At the event held in 2018, we started problematizing some overlooked issues in the policy transfer literature. For example, in the plenaries, questions such as the power relations and geopolitics of policy transfers were brought to attention. With the inclusion of international cooperation in the discussions, the role of policy transfer as an instrument of foreign policy was also problematized (Porto de Oliveira, Milani, forthcoming; Pimenta de Faria, forthcoming). Authors associated with policy diffusion and policy mobilities approaches – respectively Jacint Jordana and Jennifer

2. The book was the result of the papers presented on the panels of the second edition of the International Conference on Public Policy, held in Milan in 2015, where some of the scholars attending the events in Brazil met for the first time.

Robinson – joined the event as main speakers. Their contribution was fundamental to bring together the different streams of research studying the international movement of public policies. The role of the Global South in policy transfers was once again an important element and took centrality in the debates.

The conference was also an opportunity to structure our reflection on this matter, building on the discussions from the previous event. A special issue organized by Policy and Society (volume 39, issue 1, 2020) called "Transnational Policy Transfer" brought these reflections, which were synthesized in the introduction (Stone et al., 2019). In this collection of articles, the role of knowledge, power, and development are highlighted by different case studies, both involving empirical settings from the Global South (i.e., microfinance, bus rapid transit, food security), as well as international organizations (i.e., OECD, FAO, and the World Bank). Additionally, the conference brought together a significant number of prominent scholars working with different traditions of research, using various concepts (translation, instrument constituencies, causal mechanisms, learning), methods (ethnography, network analysis, participant observation), in distinct sectors (participatory democracy, social security, environment, urban policy, health), with cases from both Global South and North. It was possible to organize the first Handbook of Policy Transfer, Diffusion, and Circulation with this group, which covers the most important topics of this field of research and advocates for a more pluralistic and inclusive area of studies (Porto de Oliveira, 2021).

For the 2020/2021 conference, new concerns were brought to the agenda such as the role of state capacities for policy circulation, small states in policy transfer, the use of network analysis as a methodological strategy, security issues, and policy diffusion, among others. Also, the participation of experts on Asian studies was very important to expand the regional discussions beyond Global North countries and Latin America, with a panel organized by Giulia Romano and Kidjie Saguin, who used the event to start preparing a special issue with the results of their sessions. During the conference we were able to advance on different fronts, which pushed our reflection to new elements. An important discussion was held on the need to bring together the literature of policy transfer and state capacities to understand the individual, organizational, and systemic skills required to "internationalize and internalize" policies. From the perspective of South-South cooperation, the point was also to understand the role of states and international organizations in the transfer of capacities (or actions such as capacity-building) to implement specific policies in different areas such as social and food security. Another innovative debate was brought through reflections on the

influence of "small states" (i.e., Qatar, Singapore or Sao Tome and Principe) in policy transfers.

From a methodological perspective, the discussion around the use of social network analysis flourished in a panel organized by Christopher Walker. Meanwhile, regarding concepts, the notion of translation and causal mechanisms were objects of discussions of two different panels. Patrick Hassenteufel and Ulrike Zeigermann advanced the discussions on the different ways policies are translated when they travel. Since the first event, this topic has been an object of discussion, and Patrick Hassenteufel published different material around this concept (Hassenteufel et al., 2017; Hassenteufel and Zeigermann, 2021). Johanna Kuhlmann and Amanda Shriwise, in their panel about causal mechanisms, attempted to push the discussions with participants beyond the four classical notions established by the literature: coercion, emulation, competition, and learning (Graham et al., 2013). Finally, security was the main theme of one specific panel to deal with issues related to the ways state and non-state actors address violence, insecurity, and instability. The panel called for a discussion on the role of public forces in diffusing their experiences in addressing drug and human trafficking, terrorism and gang violence, the participation of Southern countries in UN peacekeeping missions, the engagement of international institutions in the diffusion of Southern responses related to peace, security and defense and the connections between transnational technocratic networks in the domain of security and the re-positioning of the Global South in these global flows of practices.

After working for one year on the conference that would take place in 2020, a new and unexpected reality changed the course of the event, the Covid-19 pandemic. The sanitary situation compelled the organization to reflect on the impact of the global pandemic in our specific area of research. In the next section, the discussions of the webinars about Covid-19 undertaken during the event are presented.

Policy diffusion, international cooperation and the global pandemic

At the beginning of 2021, almost nobody in our network had expertise on these phenomena combined: pandemic, policy diffusion, and international cooperation. Two webinars were organized to discuss this topic during the conference. The first webinar took place in July when we were still at the beginning of the pandemic, and not many research findings were available. The second was held in September and was dedicated exclusively to the case of Brazil. The global pandemic offered a new empirical setting to observe and analyze policy diffusion and development cooperation. The whole world

witnessed situations in the antipode of globalization, such as the closing of borders and travel bans to contain the dissemination of the virus and rapid cooperation arrangements and agreements, as the South-South Galaxy,[3] sharing information about responses to the pandemic or the Covax Facility.

The first webinar was opened by a talk from Osmany Porto de Oliveira, highlighting the fact that similar policy instruments were being adopted across countries, albeit to different degrees and intensities, to fight the Covid-19 pandemic. In fact, distinct governments used strategies such as closing schools and cancellation of public events to enable social distancing or basic income measures to mitigate the economic effects and unemployment brought by the pandemic. Some of these policies were advocated by international organizations, while others followed a convergence movement among countries. In fact, in the early months of the pandemic, when little was known about the Covid-19 sanitary, economic, and social effects, governments were looking to their peers elsewhere to understand policy responses that could work. In this context, it was possible to observe the use of similar measures being translated to each context. Cash transfers is one example of a policy adopted by different states. However, the amount of money given by the government and the public that could benefit from such policies during the pandemic was different in Brazil, Canada, and Italy, yet all countries were using basic income to fight against the social and economic effects of the pandemic. Besides policy translation, it was also possible to observe the rapid rise of global public policies (Moloney and Stone, 2019). For example, the attempt of the WHO to orchestrate domestic responses and provide detailed information on the pandemic situation for each country. Unesco was engaged in coordinating the area of education, while other UN specialized agencies worked in a similar direction in their own sectors.

From a different perspective, Leslie Pal argued in his presentation during the webinar that the pandemic raised a paradox for policy diffusion. In an age where we have so much information about the state of public policy and policy responses around the world, the level of coordination and policy diffusion to respond to the pandemic is relatively low. In other words, there is a surplus of information on policy responses and a deficit of information of actual diffusion and borrowing. As examples of such surplus, he mentioned information trackers for Covid-19 such as the database organized by the WHO and the Coronavirus Resource Center developed by the John Hopkins University. He also mentioned the use of policy trackers, which are tools often used by international organizations to monitor political or policy phenomena in a

3. https://www.southsouth-galaxy.org/response-to-coronavirus, retrieved on June 15, 2021.

particular area, such as the "Tracking Coronavirus" of the OECD. In parallel with such data gathering, we witnessed different forms of domestic protectionist measures or "Corona nationalism", where governments tried to uncouple themselves from the global policy coordination system.

Olivier Nay, in turn, insisted on the need to reform the WHO due to the perception of the inefficient way the organization addressed the Covid-19 pandemic. He mentioned that this crisis revealed the challenges of multilateralism, in particular the difficulty of the UN system responses to a collective risk. One of the main arguments he defended is that many of the WHO challenges result from a lack of political support and engagement, which weaken the organization's authority and legitimacy. In other words, it cannot work effectively without the cooperation of states, and it has no coercive power. Olivier Nay mentioned that the pandemic revealed different problems of the WHO, such as the lack of leadership, weak financial resources, dependency on donors, delays in allocating funds, the bureaucracy in managing programs, low responsiveness in front of emergencies, and political rivalries in terms of discussions that should be scientific. He also stressed the lack of capacity to embark all countries in a coordinated response. From a normative perspective, he addressed six governance reform proposals: 1. reinforcing the international sanitary regulation; 2. reduce the financial dependency from volunteer contributors; 3. decompartmentalize the organization and restore the authority of the General Director; 4. create a hybrid intergovernmental entity such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; 5. Give an important place to non-governmental actors in the governance of the WHO; 6. Establish health security governance linking global health and the environment. These suggestions were proposed for improving the global health governance, serving the interest of the countries and the health of the global population.

A few months into the pandemic, countries had different performances fighting against Covid-19. As the conference was supposed to take place in Brazil, a webinar was organized to discuss the country's performance in the pandemic. Brazil became an emblematic case of fighting Covid-19, insofar as the number of infections and deaths being among the highest in the world, considered to have one of the worse public health management to fight the pandemic.[4] Different Brazilian experts were invited to discuss Brazil's responses to face the pandemic. Natalia Koga, in particular, brought the importance of taking evidence-based public policies in fighting Covid-19 more seriously. She

4. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/scienceandhealth/2021/01/brazil-is-the-worst-country-in-managing-the-pandemic-according-to-analysis-by-98-governments.shtml, Retrieved on June 22, 2021.

raised different questions toward the Brazilian government, such as if it was prepared to use evidence-based knowledge. She also mentioned the importance of acknowledging that evidence-based policies can be used for different purposes (e.g., instrumental, symbolic, conceptual).

Meanwhile, Rômulo Paes Souza stressed that Brazil's performance was very disappointing. He insisted that despite the country's solid universal health system, primary healthcare services implemented all over the country, very prestigious health programs (e.g., vaccination and HIV/AIDs), and considerable healthcare expenditure, its performance was bad. He mentioned that the country also had problems, such as high heterogeneity in public health capacity, high social-economic inequality, and reductions in health expenditure. He criticized the governmental measures highlighting five main points: 1. the lack of coordinated actions; 2. Slow responses to quarantine needs; 3. Confusing communication; 4. Controversies around lifting cruise bans; 5. Disagreement regarding the priority population to be tested and voluntary isolation. There was a lack of a common approach to fight Covid-19. Finally, Danielle Rached argued that the main responsibility was of the federal government, with the particular figure of the President, who politicized the response to the pandemic. She shared three examples of responses to Covid-19 in a context of lack of federal coordination and leadership. The first, the Northeast Consortium, a subnational initiative assembling 9 governors of the Northeast region in Brazil, which undertook different measures to fight Covid-19, such as procuring respirators, contacting the Chinese embassy to request hospitals supplies, and creating a scientific committee (a group of experts to advise and monitor Covid-19 in the region). The second example mentioned was how the WHO recommendations were used to legitimize and support judiciary decisions in Brazil, such as the case of the lockdown decree of the metropolitan area of São Luiz in the state of Maranhão. She concluded with an example of the case of Paraisópolis, a large informal settlement in São Paulo city, where the inhabitants, facing the void of public policies, created their own community plan to fight Covid-19 following the scientific recommendations of the WHO.

The discussions at the conference around the pandemic raised new insights and questions about policy diffusion and international cooperation. As Cecilia Osorio mentioned during the first of the webinars, the pandemic offered a particular circumstance for us to observe policy diffusion, in which such phenomenon was not occurring in its "normal" conditions. While looking at policy diffusion under the conditions of a crisis, such as the pandemic, we understood that cross-national policy learning and transfer were operating to different degrees. Nevertheless, considering the international structure

for global coordination, policy transfer and transnational cooperation should have been more intense than expected. Multilateralism and global public policymaking showed the limits, insofar as international organizations could not exert a coercive power to provide a global response to the crisis, also lacking the adhesion of different countries to suggested protocols. The discussions around Covid-19 did not rely on extended research, but instead, they were prepared mainly by the experts' observations of the ongoing global situation. If we did not provide solid explanations for the crisis, the content of our debates certainly offered valuable suggestions for future research on the impact of Covid-19 on policy diffusion and development cooperation. In the next section, the synthesis of the chapters of the book is presented.

New realities and new constraints

This section presents a summary of the book's content. This volume brings together some of the papers presented by the authors from different parts of the world who participated in the conference. Different facets of policy diffusion and development cooperation are brought to analysis in the 12 chapters of the book. The researches prepared by the authors are a snapshot of some of the new realities, and new constraints of the area. The idea related to the capacity to transfer policies is discussed in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 from different perspectives. Aray Ilyassova-Schoenfeld explores the roles of individuals, instruments, and ideas in the transfer of the Bologna Process initiative in Kazakhstan. Lionel Arnaud *et al*., using the notion of programmatic actors, focus on the capacity of social movements to transfer cultural rights in different contexts, comparing Brazil, South Africa, and France. Finally, Natalia Dus Poiatti investigates how the European Central Bank's announcements have impacted the accumulation of debt in the peripheral European countries, discussing the capacity of states to implement austere fiscal policies.

In Chapter 4, Lara Gautier provides a conceptual review of the notions of transfer agents and proposes the concept of diffusion entrepreneurs, which can refer to individuals, networks, and organizations, advocating for the diffusion policy models. In Chapter 5, Allegretti *et al*. discuss the topic of the platform economy, such as Uber and Airbnb, in Lisbon during the pandemic. They argue that local authorities and their transnational networks played a significant role in the debate around the platform economy in Portugal. Policy diffusion and international cooperation in the area of security studies is addressed in two chapters. Thales Carvalho presents a case study of the South American Defense Council in Chapter 6. The author considers this organization a facilitator of policy diffusion processes, fostering interactions and circulating information among members. In Chapter 7, using a single country study,

João Fernando Finazzi disentangles the multitude of agents participating in the Minustah operation in Haiti, looking in particular at the involvement of southern security actors in such multilateral security cooperation.

Development cooperation is the subject of different chapters. Using a methodological strategy, which includes Qualitative Comparative Analysis techniques, in Chapter 8, David Beltrão presents an overview of the Brazilian cooperation with Africa. The author attempts to explain the increasing speed by the African states to demand cooperation projects from Brazil and the factors that can influence a country to engage in a cooperation project with the country. From a different perspective, Kelly Cristine Oliveira Meira's study presented in Chapter 9, discusses cooperation and development in the regional integration process Southern African Development Community. Focusing on the impact of digital platforms in South-South Cooperation (SSC), Marianna Rios Franco highlights the dimension of knowledge diffusion and translation in Chapter 10 about the Brazilian Learning Initiative for a World Without Poverty. Finally, in Chapter 11, Patrícia Nogueira Rinaldi analyzes the role of the UN as an agent of mainstreaming SSC, providing a historical account of the organization's engagement with this topic and the rise of Southern powers. In the next section, a brief discussion about the need to consolidate a broader area of studies considering the transnational dimension of public policies is presented.

Conclusion: Moving toward the Policy Beyond Borders studies area

Public policies become even more complex when they move beyond borders. The discussions in the past years were important to consolidate concepts and methodological strategies, point to new research directions, and systematize the knowledge produced so far involving policy transfer and development cooperation. It also allowed us to build a community sharing similar research concerns about how policies move transnationally and the dynamics of collaboration and conflict among agents. This community acknowledges that the domestic and international realms are often intrinsically intertwined in what currently regards public policies. Thus, instruments are being internationalized – from the subnational and national levels – and models from abroad are used in domestic policy responses. Examples of the movements of policy internationalization are the diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfers, Participatory Budgeting, or Bus Rapid Transit solutions from Latin America (see: Ardila, 2020; Morais de Sá e Silva, 2017; Porto de Oliveira, 2017). Policy internationalization is also an instrument of foreign policy when for example, states want to create a domestic "brand" of being recognized for their success

in a certain area. Sectoral diplomacy (e.g., health, social, scientific, or food security diplomacy) frequently involves policy internationalization. Regarding internalization, it is possible to look to the Sustainable Development Goals, defended by the United Nations, or the New Public Management ideas, advocated by the OECD. There are different forms of cooperation among a wide variety of agents (governmental, non-governmental, private, etc.) to enable these processes, which can be formalized or simply informal.

However, the movement of policies across borders is not limited to policy diffusion and development cooperation. It brings together other areas of study that go beyond these. It is possible to consider, for example, the range of policies produced abroad, which influence the domestic level, studied under the literature of global and international public policies. The latter refers to actions undertaken (often but not exclusively) by states and international organizations, toward other specific countries, such as peacekeeping operations, for example, or the World Bank actions related to state reforms in specific countries (see Petiteville and Smith, 2006). Global public policy is often related to actions designed to affect a broader public worldwide (see Coleman, 2012; Stone and Moloney, 2019). Studies on foreign policy (Apodaca, 2017), international organizations (Dolowitz et al., 2020; Woods, 2006), regional integration (Radaelli, 2008; Saurugger and Surel, 2006), and global governance (Bull and McNeill, 2007; Deacon, 2007), in general, can also include the analysis of policies and politics beyond state borders. Each one of these niches of study often works with specific research questions, concepts, and methodological strategies, without necessarily dialoguing with each other.

After five years of convening to discuss how policies move across borders, it was possible to observe a significant number of heterogeneous cases, highlighting different features of policy diffusion and development cooperation. One of the key elements we drew from this learning process is that it is important to recognize the need to improve and consolidate an even broader discussion space, bringing together public policy and international relations studies to grasp the transnational dimension of public policies. Therefore, expanding the network and including other literature to discuss and improve our common treatment of the issues, the formation of shared concepts, the development of methodological strategies, and the production of theories for analyzing "**policies beyond borders**" is imperative. Furthermore, this is the future challenge this community has to prepare for in order to understand the current global transformations better and explain the future realities and constraints in a post-pandemic world.

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CHAPTER 1

Capacity to Policy Transfer in Kazakhstan: The Roles of Individuals, Instruments and Ideas

Aray Ilyassova-Schoenfeld

Introduction

This paper focuses on the roles of individuals, instruments and ideas in the context of educational reforms in Kazakhstan. It considers the actors involved in the policy transfer process at different levels. Taking an actor-centred perspective is not in itself a novel idea (Dolowitz & Medearis 2009; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Scharpf, 1997; Wolman, 1992), however it is adopted here in connection with the policy transfer framework to explore how actors' abilities, knowledge, skills and interactions shape policy choices. The reason for focusing on the role of actors is that policy choices tend to be established through interaction among actors by applying individual skills and competences directly or indirectly to impact on the policy transfer process (Dolowitz, 2020).

This paper takes the example higher education reforms in Kazakhstan. The country signed the Bologna Declaration in 2010 and became the only Central Asian member country. The Bologna Process (BP) is an initiative of European countries. It aims to harmonize the higher education systems of its member countries in order to ensure international competitiveness and greater mobility within the European Higher Education Area (EHEA).

Kazakhstan is a post-communist country that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Being a former part of the USSR, it has a different organisational/state structure, norms, and culture in terms of engagement its actors at the local level compared to the Western Europe. The Soviet era has had a significant influence on the development of the Kazakhstani policy system in which the role of individuals is key. The Soviet legacy of the country affects

decision-makers to this day. The Soviet regime, which maintains an influence decade on, was characterised by a centralised administration, a top-down system, a communist ideology, as well as the practice of repression and exile.

There have, to date, been no empirical studies published on policy learning and policy transfer practices in Kazakhstan. The aims of this paper are to identify actors involved in the policy transfer process at different levels; to explore the role of individuals, instruments and ideas in policy transfer and to apply empirical data from an intrinsic case study. This paper consists of two parts. The first part comprises a literature review on policy transfer and policy/state capacity, including its forms and tools. The second part is based on empirical qualitative data from the case study.

Theoretical framework and methodology

The policy transfer framework helps to analyse the roles of individuals, instruments and ideas by using the case of Kazakhstan. The study focuses on the role of actors and how individuals perceive policy transfer. It attempts to illustrate individual interactions and how these affect the policy transfer. Furthermore, it looks at where ideas come from, via what instruments and who supports them. Here, not only is the literature on policy transfer used, but material on policy learning, policy diffusion and policy capacity are referred to covering different instruments of policy transfer in the process such as the multi-level and the ideational (Evans, 2004;2009; 2010).

The multi-level analytical tool of policy transfer helps to answer the research questions at different levels: macro, meso and micro (Evans, 2004; 2009). Applying this approach helps the researcher to focus on and discuss the challenges and problems faced at the European, national and institutional levels. The ideational approach focuses on the influence of external pressures on the transfer of knowledge by identifying actors at different levels. It addresses the problem of when and how politicians learn. The key feature of this approach is the exploration of how a system of ideas (instruments) influences policy makers. The approach refers to 'soft' forms of transfer, particularly the transfer of knowledge.

Empirical data were collected through semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Both the interview and documentary data were thematically analysed to understand the role of individuals at the European, national and institutional levels. In order to identify the individuals involved in the policy transfer process, the interview sample attempted to cover actors from two levels: international and domestic. The international level included members of the Bologna Follow Up Group and international experts of the BP or in higher education who have an interest in Central Asia. The domestic level

included state officials, university representatives such as faculty members, administration staff and students. In order to examine and understand the principles, structures and procedures of the BP, international experts of the BP were included in the preliminary sampling. The main limitation of this study is that it uses only a single case to examine policy transfer capacity and the role of individuals in the BP context.

An 'Umbrella' term

The broad notion of policy transfer covers various concepts and terms such as policy learning, policy diffusion, and policy/state capacity, each of which explore the role of individuals from different perspectives. For example, international policy transfer occurs when politicians or policy-makers update or revise their beliefs as to what works in their own country based on other countries' experiences. Transnational policy transfer occurs globally among policy ambassadors, policy networks and international organisations (Stone et al, 2020). Meanwhile, policy diffusion occurs when (technical) information on efficient policies is diffused among elites, politicians, and policy makers.

Epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions and other policy networks also play roles in the policy transfer process (Dolowitz, 2000b, p.22). There is some debate as to what constitutes epistemic communities. Stone (1999, 2000) identified the key role of think tanks and international organisations within epistemic communities. Epistemic communities refer to "social and natural scientists and individuals from different disciplines with authoritative claims to policy relevant knowledge that reside in national, transnational and international organisations" (Evans, 2004, p.18; 2009, p.252). In other words, they are groups of people belonging to different fields of science, but who hold a common interest in politics and policy questions. A study by Haas (1992) with respect to the importance of 'epistemic communities', can be applied as a mechanism of understanding the movement of ideas in the international arena. Rose argues that learning happens via transnational epistemic communities, for example the OECD (1993, pp.68-69). The main mission of epistemic communities is to help in understanding the emergence of policy learning.

Policy learning focuses on where ideas come from via what instruments and who supports them. Dobbin et al. argued that learning occurs directly and vicariously (2007, p.460). Indeed, there are different levels of learning. For example, when actors learn how to achieve a certain goal in a more efficient way, this is known as the tactical level. When they actually learn what specific goals they should pursue, this is known as the deeper level (Levy 1994, p. 286). Policy learning is more efficient when policy-makers not only

adapt policies from elsewhere, but change their own beliefs about cause and effect (Elkins & Simmons 2005).

The policy learning approach broadly adopted by many post-Soviet countries has entailed learning from other countries and identifying 'best' policies in the course of doing so. To identify the 'best' policies, developing countries often partake in alliances or international organisations (join-a-club). As Levy (1994, pp. 287–89) stated, policy change is often a process of "encoding individually learned inferences from experience into organizational routines." Of course, we know that organisations cannot learn; only individuals can. Therefore, the role of individuals is pivotal.

The literature on policy/state capacity has focused on individuals' competences and capabilities. In particular, some authors placed an emphasis "on the ability of individuals working in public policy organizations to produce sound analysis to inform their policy-making activities" (Parrado, 2014; Dobuzinskis, Howlett, & Laycock, 2007, 4–5; Howlett 2015). The term 'policy analytical capacity' (Howlett, 2015) describes the ability of individuals in a policy-relevant organisation to produce valuable policy-relevant research and analysis on topics either assigned to them or of their own choosing (Howlett, 2009). Some of the scholarly work in this area has focused on the importance of the individual skills or competences of analysts (Colebatch, 2006a, 2006b; Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2011). The skills and capabilities of individuals are important, because these affect the overall governmental capacity, as well as its ability to anticipate future policy impacts and to react to them in a timely fashion (O'Connor, Goran, & Vickers-Willis, 2007; Preskill & Boyle, 2008). For example, Howlett (2015) argued that these factors impact upon how much research a government can undertake, as well as its proficiency with regard to statistics and handling data. He added that this would ultimately restrict or enhance a government's capacity to follow the prevalent public view on certain issues. In addition, the abilities of policy-makers are crucial when it comes to relaying policy-relevant information to concerned persons and groups, and enabling a government to be well-informed in the course of making decisions (Howlett, 2009; 2015, p. 174; Tiernan, 2011).

When we talk about capacity with respect to policy transfer, there are two types of knowledge to consider. Parsons (2004) classified knowledge that helps to steer, command and control as instrumental (top-down), while knowledge picked up through practice and experience (bottom-up) was also beneficial. Specifically, the latter is more advantageous when seeking to innovate through imagination, intuition, and experience (Parsons, 2004, p.55). Policy officials learn selectively from the experience of other actors (Gilardi, 2010). The exporting of lessons occurs at an informal level between non-state

actors (e.g. think tanks, academics, consultancy companies) and through informal networks of official actors (e.g. international organisations). The borrowing of lessons or knowledge likely occurs indirectly through seminars, conferences or forums, when countries send their representatives and delegations abroad (Stone, 1999).

Instruments and ideas (knowledge) might change from one country to another regarding the interests of different actors. If the role of the state individuals such as the President's Office, the Prime-Ministry Office and state officials of different ministries is more political, then it is worthwhile to explore the importance of the role of non-state actors in the process of policy transfer including transnational actors (Stone et al, 2020). Non-state actors include interest groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks (Stone, 2000, Ettelt et al., 2012), consultancy firms, research institutes (Ladi, 2005), university centres, law firms, banks, scientific associations, professional societies and training institutes (Stone, 2004, pp.550, 556). The former World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz said that "in developing countries, think tanks have proliferated and have become important actors to introduce and adapt new policy initiatives" (2000, taken from Stone, 2004, p.556). This scenario arose when the Soviet Union collapsed and post-Soviet states moved towards market economies. International advisers and experts proposed "immediate consultations on democratic transition" to post-communist countries (Savi & Randma-Liiv, 2013, p.69). Many developing and transition countries have consulted with think tanks from which they have imported Western ideas.

Policy transfer in Kazakhstan- Why?

The period after the collapse of the Soviet Union was characterised by extreme social disorder and economic instability. All these changes drove policymakers to engage in policy transfer to cope with external pressures. In order to cope with external pressures such as globalisation and international integration, Kazakhstan embarked on an arduous and complicated process to situate itself politically, socially and culturally with the West. The country was unrecognised in the western democracies. The recognisability of Kazakhstan increased in the international arena mainly because of its active involvement in international affairs. For example, in 2010 the Head of the State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a proposal for Kazakhstan's Chairmanship of the OSCE that helped to create a positive image of the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a significant role in developing the state programme 'Path to Europe' that influenced the decision to integrate with Europe. Since gaining its independence, Kazakhstan conducted a so-called 'multi-vector'

international policy. In the country's strategic documents, Kazakhstan envisios being among the top 30 global economies by 2050 (Akorda, 2012).

During the 1990s, problems arose in the country regarding the lack of industrial production caused by the breakdown of the command economy, which fuelled the need to train and retrain highly qualified labour. This need for training pushed higher education onto the political agenda. The country was especially interested in wholesome changes to the educational system in order to (1) modernise its educational training of specialists and researchers; (2) to increase the quality and competitiveness of higher education, and (3) to enhance the recognition of local research and faculty abroad. In order to prepare highly qualifies employees, it was necessary to train them in Western countries. For this purpose, it was required to look at the educational systems of developed countries, such as those in the United States and Western Europe.

The Bologna Process (BP) – 'knowledge agent'

The BP has clear and understandable goals, which were initially set to be achieved by 2010. The requisite administrative instruments of the BP include, (a) the Diploma Supplement veryfying that degrees are readable and comparable, (b) the adoption of the three-cycle system, (c) the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS), (d) the National Qualifications Framework (NQF), and (e) European cooperation in quality assurance through independent professional associations. These measures, along with governments' active involvement in related areas, facilitate and promote flexible curriculum design, mobility, and lifelong learning.

In order to enter the EHEA, Kazakhstan held a number of international seminars concerned with the issues surrounding Kazakhstan joining the BP. The main topic of discussion within such seminars was Kazakhstan's adoption of the ECTS. The ECTS is a component of the BP, which standardises grading systems in order to facilitate student mobility. This credit system began being implemented in 2003-2004. The pilot introduction of the credit system was determined by the Ministry of Education and Science (MES).

In 2008, there was an international forum in Kazakhstan dedicated to the principles of the Bologna Declaration. On February 5, 2009 in Almaty the final preparation forum was held before Kazakhstan formally joined the BP (Ministry of Education, 2009b). In 2008-2009 there was a period of reflection and analysis on how universities in Kazakhstan could enter the process in a painless manner.

The Bologna reforms in the educational system in Kazakhstan have occurred within a new structure and curriculum, with new types of educational

institutions and new principles of governing the management and financing of the education system. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan did not merely imitate the BP, instead there were various translations and adaptations during the process (Ilyassova-Schoenfeld, 2019). Take, for example, its complex national credit system, which is a mixture of ECTS and US Credit Hours. And, yet not all universities follow the same system, and rather use some translation mechanisms making ECTS as the reference point. The main reason for this are confusion, lack of understanding, and path-dependence. Furthermore, there remain a large number of mandatory socio-political courses at the graduate level and very little flexibility for cross-program registration, quite the opposite of what the credit system supposed to achieve.

The BP has no mechanism that requires strict compliance with rules or laws. In post-communist countries, the BP was perceived differently. By inertia, according to the post-Soviet countries if there is a process where officials are involved (i.e. ministers), the process is understood as a command.

European level

In December 2006, the European Council decided to formulate an EU Political Strategy for Central Asia (CA) in order to enhance its position within the CA region. The strategy for a new partnership demonstrated the EU's intention (Sadykova, 2012). It was adopted in June 2007 under the German EU Presidency. According to Wegener, a member of the German Parliament:

> *"The EU is pleased to get closer to the door of Central Asia, because Central Asia is close to our home [Europe]. It borders with Europe, and feels part of Europe. In addition, all five Central Asian countries are members of the OSCE. Hence our interest is to ensure that Central Asia is a peaceful and stable region" (Wegener, 2007 taken from Gubaidullina, 2010).*

In 2009, the European Commission decided to increase its funding of educational programmes such as Erasmus Mundus and Tempus from €5 million per year to €10 million for 2010 (Syzdykov, 2010; European Commission, n.d.(c)). Such programmes encourage universities within the EU and partner countries to engage in structured cooperation by establishing consortia between businesses, ministries, non-government organisations, and other organisations working in higher education. Tempus was established in 1990 (Dixon & Soltys, 2013). By 2013, it covered 27 countries from Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, Central Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. It also supports the reformation of higher education by funding two types of

actions. The first type is defined as "joint projects that develop new curriculum, teaching methods and enhance quality assurance and management of HEIs", whereas the second type is classed as "structural measures that reform HEIs and develop systems in partner countries by enhancing their quality and increasing their convergence with EU developments" (Dixon & Soltys, 2013). This was how policy learning or 'knowledge transfer' happened in Kazakhstan, through a variety of European educational programmes (Evans, 2009; Evans & Barakat, 2012).

National level

Integration into the European educational space was the Kazakhstani government's aim. The idea to adopt the BP was prepared and presented by professionals and experts who were invited to Kazakhstan by the MES. State bodies and analytical centres did analysis about the effects of the various reforms that were undertaken. The final decision was made by the Kazakhstani government and by the MES, along with the support and instruction of the President. Ultimately, the country selected a European path for its educational future.

In December 2012, during the annual address to the people, the President announced a new political strategy of the country until 2050. As outlined in "Kazakhstan's way-2050," the country's main goal is to become among the 30 most-developed countries in the world (Akorda, 2012b). One of the members of the BP Centre views this as a motivation to improve the education sector. She said:

> *"According to the message 'Kazakhstan 2050' of the President, one of the criteria for entrance among the 30 most competitive countries is to improve the efficiency of higher education sector. That was motivation for us … our [Kazakhstani] education should be competitive, we [started to] conduct our national ranking of universities. Universities are actively involved in ratings, such as TIMES, QS and Shanghai" (Int. 6).*

Given its non-European history and culture, Kazakhstan faced certain barriers prior to ultimately signing the Bologna Declaration. Firstly, the country had to ratify the European Cultural Convention (1954), and only after that could Kazakhstan apply for entry into the BP. The process of signing the European Cultural Convention (ECC) and ultimately the Bologna Declaration was complicated because Kazakhstan was not the legal successor to the USSR. In order to sign the Declaration, Kazakhstan sought documents that

confirmed its right to enter and become a member of the BP. It was a long, political process for Kazakhstan, and the signing of the ECC was a complicated issue. Accordingly, much needed to be done as the Convention, which was a public law treaty, fell outside the scope of the MES's authority. The Ministry of Culture did not have any interest in the BP or, consequently, in the Convention. It took a long time to pursue other official bodies about the need to sign the ECC (1954).

In any case, the country started to implement the BP principles before the official joining. It has partially implemented its principles with the state support. It used its oil revenues to restructure the inherited Soviet educational system for reforming its higher education. A substantial amount of investment in Kazakhstan has gone into the development of human capital, and the country has allocated significant funds to staff and student mobility. An example of this is the Bolashak programme, which has led to much outward mobility. However, there has been very little inward mobility into the country. It demonstrates that political support is vital in the policy transfer process.

Kazakhstan adopted the qualifications frameworks in 2012. The National European Qualifications Framework (NEQF) describes the qualification levels corresponding to the level of education. According to a local expert, the meaning of the document is essential for the requirements of the educational service and labour market (Int.4). The connection between the NEQF and the labour market can be illustrated by how Kazakhstan's government proposed changes to the Labour Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is the basic regulatory act that determines the relations between employer and employee. The process of making the national framework of qualifications compatible with the NEQF took time, especially when it came to developing and improving the national legislation. Therefore, Kazakhstan did not have a document stipulating the national framework of qualifications before 2012, which is one of the indicators in monitoring the implementation of the BP (Int.7). Only in 2012 was the national framework of qualifications formally approved by both the Ministers of Education and Labour (Int.4; 9). One former civil servant claimed:

> *"Two ministers of education and labour signed this document together, because that's really related to the educational services market and the labour market. This balance should be implemented through the qualifications framework. If you look, you see this framework, it is a simple document, but this simple instrument costs a lot …. This one proposal has radically changed the demands in the labour market; … it is the catalyst for the development of Kazakhstan's economy, the*

development of labour relations, etcetera. Therefore, education always takes over this heavy burden…. Sometimes education dictates some requirements on the labour market" (Int.4).

At the national level, the importance of the BP for Kazakhstan is evidenced by the establishment of the BP and Academic Mobility Centre in Nur-Sultan (formerly Astana). The main mission of the Centre are: to promote the BP principles in Kazakhstan; to analyse all data provided from all HEIs in the country; and to provide workshops and seminars with the aim of informing HEIs about the BP and its principles. Due to the absence of a single national database being kept by the Centre and the relevant ministry, the country has not always been able to present results to the BFUG or working groups.

Kazakhstan has been included in all working groups of the BP and its representatives can take part in all group meetings. However, in practice, Kazakhstan's representatives have not attended all of the meetings. The representatives have decided to attend only the meetings in which the delegation had an interest. This lack of participation in all meetings restricts the appropriate implementation of the BP and has lead to the problem of misinterpretation at the national and institutional levels.

Academic freedom and autonomy remain questionable despite some legislative efforts. The State Programme for Education Development 2011-2020 (2010) states that autonomy would be granted to national research universities from 2015, to national higher education institutions from 2016, and to other higher educational organizations from 2018. Despite according autonomy on paper to universities, the role of MES remains central in higher education including on matters like calculating credits, programme design and approval, and quality assurance, as highlighted by many of our interviewees and noted by the European Association for Quality Assurance (ENQA 2017) and OECD (2017).

The underlying values of the BP or any other high quality education system include freedom and autonomy, critical thinking, and linking research and teaching. The findings indicate that Kazakhstani policy makers and academics alike did not fully comprehend the BP in this respect. They believed that the BP was only about the three-level degree system, diploma supplement, and implementation of the ECTS. Once implemented, they believed, it would automatically provide their students a ticket to Europe for study and work. Kazakhstan implemented these measures through legislation as part of a bureaucratic top-down approach, with the required political will and leadership.

The role of individuals

The influence of individuals has been crucial within the policy transfer process in Kazakhstan. Personal relations have played a key role in most cases. The reforms inherent in the BP, throughout all policy stages, also depend on the role of the individual. One international expert expressed his understanding of the reforms as follows:

> *"It was Minister Tyumebayev. As you know, policies in Kazakhstan very much depend on individuals, so, if it wouldn't have been for Tyumebayev, but for another minister a different decision would have been taken" (Int.38).*

The policy-making process with respect to educational reforms was centralised. One international expert took as an example the development of the education system in general (Int.38). He said:

> *"… now this Bologna Process Center has been created, there was a real slow-down of the whole initiative. Minister Zhumagulov left, and the new minister is less interested in Europe but is choosing more to look towards the United States because of his background there. … in the beginning, policies are not necessarily institutionalised, but to a large extent depend on the individual people in charge, and that creates problems for the sustainability of such a process, which is taking a long time – much longer than the mandates of the ministers" (Int. 38).*

Institutional level

The process of deciding whether to enter into the BP was not only driven by state officials working in the education system, but was also by the needs of Kazakhstani universities in particular to change the system in order to join the BP. The universities increasingly began to face the following questions: how was the Kazakhstani programme compatible with those in the rest of the world?; how could the academic mobility be developed?; and how could the Kazakhstani educational programmes be comparable with foreign programmes in terms of content, structure, assessment system and mathods? All of these questions were crucial to the process through which Kazakhstan's universities became actively engaged in developing partnerships and cooperation with other universities across the world. A state official mentioned that, since independence, the MES had cooperated with universities in more than 124 countries, including in regional integration processes (Int.4).

The role of state and government, as well as the initiative of the HEIs in signing the Magna Charta, were crucial. The government officials in Kazakhstan treated the Magna Charta as a facilitating administrative step towards the BP and an issue of international prestige, as the Minister of Education proclaimed during the 2010 Ministerial meeting. A large number of Kazakhstani universities had started signing the Magna Charta on encouragement from the MES, according to many local educationists and an MES official. Currently, more than half of all Kazakhstani universities are signatories.

The bottom-up initiatives were launched, where universities persuaded the MES to adopt decisions at the national level. Thus, this research argues that national and institutional levels were equally involved in the decision-making process in Kazakhstan. There were various actors who played crucial roles at both levels.

Kazakhstan signed the Bologna Declaration in 2010 but in practice, some HEIs in Kazakhstan had already implemented the BP principles as early as 2004. The country had all conditions to be a member and join this process not as a de facto member, but as a de jure member.

The decision to join the BP pushed the universities of Kazakhstan to progress and develop. However, not all universities had a clear understanding of how the signing of the BP would influence the development of education. In an attempt to achieve national and international recognition, Kazakhstani HEIs are trying to move from being primarily teaching oriented institutions to instead focus on research. Changes, including to the design of the curriculum and the academic calendar and student grading procedures, have been implemented. One of the results arising from these changes was that "the university faculty was expected to move from the teacher-oriented to student-centered instruction towards a greater emphasis on research" (Anon, 2009, as cited in Shaw et al., 2011). As a result, while Kazakhstani HEIs previously had a teaching-oriented culture, faculties are now coming under considerable pressure to conduct research (Shaw et al., 2011).

Conclusion

Primary data show that different actors contribute to policy transfer. The process of exchange and sharing between actors affects the nature of the transfer process and determines the success or failure of a policy or programme. This research argues that the policy transfer process in higher education occurs through learning that involves actors, instruments and ideas. For example, one of the functions of the BP is the exchange of knowledge and ideas among signatory-countries. Countries are willing to help each other by sharing ideas, experience, knowledge and information. It shows a capacity to policy transfer of each country.

This study argues that actors at the national and institutional levels were equally involved in the process of transfer in Kazakhstan. From an outside perspective, it seemed that all reforms in Kazakhstan have been top-down. This research shows that this has not always been the case. Bottom-up initiatives have been launched where universities have persuaded the MES to adopt decisions at the national level. The universities pushed the Ministry to join the BP. Thus, the initiative was driven bottom-up, which shows that the decision-making processes in post-communist countries are not always top-down. The role of elites or individuals is crucial at the national level in the decision-making process but limited when it comes to knowledge transfer among levels. The research shows that there has been misunderstanding about the implementation process of the Bologna principles occurs at different levels. For example, the decisions made at the European level are not necessarily well-understood at the institutional level and national level. Incorrect implementation mainly happens due to a lack of information and/or a lack of access to information. Policy-relevant bodies usually use SWOT analysis or employ unsystematic surveys or studies, anecdotal case-studies and interview research when it comes to satisfying the demand for policy advice from decision-makers. Kazakhstan faces problems that need to be solved along the way.

Some experts claim that member-countries take only the elements of the BP that they want or like. This presents problems since the BP is itself a system or structure based on joint elements. National governments claim that certain instructions have to be followed because they were set at the European level. The BP did face problems at the institutional level. The academic community in Kazakhstan attempted to implement a new model with new terms and titles, but there was little change in content to the academic programme, teaching style, or methods of conducting research. In practice, academics have worked in the old style due to their Soviet background. The institutional culture based on the Soviet system restricts the full implementation of a Western education system. The affects of the adoption of the BP on institutional culture and academics in a post-communist country could be a worthy subject for further research.

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CHAPTER 2

The dissemination and implementation of cultural rights worldwide: from "insurrectional actors" to "programmatic actors"? A comparison of Brazilian, French and South African cases

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Cultural rights are clearly and specifically defined in different international human rights treaties. However, the interpretation of these rights is still subject to much debate[1]. In fact, the work of "translating" cultural rights can only be an unfinished business because it is constantly necessary to integrate into reflections on the historical context, the transformations of the world and the societies that compose it. In this field, the priorities are not equivalent from one country or region of the world to another, and from one period to another. Thus, when an indigenous people are threatened, a language endangered, a heritage destroyed, an artist or author imprisoned, tortured or executed, the urgency of these problems is not the same. Moreover, cultural rights are approached in very different ways in different countries and institutions: they can contribute to the principle of cultural democratization (access to culture for all); they can contribute to the recognition of the multicultural fact and to the promotion of cultural diversity and the equal legitimacy of all

1. In particular, the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity reaffirms cultural rights as an enabling framework for cultural diversity, while the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted in 2005, confirms this idea. These official texts commit 133 UNESCO Member States, including Brazil, France and South Africa, to respect the Convention as of 2014 (148 States today). In a text adopted in 2007 under the name "Fribourg Declaration", a group of philosophers and cultural activists also sought to define cultural rights more precisely.

cultures; and/or promote the expressive and cultural practices of citizens. This diversity of interpretations reflects the difficulties encountered by social science researchers in delineating "the cultural", as the characteristics of "culture" are subject to debate and contestation, and do not adhere to the usual coordinates of social life - as framed by the private, social, political or economic spheres. Indeed, while "culture" can be seen as a "domain" of social life and public policy, it permeates (and therefore faces the demands of) all other domains. Beyond this, it is the real application of cultural rights that must be questioned insofar as the actors do not necessarily put social justice at the heart of their projects but rather "social cohesion", evading the question of power structures and the causes of exclusion[2].

The hypothesis that guides this communication is that the recognition of cultural rights questions more broadly the project of "cultural democratization" which has led Nation-States to reformulate their discourse, using the notion of "cultural participation" and "empowerment". In this sense, the recognition of cultural rights would be part of a change in cultural policies, a reorientation of the objectives and conceptions that underlie them (Hall, 1993). Such a recognition would constitute a real "paradigm crisis", *i.e.* the questioning of the cognitive foundations of a public policy by an accumulation of anomalies (policy failures), corresponding to the unexpected effects of a policy and, above all, not explained by the ideology behind it. Peter Hall favors here the questioning of the dominant paradigm in relation to the results of public policy over the questioning of the actors who are the bearers of a new paradigm. This is why we have also turned to the capacity of cultural movements to disseminate their agenda to local authorities, and to move from the status of "insurgent" actors[3] to that of "programmatic" actors,

2. Since the 1990s, wishing to approach issues of cultural "diversity" in a deconflictualised manner, many governments (notably those of Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, etc.) have been mobilizing the concept of "social cohesion". The vague and consensual definition of this buzzword, which oscillates between the academic and political worlds, allowing its adaptation and reappropriation in diverse cultural and social contexts, has earned it the use of many international organizations (OECD, European Union, World Bank, etc.). (Jensen, 2010).

3. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) identify four categories of actors who bring about change within institutions: insurrectional actors (representing disadvantaged groups), symbiotic actors (using institutions for their own purposes), subversive actors (bearers of change from within the institutions) and opportunistic actors (with ambiguous preferences). Distinguishing between these different categories of actors helps to explain the type of gradual change: thus, layering is linked to subversive actors in the presence of strong veto actors and weak institutional capacity; drift to symbiotic actors in the presence of strong veto actors and strong institutional capacity; while conversion is explained by the role of opportunistic actors in the presence of weak veto actors and strong institutional capacity

endowed with sufficient resources to be able to orient and define the content of public action (Genieys & Hassenteufel, 2012). Historically positioned outside of public action, and attempting to influence it, cultural movements would therefore become "partners" in a context of reconfiguration of relations with the State and a redefinition of its actions. They would therefore contribute to the dissemination of ideas and practices that had hitherto been the subject of strong institutional resistance.

We have chosen to test this hypothesis within the framework of an international comparison of mobilizations in favor of cultural rights in three cities located in three different countries and three different continents, and which present contrasting situations in terms of the management of cultural diversity: Cape Town in South Africa, Salvador de Bahia in Brazil and Toulouse in France[4]. If the definition of the subject "cultural rights" proves to be difficult, insofar as it is a notion that still remains vague and has no legal scope, the comparison is always subject to the compatibility of the phenomena studied. Our study is particularly interested in cultural associations that operate in socially and culturally segregated and stigmatized territories, that involve Afro-descendant populations and that intend to fight against racism and discrimination against these populations. As such, these associations appear to be the main operators of the "cultural rights" of racialized and ethnicized populations. But what is the relationship between populations and organizations operating in the shantytowns of South Africa, the miserable neighborhoods of Salvador de Bahia and the large popular housing estates of Toulouse? If the very nature of these cultural movements is different, the variety of economic, political and social contexts in which they take shape could alone neutralize any attempts to confront them. But the point here is not so much to propose a term-by-term comparison that would seek to outline the differences and similarities between the Brazilian, French and South African situations, as to attempt to identify some of the elements that make it possible to define the nature and modalities of structuring and influence of these groups, in order to be able to question the process of political transfer in a fairly broad manner. After presenting the historical and institutional constraints that hinder the promotion of the cultural rights of Afro-descendant populations in each of the

4. The international research team "Cultural rights: a turning point for cultural policies? An international comparison Brazil-France-South Africa" associates five laboratories: LaSSP (Sc Po/Université Paul Sabatier) and the LISST-Cieu (Université Jean Jaurès) in Toulouse, the Human Sciences Research Council in Cape Town, and the Catholic University of Salvador de Bahia. For 3 years (2019-2022) it will benefit from cross funding from the French Ministry of Culture, the Labex SMS of the Federal University of Toulouse, the Institute of the Americas, and the French Institute of South Africa.

three countries studied, we show how the cultural dynamics of these populations are directly associated with the spatial, social and economic segregation they suffer. The last part highlights the strategies for mobilizing and asserting cultural rights in each of the three cities, and the capacity of influence of the associations that intend to promote them.

1. Cultural rights: an ambiguous and controversial notion

In a chapter that focuses on cultural rights, it is important to first present how culture is institutionally constructed and mobilized as a category of public action in each of the three countries we have chosen to compare. It is a question of studying how and by what these categories of thought and action are made: by words that specify them, by groups of agents that give them substance, by institutions that materialize them, by discourses that legitimize them. The results of our surveys thus underline the weight of the national context in the understanding of culture, and more particularly of the colonial heritage which, in South Africa, Brazil and France, associates to this field of intervention either fine arts, artistic creation and heritage, or a communitarian, socio-cultural, even folkloric approach. Beyond this, locally-led policies aim to make culture, whatever its meaning, a tool for local development in economic terms, social cohesion and/or social peace.

1.1. Cultural policies and pluri-culturalism

In the field of cultural policy, France sets a good example because of its long-standing commitment to the arts, its high level of expenditure, its numerous and renowned public institutions, and the omnipresence of a political discourse adorned with the finery of voluntarism, of which the emblematic figures of André Malraux (1959-1969) and Jack Lang (1981-1986/1988-1993) are the symbols (Dubois, 2010). However, the French model of exporting via the cultural diplomacy of the French state, but also UNESCO, the Council of Europe, or the interventions of the French government in international negotiations on cultural issues (such as the principle of the "cultural exception" in trade agreements in 1993 and the affirmation of the principle of cultural diversity) is not without paradoxes, since the French state is more ready to defend cultural diversity outside its borders than on its own floor[5]. French cultural policies in working-class neighborhoods do not recognize the existence of any "cultural communities" and are generally associated with policies of urban intervention and national and local solidarity, such as the

5. Among other examples, France has not ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, a European treaty (CETS 148) adopted in 1992 under the auspices of the Council of Europe to protect and promote historical regional and minority languages in Europe.

policies which have been implemented since the early 1980s in the "priority neighborhoods of the urban policy" (*Quartiers prioritaires de la politique de la ville*, QPV), which are characterized by a significant gap in economic and social development with the rest of the conurbations in which they are located.

With regard to Brazil, Rodrigo Manoel Dias da Silva (2014) distinguishes three moments in the institutionalization of a cultural policy. After a first period (1930-1980) characterized by the will of the Brazilian state to valorize above all the colonial heritage, the end of the military dictatorship was marked by the creation of a Ministry of Culture in 1985. During the terms of office of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Roussef (2011-2016), policies aimed at "democratizing culture" and promoting the plurality of Brazil through the affirmation of ethnic, religious, gender, regional diversities. Originally, Brazilian cultural policies pursued the ideal of "racial democracy", in other words, harmony between the country's three "racial" groups, apparently resolving the racial question in a "cordial" manner, whereas in reality it borrowed a value system from Europe, in a colonial fashion. Subsequently, the principles of multiculturalism were established in the 1988 Constitution, aimed at promoting ethnic cultural traits according to a logic of cultural recognition of the various constituent groups of the Brazilian Nation. Since 2019, a new period is taking shape in which Jair Bolsonaro's policy is being designed to dismantle the cultural policy of his predecessors, in particular by replacing the Ministry of Culture with a special secretariat for culture, under the Ministry of Tourism. The appointment of a "black anti-movement" activist to head the Palmares Foundation, an institution whose vocation is to defend the "cultural rights" of the Afro-descendant population, is a good example of the current Brazilian government's desire to weaken the recognition of cultural "minorities".

Representations of cultural rights close to those of Brazil guide South African cultural policies. The release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 opened a period of optimistic redefinition of cultural policy as a tool for reconciling a society torn apart by apartheid and colonialism, and building the famous "rainbow nation" promoted by Anglican Archbishop and Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu. The function of cultural policy in the new South Africa was therefore to appreciate and affirm the different "colors" (and "cultures") of the rainbow, while creating a solid basis for integration and social cohesion in the whole of society. However, this ambition, affirmed in the 1996 Constitution and in all the strategic documents produced since then by the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC), has never been realized, not least because of the neo-liberal turn taken by the South African government. With

a reduced budget, the DAC tried to involve the private sector, which was reluctant to invest in the townships, in a multicultural policy that was largely confined to symbolic actions and declarations (Hagg, 2010). It should be noted, however, that the White Paper on Arts and Culture, published in 2017, recommends the creation of a National Heritage Council for South Africa and that the DAC, which does not include the issue of indigenous knowledge systems in its scope, nevertheless recommends the creation of a South African Centre for African Art, Culture and Heritage.

1.2. The burden of colonial legacy

In Brazil, France and South Africa, cultural policies reflect the weight of colonial models and it is therefore important to link the conception of culture in these three countries to the history of European imperialism. For example, European racial and racist theories of the late 19th century had a direct impact on the way cultural policies could contribute to the construction of the young Brazilian nation: they helped to reaffirm the colonial hierarchy that felt threatened by the abolition of slavery (1888) and the proclamation of the Republic (1889). Against a backdrop of European racial theories, Brazilian intellectuals developed a local version of crossbreeding in which degeneration was replaced by the idea of a certain exoticism, a singular charm (Schwarcz, 1994). The Brazilian Métis national identity is one of the founding principles of "racial democracy", an ideal that has always espoused European "good manners", to the detriment of African or indigenous cultures considered uncivilized.

The deleterious impact of cultural imperialism during the era of white domination, and the fact that this legacy continues to undermine solidarity within South African society, was recognized in South Africa by the Department of Arts and Culture at the end of apartheid, with the aim of building a "multiracial" and peaceful society. However, South Africa's cultural policy does not challenge the "nation-building and ethnicity" of apartheid (Fauvelle, 2016), but rather seeks to "unite in diversity" - to paraphrase the motto adopted in the new constitution of 1996 - through the "depoliticized instruments of arts and culture" (Barolsky, 2013). The aim is to generate a "sense of South Africanness" (Abrahams, 2016) through a set of national symbols and the celebration of a singular aesthetic, enhanced by works and artists who are supposed to represent a nation reconciled with itself, whether in music, theatre, plastic arts or rugby.

French cultural policies are also part of the colonial heritage. Because the French state has, throughout its history, largely contributed to popularizing the idea of a "cultural universalism" based on the greatness and superiority of

European works, but also because the creation of a cultural administration in 1959 was partly based on the know-how of officers from the former French colonies (Dubois, 1999). The latter contributed to the administrative basis and the definition of the political orientations of the Ministry of Culture, in particular via this new mission of "democratization of culture" which was entrusted to them. The result was an approach in which the promotion of " the great cultural works of humanity, first and foremost of France" (Article 1 of the Ministry's founding decree) must predominate over other forms of creativity and cultural expression which, such as "regional", "youth" or "immigrant" cultures, are in fact referred to as "infra-cultural", community or folklore.

2. Racialized and ethnicized populations facing urban and cultural segregation

In Brazil, France and South Africa, the lack of cultural recognition of racialized populations and the processes of social distinction are not only to be found in history and ideology: they also result in phenomena of spatial segregation, while the political struggle against a culture perceived as essentially European is more generally part of a struggle for the right to have rights. This approach lays the foundations for a rapprochement between culture and politics, and urban popular movements do not fail to integrate and enhance their cultural expressions in their collective actions. In this respect, associations are the main promoters of cultural rights in these three countries.

2.1. Cultural rights as a claim to the right to the city

In Cape Town, Salvador or Toulouse, the spatial distribution of the Afro-descendant populations reflects cultural segregation insofar as the majority of cultural facilities (private and public) are concentrated in city centers. However, these segregative logics are not only suffered by the inhabitants, who are also able to resist them by producing forms of life that suit their living conditions, their experiences and their point(s) of view(s) on the world. By relying on a variety of artistic (carnival, theatre, music, cinema, etc.) and cultural (cuisine, journalism, sport, etc.) forms, the cultural associations intend to affirm and gain recognition in the public space, if not for other ways of living and creating, at least for the capacity of populations to "participate in cultural life" and to transform it.

In Toulouse, some cultural associations thus function as a democratic relay to make the "voice of the voiceless" heard and take into account the skills and expertise of the inhabitants of disadvantaged neighborhoods. The identification and support of residents' projects is an essential part of the

approach taken by associations such as Tactikollectif in the popular district of Les Izards, and Dell Arte in that of Le Mirail, two neighborhoods labelled "QPV" by the French state. Created in 1997, Tactikollectif aims to (re)valorize the cultures and memories of the French populations "of immigrant origin" and, more broadly, "post-colonial", notably with the organization since 2004 of the "*Origines Contrôlées*" festival, which mixes hip hop shows and concerts with meetings and debates on the social and cultural struggles of the inhabitants of working-class neighborhoods, by inviting researchers, journalists, activists from associations, institutions, etc. Through different types of actions (welcoming, listening, supporting initiatives, contributing to the development of local cultural and civic actions, developing partnerships with associations, etc.), Tactikollectif is able to help the local community in its efforts to promote cultural diversity.), and the general objective of the association is "to contribute to the improvement of the living environment, and to the development and strengthening of social ties and community life in the northern districts of Toulouse"[6]. For its part, the Dell Arte association organizes the Toucouleurs festival once a year, as well as the Escales meetings, which combines dance, slam and rap shows with boxing, parkour and video game workshops, all of which are showcases for the know-how of the inhabitants of Mirail and elsewhere. Since 2011, the association has also engaged, via the label Kif Kif Collectif, a reinforced accompaniment of about fifteen emerging artists on creation, residencies, diffusion, administrative support and communication. Particularly critical of cultural spaces "which remain inaccessible to the inhabitants of the neighborhoods because of cultural barriers, pricing policies and an elitist culture that is not representative of the population", the Dell Arte association mentions its desire to promote the cultural rights of the inhabitants of poor neighborhoods in its activity report[7].

In Cape Town, a large part of the city's population lives in slums and segregated areas, characterized by high levels of violence and conflict and unable to access basic services. A situation that has led to numerous mobilizations over the last two decades. Generally speaking, the inhabitants refer to the concept of Ubuntu[8] to express their common situation: they describe

6. Tactikollectif, *Bilan d'activité 2018*, p. 5

7. Dell'Arte, *Rapport d'activité 2017*, p. 32

8. Ubuntu, a notion derived from the Nguni expression "*umntu ngumntu ngabantu*" (I am because we are) is an indigenous African philosophy according to which people acquire their humanity in relation to others. The emphasis on community spirit distinguishes Ubuntu from a Western vision of living together based on individual interests. However, this notion remains highly polysemic and labile and is used by institutions and actors with very different worldviews, both in the governmental sphere, in the corporate world and in the space of social movements.

themselves as living in foreign places, where people "struggle together" and "help each other" to survive (Burns, Hull, Lefko-Everett & Njozela, 2018). The manifestation of a community of destiny can be aimed at the reconquest of land and a number of material rights (which, in toxic forms, can take the form of xenophobia and exclusionary discourses) but also at the establishment of cultural places and the organization of festivals and celebrations. In Cape Town, the Khayelitsha Art School and Rehabilitation Centre (KASI-RC) is a small theatre made of tin and wood, built with the means at hand in the midst of other informal settlements in one of South Africa's largest townships. Since 2017, young artists have been offering the inhabitants a space for meeting, transmission and creation, but also for the dissemination and promotion of a demanding theatrical and musical repertoire, be it South African or European. For its part, the Guga S'thebe Cultural Centre enables the inhabitants of Langa Township to meet and learn about different cultural activities. The center has six active and rented studios, a gathering space, an open-air amphitheater and an arts and crafts shop. A multi-purpose theatre added in 2015, designed and built by a team of international students using old shipping containers, recycled wooden crates and locally available building materials such as straw and clay, also offers workshops in dance and theatre in an environment that until then had been devoid of institutionalized cultural provision.

In Salvador de Bahia, the demands of Afro-descendent cultural groups are manifested preferably during the carnival, or through associations that claim a black, Afro-Brazilian identity as an anchor point. The "Afro blocks"[9] have occupied the city center circuits since the 1970s and promote cultural activities and debates that highlight the heritage of African cultures and the fight against racism. The Malê debalê thus proposes black beauty contests which do not follow the dominant models but are held on the basis of a dance performance between male and female performers. In a context where violence is expressed not only symbolically, but also physically[10], this group offers young people the opportunity to visit urban centers through artistic practice. It also serves as a relay in the Itapuã neighborhood for local cultural initiatives, through its own equipment which allows it to host concerts and other cultural events, as well as a library. For her part, a reggae enthusiast

9. The Afro blocks are music (percussion) and dance groups that claim a black, Afro-descendent, Brazilian identity that parade during the carnival. The best known are Olodum or the group from Ilê Aiyê.

10. In the State of Bahia, homicide rates are increasing, especially among young men. According to Julio Jacobo Waiselvisz (2016) which publishes a report on the subject every year, the number of homicides rose from 408 in 1998 to 2,004 in 2008). Much of this violence is produced in outlying neighborhoods by the police, who, under the pretext of self-defense, can shoot indiscriminately and without being held accountable.

(afro descendant and nurse at the Salvador de Bahia public hospital), has been developing a cultural space dedicated to reggae culture on the fringes of the historic an tourist center of Pelourinho since 2018. This place is in line with the objectives of pan-Africanism to raise awareness in order to emancipate. For example, discussions are organized around the heroes of the Black Pantheon who fought for the liberation of their people, but also workshops on hairdressing (turban) or Rasta philosophy (rastology), highlighting a culture and a philosophy that is part of the Black diaspora. For Jussara Santana, the fact of occupying a space in the historic center is a way of resisting the logics of gentrification which push the poor and black populations further and further to the margins.

For cultural movements from the segregated territories of Cape Town, Salvador de Bahia and Toulouse, the right to participate freely in the cultural life of the community and to enjoy the arts (art. 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) thus appears as a broader right to participate in urban life, as a "right to the city" in the sense of Henri Lefebvre (1986): it implies a project of democracy and reinforcement of civil society; it stipulates the right of access to urban centrality, to urban life, to places of meetings, exchanges, gatherings...

3. The dissemination of cultural rights under the test of new urban and territorial policies

In Cape Town, Salvador de Bahia and Toulouse, the defense and affirmation of a cultural life in the neighborhoods where poor and racially minority populations are concentrated is part of an action to fight against segregation and to claim social rights. Although France is still very attached to the notion of a "one and indivisible" Republic[11], Brazil and South Africa are distinguished by a recognition of the cultural diversity of their nationals, and even an institutionalization of the different languages and cultural traditions that make them up. However, in a context where National States are increasingly delegating their prerogatives to external operators, in the name of promoting market mechanisms and the need for cities to be competitive and attractive, cultural associations are tending to become real vectors of cultural rights in action, regardless of the national models in force.

11. As the French President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron recently recalled, the Republic "does not admit any separatist adventure (…) because it is indivisible", Celebration speech at the Pantheon for the 150th anniversary of the Republic, 4 September 2020.

3.1. Cultural rights as a factor in the reconfiguration of public cultural policies

After being the subject of an impasse between the Senate and the National Assembly, cultural rights were introduced in France in 2015 in Article 103 of the law on the *Nouvelle organization territoriale de la République* (New Territorial Organization of the Republic), known as the NOTRe law. However, the notion of cultural rights is not defined there and therefore remains subject to all interpretations. The reference to cultural rights introduced one year later by the Law on "Freedom of Creation, Architecture and Heritage", known as the LCAP Law, is not more precise. Cultural rights appear to be framed by two provisions, the direct affirmation of the principle of freedom of artistic creation on the one hand, and the "sanctuarization" of past policies and their most established instruments in the form of national labels on the other, with the risk of maintaining a hierarchical distinction between artistic and cultural life, professional and amateur practice. It should be noted, however, that the issue of cultural rights did not wait for these two laws to become the subject of debate and action-research in France, especially at the local level[12]. Nevertheless, the situation is very uneven. The Occitanie region, to which the city of Toulouse is attached, remains apart from this movement, and the political and administrative leaders met during our research proved to be little familiar with this notion, equating it at best to a right to culture, at worst to a threat to territorial balances and the unity of the french republic.

In South Africa, the notion of cultural rights is not given much attention, but the 1996 White Paper on Arts and Culture embodied a human rights approach to cultural diversity, namely that "everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community and to enjoy the arts" (Art. 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). In 2017, the new White Paper nevertheless sought to highlight the broader and more flexible relationship between culture and development. For example, the Mzansi Golden Economy (MGE) strategy, launched in 2011 to develop cultural industries and exploit South Africa's traditional "golden economy", focuses primarily on the role of culture as an engine of growth and economic opportunity, with little attention to the cultural emergences present in the townships.

In Brazil, cultural rights are officially embodied in policies such as "territories of culture" and policies of financial support for Afro-descendant

12. Cf. in particular the "Padeia approach", which has been experimenting for 6 years with the concrete translation of cultural rights in four departments: Ardèche, Gironde, Nord and Territoire de Belfort.

culture[13]. In the first case, they are aimed at cultural development in the peripheries; in the second, they aim at staging "Afro culture" in order to integrate it into the tourist agenda, generally giving Afro identity a place on a temporary stage and preferably in the context of the carnival, at a time when the public authorities persecute Afro-descendant cultures and people on a daily basis[14]. The "perverse confluence" (Dagnino, 2014) of the late 1980s, which mixes the project of re-democratization (in which cultural rights are included) and the neo-liberal project, is today reflected in this interpretation of cultural diversity associated with market logics, ignoring the cultural claims of groups kept on the margins of society and deprived of their rights when they do not fit the contours of the tourism sector.

3.2. The action of cultural movements, between counter-power and functional adjustments

In Cape Town, Salvador de Bahia and Toulouse, the attention given by local governments to the cultural initiatives of the inhabitants of segregated neighbourhoods is part of either social and community action, aiming to make culture an instrument of integration or even of pacification and cohesion; or a form of territorial marketing, through the valorization of culture as an economic outlet and a vector of entrepreneurship. In both cases, the lifestyles of Afro-descendant populations are rarely seen as a vector for enriching cultural life in general, but more as tools for "social cohesion" and economic attractiveness. In this context, two strategies are at work among the cultural movements: the first intends to act as a counter-power, the second mainly aims to enhance the talents and "capacities" of the inhabitants of working-class neighborhoods.

In Toulouse, the activists of the Tactikollectif association come from the anti-racist movements that emerged in France at the beginning of the 1980s, led by young people of North African, Black African or Caribbean descent. The divisions of the organizers, added to the entryism of the Socialist Party via the association SOS Racisme, led the activists of Tactikollectif to defend the rights of populations of immigrant origin as close as possible to the inhabitants and with the idea of emancipating themselves from local institutional constraints.

13. Since 2014, the *Cultura viva programme* aims to facilitate bureaucratic processes for recognizing cultural groups and providing them with grants. Once an application has been submitted and authorization has been obtained, the cultural groups that apply become *Pontos de cultura* (culture points) and are networked. These policies are conceived from the notion of "territories of culture" and incorporate the periphery.

14. On the persecution of cultures of African origin by the Brazilian authorities see São Bernardo, 2006.

In fact, and in the face of the inertia and even adversity of the municipality of Toulouse, the objective was first of all to find autonomy in operating by forging new partnerships, thanks in particular to the success of Zebda, a pop-rock-reggae band which enjoyed spectacular success in the 1990s and whose members are related to the association. But although Tactikollectif's action was for a long time in direct political opposition with the municipality, going so far as to present a political list, "*Motivé-e-s*", which obtained 12.4% of the votes in the 2001 municipal elections and which allied itself with the left in the 2nd round, the association nevertheless sought alliances elsewhere, particularly at national level[15]. It has thus benefited from a certain institutional recognition, notably through the participation of its director, Salah Amokrane, in the Conseil national des villes[16], in the Commission on the image of diversity and in the working group on "Cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue" in the years 2015-20. The institutional (and personal) support of the deputy director of the Midi-Pyrenées DRAC (2005-2012) also gave them a broader legitimacy than that of policies connected to the "integration of populations from immigrant backgrounds", in which the municipality of Toulouse wanted to confine her.

In Salvador de Bahia, Afro-descendant culture plays an important role in the image that the city wishes to develop (Sansone, 2000). After more than forty years of existence, the Afro-blocks are nevertheless threatened each year with not being able to parade on the carnival circuits as access to public funding for them is not always easy. In 2020, the group Olodum - known for having propelled samba-reggae to the international level by recording with Mickael Jackson or Paul Simon - had to appeal for access to this funding in order to be able to parade normally. It should be noted, however, that the Institute of National Historical and Artistic Heritage (IPHAN) registered the *Afoxé* Parades as part of Bahia's intangible cultural heritage in 2010 as representatives of the city's cultural roots[17]. Beyond this, many schemes exist to bring the projects to life as a complement to cultural policies or to make up for their absence, for example with the help of the Catholic Church. The former church of Santa Casa da Misericordia thus offers a space for cultural activities, training or events, to fight against the marginalization of young people

15. Despite their defeat, "*Motivé-e-s*" got four councilors in Toulouse from 2001 to 2008.
16. Composed of elected representatives, professionals and inhabitants of the QPV, this consultation body contributes through its proposals to the definition of the framework and orientations of the "*Politique de la ville*" in terms of urban planning and housing, education, health, crime prevention, mobility, digital or gender equality...
17. *Afoxé* is an Afro-Brazilian rhythm. Although this rhythm differs from the rhythm of the Afro blocks, marked by Samba reggae, *Afoxé* parades nevertheless belong to the same institutional category, that of Afro-Brazilian carnival events.

in the Bairro da paz district. Furthermore, with the support of certain elected officials and the movement for the defense of the civil rights of the black population (*movimento negro*), Jussara Santana has obtained recognition in Salvador de Bahia for a day dedicated to reggae and has released funding that would otherwise not be used for a music that suffers from the prejudices that Bahia society places on the Rastafarians. The levels of recognition and acceptance of cultural rights are therefore varied in Salvador, and despite an institutional framework officially favorable to the (tourist and aesthetic) valorization of a certain diversity, funding depends to a large extent on strategies put in place by local actors.

In Cape Town, the Guga S'thebe Cultural Centre is placed under the responsibility of the municipality which, through its Department of Arts and Culture, contributes to its maintenance and operation. The management of the facility is nevertheless entrusted to a board of directors which includes local residents and "leaders". The desire to open up the township of Langa, combined with a concern to make its artistic and craft productions profitable, makes it today one of the privileged cultural attractions of the "Township Tours" which encourage tourists from all over the world to visit these relegated areas and are organized by private companies with the support of the Cape Town Tourist Office. Generally speaking, self-financing and the "D-system" are still necessary, if not indispensable, for the township inhabitants to be able to develop their cultural activities. And although there is no lack of initiatives, they are most often, if not exclusively, based on private funds, either humanitarian or via various sponsors. The KASI-RC, for example, does not receive any public funding and relies mainly on the dynamism of its founders, Mandisi and Liso Sindo. Originally from the township of Khayelitsha, these two artists, respectively actor and singer, put their organizational and artistic talents at the service of the inhabitants, which they have managed to perfect through university studies and by working with international theatre companies. They benefit from the support of some NGOs, but they also try to integrate their actions in the discovery tours of the townships which are proposed by the tourist office of Cape Town.

In Cape Town, Salvador de Bahia and Toulouse, the assertion of cultural rights is therefore part of ambiguous relations with the public authorities. By carrying out all sorts of projects which are as many relays for institutions in poor and segregated neighborhoods, associations help to legitimize another way of making cultural policies. Nevertheless, their actions remain largely confined to the perimeters of working-class neighborhoods. In this sense, the participation of "cultural communities" in cultural life remains closely dependent on the frameworks built by national and local institutions, which

guide the objectives of the action and possible funding according to patterns inscribed in the history and administrative routines of each city and each country.

Conclusion

The research project we are currently conducting on the implementation of cultural rights in Cape Town, Salvador de Bahia and Toulouse shows that, at both national and local levels, change is largely part of a logic exogenous to public action which is directly linked to the cultural movement's capacity for action and influence. Moreover, and from the point of view of political science, the action of these organizations concerns secondary aspects of individuals' belief systems, which Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith identify as the instruments and theories of action, but does not modify the set of strategies and political demands linked to the realization of the policy core, or even the set of fundamental normative values (deep core) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). These limitations can be explained less by the power of "veto actors" as such, but by the colonial past and an institutionalized social and spatial segregation, and also by the absence, in these three cities, of advocacy coalitions in favor of cultural rights. And when they exist, subversive actors apprehend community cultures more in the framework of "social cohesion" policies or even economic development, than in the framework of a valorization *as such* of "the creativity of individuals, groups and societies and which have a cultural content" (Unesco, 2005).

However, a gradual change is palpable in these three cities, insofar as the activists of racialized and ethicized populations are seeking to adjust to the institutions so that they defend the interests of their group. Unlike the "insurgent" actor who openly defends a political logic, does not follow the rules of the institution and intends to shake up the status quo, most of the actors we met propose institutional transformations while fundamentally respecting public policies (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). The type of change they favor is therefore sedimentation, which introduces new rules in accordance with the interests of the group, alongside and not against those already in place. In return, local governments are slowly and partially modifying their belief systems in order to incorporate the expectations of the associations. But in Cape Town, Salvador de Bahia and Toulouse, the belief systems of the public authorities and those of the cultural movements remain differentiated in cultural matters: within the framework of social, tourist, urban or economic policies, they continue to refer to distinct legitimacies, and to fit into disjointed rationalities.

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CHAPTER 3

The influence of the European Central Bank on the accumulation of public debt across Europe

Natalia Dus Poiatti

Introduction

The European Monetary System (EMS) was established in 1979 to promote a high degree of economic integration across member countries and a more influential European role in the International Monetary System. The EMS was a system of fixed exchange rates in relation to the Deutsche Mark (DM), which allowed minor currency fluctuations to help correct domestic economic imbalances in member countries. By fixing the exchange rates in relation to the DM, the member countries would import the Deutsche Bundesbank's credibility in fighting inflation. In fact, the inflation rates converged gradually to the low German levels.

However, in the early 1990s, the German reunification imposed high fiscal costs and inflationary pressures that led to the implementation of austere monetary policy in Germany. In order to peg their currencies against the DM, the EMS members would have to import the German contractionary monetary policy. However, Italy, France, United Kingdom, among others experienced an economic slowdown, and allowed their currencies to devalue significantly in relation to the DM, what let them to believe that the fixed exchange rate regime would be unsustainable.

In this context, the establishment of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1992 and the posterior adoption of a single currency in 2002 would be an effective way to reduce exchange risks and to avoid currency speculative attacks. The main idea behind the EMU was the promotion of economic integration as advocated by the EMS. However, the EMU would lead to a lower degree of asymmetry among members in the power to

choose monetary policies. In the EMU, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), composed of the European Central Bank and seventeen national central banks, would be responsible for choosing monetary policy to be adopted in the Euro Area. In the ESCB, the Central Bank of each participant country would support the monetary policy best suited to its own domestic economic context, reducing the asymmetry inherent to the EMS, where member countries would import the German monetary policy in order to peg their currencies against the DM.

Although monetary policy decisions were centralized in the ESCB, member countries would still choose their own national fiscal policies. The fiscal accounts would be managed inside the jurisdictions of each country, but the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Act should guarantee fiscal discipline at the national level.

The Maastricht treaty established the converge criteria that countries should respect in order to join the EMU: public finance discipline, characterized by public deficit and debt limits of 3% and 60% of GDP, respectively; interest rate convergence; price and exchange rate stability. Once joined the EMU, member countries should follow the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), a set of rules and procedures to limit fiscal imbalances, including the imposition of the same deficit and debt limits determined in the Maastricht treaty.

Countries can benefit from joining a single currency area, by eliminating exchange risks and transaction costs and promoting international trade and financial flows. However, the main disadvantage from joining the single currency area is giving up the choice to adopt optimal monetary policies to face adverse domestic output shocks or inflationary pressures.

Mundell (1961) developed "A theory of optimum currency areas", a cost-benefit analysis to understand whether it would be optimal for a country to join a single currency area. According to that theory, the net benefits from the adoption of a single currency would increase the less asymmetric would be the economic shocks among member states and the greater the mobility of factors of production.

Firstly, the less asymmetric the economic shocks are, the less an economy would suffer from not being able to choose its own monetary policy. In the limit, when business cycles would be perfectly correlated, the optimal monetary policy for all countries would be the same. Secondly, the adoption of a single currency does not allow countries with an external imbalance to depreciate its currency and increase net exports. Since business cycles are unlikely to be perfectly correlated, a high degree of labor mobility would be important in order to allow an unemployed worker in one state to find a job position

in another member state. Also, capital mobility would allow investment in adversely affected sectors in one country to flow to other countries.

If member states exchange a high volume of goods and services, they can have substantial trade gains from the decrease in the exchange risk and transaction costs. Also, the greater the degree of export diversification, the less countries can suffer from an adverse demand shock to any exporting sector.

The European Economic and Monetary Union is being criticized for not being an optimum currency area, mainly due to the low degree of labor mobility, asymmetric economic shocks and low degree of export diversification in some member countries. Criticism has escalated since the European sovereign debt crisis, which began in 2009.

Since the adoption of the Euro, many countries have not respected the Stability and Growth Pact and accumulated stocks of public debt that surpassed the limit of 60% of GDP. This was supported by the low cost of sovereign borrowing, which possibly did not reflect the economic fundamentals of some countries. Although the Maastricht treaty had a no bail out clause, most European sovereign bonds were apparently placed in the same basket of low risky European bonds on international financial markets. However, when the global financial crisis hit Europe, European governments have adopted expansionary fiscal policies to reduce the economic impact of the crisis, and also bailed out national banks in financial distress. The unsustainable paths of public debt have become more evident.

In the first quarter of 2010, when governments and the ECB announced they would not bail out Greece (Traynor, 2010), European sovereign bonds may have started to be priced according to the economic reality and repayment capacity of each issuer. If that is true, changes in the economic fundamentals may also have had a lower impact on sovereign spreads since July 2012, when Mario Draghi, then president of the ECB, announced financial solidarity: "within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough."

This paper investigates how the announcements of the European Central Bank have impacted debt accumulation in the peripheral European countries, by changing the cost of sovereign borrowing.

The next sections are organized as follows: section 2 defines the public debt dynamics and how they are affected by changes in the cost of sovereign borrowing; section 3 defines the methodological approach; section 4 provides the results of the model estimation and the last section presents the final considerations.

2. Public Debt Dynamics and the Cost of Sovereign Borrowing

The ratio of public debt to GDP increases due to four main reasons:

1. The negative primary balance or public deficit. If government expenditures exceed government revenues, the government issues additional debt to cover the deficit.
2. The interest payments on debt issued on the past periods.
3. The deficit-debt adjustment from government transactions not included in the primary balance such as the government support to banks during the financial crisis.
4. The decrease in the growth rate of GDP.

The dynamics of public debt-to-GDP follow the equation:

$$\Delta debt_t = \frac{i_t - g_t}{1+g_t} = debt_{t-1} + balance_t + adjust_t$$

where $\Delta debt_t = debt_t - debt_{t-1}$;

i_t is the cost of sovereign borrowing on past debt obligations;

g_t is the nominal GDP growth rate, which depends on the real gdp growth and inflation rate;

$balance_t$ is the primary balance;

$adjust_t$ are the deficit-debt adjustments.

The cost of sovereign borrowing for each unit of new debt issuance today is defined by the government yield agreed today for payment in the coming periods. Sovereign spread is the difference between a government yield and the yield of the anchor country, which is characterized by the lowest risk of default. In this paper, we take Germany to be the anchor country, what is usually assumed in studies about European sovereign spreads. Sovereign spread is the additional compensation an investor requires in order to lend to a government that has a higher default risk than the anchor country. It depends on the probability and price of default.

The European Sovereign Debt Crisis has led to significant variations on the peripheral European sovereign spreads. This paper will show how the ECB announcements of bail-out infeasibility, in the first quarter of 2010, and viability, on the third quarter of 2012, impacted the relative costs of sovereign borrowing, measured by sovereign spreads.

We will show that while the European Central Bank has announced non-cooperation among States to deal with the crisis, mainly the infeasibility of bailing-out highly indebted governments, it has magnified the crisis by increasing the probability and price of default risk priced on European sovereign debt. On the other hand, it has helped to decrease sovereign spreads when they announced cooperative measures. The empirical evidence supports a greater impact of economic fundamentals on sovereign spreads when there would be no bailout expectations.

In addition, this paper shows empirical evidence that peripheral European bonds were reclassified as being "bad quality" when the European governments and the Central Bank first announced they would not bail out highly indebted countries. The econometric model results point out that the increase in the degree of international risk aversion has led to a significant increase in the cost of borrowing for the peripheral countries, which could not be attributed to the worsening of domestic economic conditions. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports an increase in the price of risk, measured by the impact of international risk aversion, for peripheral countries. However, the peripheral bonds were not classified as being "bad quality" anymore after Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" announcement.

3. Methodology

This paper analyzes the dynamics of sovereign spreads for the peripheral European countries. Although there are many methodological approaches to study the factors underlying changes in sovereign spreads, the empirical macro-finance focuses on linear regressions of spreads against explanatory variables. First of all, we consider the dynamics of sovereign spreads over the business cycles. On the finance literature, the countercyclical movement of spreads has been consistently evidenced. Cline (1995), Cantor and Parker (1996), Poiatti (2020) and Uribe and Yue (2008) show that during economic downturns sovereign spreads increase, what could be attributed to the higher the probability of default or price of default risk.

Since the ability to honor the future debt obligations inherent to new sovereign debt issuances depends on the availability of public resources, the models also usually include measures of fiscal sustainability. Cline (1995); Cantor and Parker (1996); Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010); Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) have considered the ratio of total government debt to output to be a measure of fiscal sustainability important to determine sovereign spreads. The higher is the level of debt in relation to the size of the economy, the lower the availability of resources to repay new debt obligations *ceteris paribus*.

Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) and De Grauwe and Ji (2013) show that sovereign spreads can be impacted by changes on the availability of resources generated though international trade to repay debt obligations, measured by the current account balance, the terms of trade, or the real effective exchange rate.

We employ the real effective exchange rate, defined by the ratio between the average level of prices on the main country trade partners and the level of national prices, which is a measure of the relative cost between foreign and domestic products. Probably, a country facing a higher relative price of foreign produced goods may be more competitive in international trade and get a higher volume of net exports.

According to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) and Krishnamurthy (2010), during international financial crisis, investors sell off relatively risky assets and hold safer assets due to an increase in the global risk aversion. This phenomenon was named "flight-to-quality". We include the VIX, the equity volatility index, in order to control for global risk aversion.

Therefore, the dynamics of sovereign spreads will be expressed by a function of domestic macroeconomic fundamentals and global risk aversion:

$$spread_t = f(debt_t, gdp_t, VIX_t, reer_t)$$

In this paper, we will allow for two structural breaks: in the first quarter of 2010 and in the third quarter of 2012.

4. Results

This paper analyzes the dynamics of sovereign spreads for the peripheral European countries most affected by the European debt crisis: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. Table 1 shows the estimated parameters by the fixed effects estimator. The Hausman test points out for the possible inconsistency of the random effects estimator.

Table 1: Estimation Results

Variable	Impact	Variable	Impact
debt	0.04	I2010*vix	0.13
	(0.01)*		(0.03)*
gdpreal	-0.04	I2012*debt	-0.01
	(0.04)		(0.01)

reer	-0.09 (0.03)*	I2012*gdpreal	-0.55 (0.11)*
vix	0.01 (0.01)	I2012*reer	0.00 (0.03)
I2010*debt	0.00 (0.01)	I2012*vix	0.12 (0.18)
I2010*gdpreal	-0.80 (0.06)*		
I2010*reer	0.00 (0.01)		
R-sq	0.86		

Note: Estimated parameters and corresponding standard errors in parentheses. 'I2010' refers to the indicator function taking the value 1 from the first quarter of 2010 until the second quarter of 2012 and 0 otherwise. 'I2012' refers to the indicator function taking the value 1 from the third quarter of 2012 onwards and 0 otherwise; *significant at the 5% significance level.

The estimated parameters show that the economic fundamentals were always important to price sovereign spreads for peripheral European countries. However, their importance increases significantly after the ECB and the European governments announced they would not be willing to financially rescue highly indebted countries, in the first quarter of 2010.

Until the last quarter of 2009, a one percent point increase in debt to GDP ratio would increase sovereign spreads by approximately 0.04 percentage points, 2.5% of the average value of spreads for peripheral economies (1.56). A one percent point decline in the real GDP growth rate would also increase sovereign spreads by 0.04 percentage points. In fact, both the increase in the debt to GDP ratio and the decline in the real GDP growth rate decline the availability of resources to repay sovereign debt. An increase in one unit of the real effective exchange rate, a measure of international competiveness is associated with a decline of 0.09 percentage points in spreads.

After the first quarter of 2010, the impacts of domestic economic fundamentals on spreads became more important. They are given by the initial impacts in addition to the impact associated to the multiplication of the indicator function 'I2010' by the corresponding economic variable.

After 2010, a one percent point in the growth rate of real GDP would lead to an additional decrease of 0.80 percentage points in spreads for the

peripheral economies or almost 50% of the mean value of spreads in the sample of peripheral economies, given by 1.58.

Furthermore, an increase of a one percent point in the VIX leads to a significant additional increase of 0.13 percentage points in spreads for the peripheral economies or 8.3% of the mean value of spreads for those economies. The results suggest that financial markets considered peripheral European bonds significantly riskier after the European Central Bank decided not to bailout Greece. It seems that financial markets did not expect peripheral economies to have the capacity to adopt the austere fiscal policies that were adopted by the central European economies to reduce the accumulation of sovereign debt.

After the Mario Draghi "whatever it takes" message, financial markets became less sensitive to the economic fundamentals, as indicated by the significantly lower coefficients associated to the pre-multiplication by 'I2012' in relation to 'I2010'. After the first quarter of 2010, a one percent point increase in real GDP growth rate would lead to an additional decrease of 0.55 in percentage points in spreads instead of 0.80, which hold before the announcement.

It is important to notice that the VIX does not have a significant additional impact on spreads after the cooperative announcement. Therefore, the expectation of financial solidarity in the EMU has helped to decrease the cost of sovereign borrowing for the peripheral economies, which have been reclassified as "good quality" bonds.

Final Considerations

De Grauwe and Ji (2013, 2015) argue that most fluctuations in sovereign spreads during the Eurozone debt crisis could be attributed to markets sentiments, not related to the economic fundamentals of those countries. However, in this paper, we show that a model that incorporates the changes in expectations can explain most variations in spreads.

Loureiro (2018) suggests that since 2010 markets may have changed the default risk pricing, given more weight to macroeconomic fundamentals. As a matter of fact, it was clear, since then, that each government would have to find its own way to deal with the sovereign debt crisis. The Euro Area would not bare the costs of each government's lack of financial resources to repay its public debt.

However, the lack of significant financial assistance to the countries most affected by the European debt crisis has put in check the existence of the European Monetary and Economic Union. It seems that markets expected that peripheral countries would not have the capacity to adopt the austere fiscal policies that were adopted in the central economies to face the crisis. In order

to control financial market expectations and decrease the risk of a collapse of the euro, in July 2012, Mario Draghi, then president of the ECB, said "within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough."

In fact, the improvement in the economic fundamentals since then, including the increase in the output growth rate and the decrease in the degree of international risk aversion have been accompanied by a concomitant decrease in sovereign spreads.

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Chapter 4

From development brokers to diffusion entrepreneurs: a review of concepts designating influential policy actors in global governance

Lara Gautier

1. Background

Policy ideas travel through space and time thanks to people and communities who give them meaning. Public policy analysts, development anthropologists and others, have conceived a wide array of terminologies to designate those influential policy actors who actively participate in the 'traveling' of those policy ideas.

In this paper, we adopt the ideational perspective of policy analysis (Béland and Cox, 2010; Gofas and Hay, 2010; Hall, 1993) to review the public policy and social science literatures. We offer a comprehensive overview of the terminologies used and applied in the context of global policymaking. We review each concept through a critical eye, highlighting some of their strengths and limitations, particularly in the constantly evolving context of 'multi-centric' governance (Cairney, 2019a). We embrace Cairney's expression because it enables for a synthesis of two major features of contemporary global policy arenas, i.e., the fact that they are multilevel, and the fact that they are polycentric.

First, global governance is multilevel (Hill and Hupe, 2006). This means that it features governing units (or jurisdictions) who exercise decision-making power either at the subnational, national, transnational or global level. For instance, cities (subnational level) have had a growing policy role in climate change policy discussions over the past decade (Jones, 2012). Second, global governance is polycentric (Ostrom, 2010). The polycentric characteristic of

global policymaking arenas makes the entrance of non-traditional policy actors possible (Tosun, 2017). Polycentric governance is "a system of government in which many 'centres' have decision-making autonomy but adhere to an overarching set of rules to aid cooperation" (Cairney et al., 2019, p. 7). It is important to distinguish polycentric governance from multilevel governance, which conceives individual centers to be nested in a structure (Gautier et al., 2018). Non-traditional actors include transnational networks and "international experts" (e.g., development economists) who have acquired power in global policymaking arenas and/or in low- and middle countries (LMICs) (Shiffman, 2014; Stone, 2008). The influence of these actors involves setting the policy agenda notably by "select[ing] issues over which [they] ha[ve] relative control" (Cairney et al., 2019, p. 8). Crucially — and this is particularly true for non-traditional policy actors — they carefully cultivate their image.

Building on this, we draw on the limitations of each reviewed concept to suggest another concept, that would incorporate the multi-centric nature of contemporary global governance. Questions can be raised as to the opportunity and relevance of adding yet another concept to describe policy actors in global governance. We attempt to answer these questions in the second part of the paper. We close this conceptual review by sharing reflections on the future of applying the global policy entrepreneurs/ agents/ translators/ brokers terminologies from a decolonial angle.

2. Conceptual review

We review eight existing terminologies, namely Epistemic communities (Haas), Policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon), Knowledge/reform entrepreneurs (Nay), Change agents (Strang & Soule), Transfer agents (Stone), Translators (Callon), Knowledge brokers (Lomas), and Development brokers (Olivier de Sardan & Bierschenk).

First, Haas's concept of *epistemic communities* (Dunlop, 2009; Haas, 2015, 1992) has been widely applied in studies of global development policymaking. Epistemic communities "differ from ordinary scientific communities [...] in the normative — and political — dimension of their role in the construction of legitimate and consensual knowledge that is yet possible to refute" ((Charton, 2015, p. 52); personal translation). Charton goes on to mention LMIC decision-makers' calling of members of these communities, to support them in their political action. While policies may indeed travel through organisations and networks (i.e., collective actors), they also do so through individuals (and their personal/professional trajectories), who exert power because they are recognised as having their own legitimacy in polycentric governance. Even though individual leaders may be members or leaders

of epistemic communities (and policy networks), we argue that they have, on their own, an important role in the diffusion process (Hogan, 2006).

Second, Kingdon's wide-known multiple-stream approach popularized the notion of *policy entrepreneurs* (Kingdon, 1993). Policy entrepreneurs are defined as "advocates who are willing to invest their resources — time, energy, reputation, money — to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits" (Kingdon, 2003, p. 179). Policy entrepreneurs may be bureaucrats, academics, journalists, representatives of interest groups, or parliamentarians. They may qualify as policy entrepreneurs as long as they are perceived at the ones who "push their proposals […] in order to find broad support among the members of the policy community" (Herweg et al., 2017, p. 34). Kingdon's work has attracted a lot of attention from ideational scholars because it features the promotion of policy actors' underlying values and worldviews (Béland, 2015). Yet public policy analysts tend to agree that the concept is under-theorised (Clausen, 2014; Lynggaard, 2006, p. 67). Kingdon's concept and multiple-stream approach was initially developed to study policymaking at the national level, and in a very specific context: a high-income country (United States). Yet Kingdon's work has been widely used to describe policymaking occurring in LMICs (which often also feature global-level actors), which raised some criticism as to the alleged "universality" of the concept (Kane, 2016). In fact, among global health scholars applying it to explain health policy processes in LMICs (Koduah et al., 2015; Kusi-Ampofo et al., 2015; Mauti et al., 2019; Nay, 2012; Parkhurst and Vulimiri, 2013; Ridde, 2009; Shearer, 2015; Sieleunou et al., 2017), some recognise the limitations of Kingdon's concept and approach by highlighting its "Western-centric" features (Kusi-Ampofo et al., 2015; Mauti et al., 2019; Ridde, 2009). Some scholars discussing the multiple-stream approach, which prominently features the actions made by policy entrepreneurs, argue that it overlooks group and network power dynamics (Clarke et al., 2016; John, 2013). This is particularly problematic if one considers the importance of networks in polycentric governance: networks are prominently featured within the key attributes of our concept (see below). For all of these reasons, we chose not to apply this concept to the study of the diffusion of global health policies. Finally, scholars criticize the fact that the motivations (or "interests") of policy entrepreneurs are eluded in Kingdon's work and its subsequent applications (Clausen, 2014; Hyndman, 2017). One of the key dimensions of DEs (featured in the framework) is precisely about DEs' motivations, which crucially guide DEs' actions. In general, our DE concept and accompanying framework provide a useful heuristic approach to describing DEs, something that was missing in Kingdon's conceptualisation of

policy entrepreneurs.

The policy transfer literature is also useful for conceptualising a more actor-centered approach to policy adoption in multiple settings (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The authors defined the policy transfer as "a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place" (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 343). Policy transfer scholars frequently used Kingdon's policy entrepreneurs. Others coined the term *transfer agents* operating in global governance according to three modes of policy transfer: 1) ideational; 2) institutional; and 3) networks (Stone, 2004, p. 562). However, actors in these three categories may easily join their efforts to form larger networks. In addition, items in the institutional category can also be reflected in the ideational category. Yet according to Barnett and Duvall, effective taxonomies of policy actors must try to "derive critical, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive distinctions" (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 43). While we find the policy transfer literature useful to describe policy actors (as compared to the policy diffusion literature), we note a lack of in-depth look into how they get convinced by a policy idea and take it through a diffusion process. We argue that policy transfer may be included in the broader category of knowledge transfer. Conceptual distinctions between those two fields are indeed difficult to establish, since the original definition of policy transfer features knowledge as the core item that gets transferred (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 343). Stone, for instance, reproduces this confusion when speaking of "the role of international actors in policy/knowledge transfer processes" (Stone, 2004, p. 545). This is all the more relevant in the context of influential knowledge-based policy actors; as those precisely assert their power through designing and disseminating norms (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016; King and McGrath, 2004; Tomlinson and Harrison, 2018).

Sociology of science provides us with another concept – that of policy translators. For the renowned sociologist Callon, "*translation*" is the dynamic process by which actors initially different, end up (by negotiation or conviction) entering into a dialogue around a common problem representation (Lavigne Delville, 2013). Callon suggests that solution promoters, who engage in 'problematisation', seek actors who may have an interest in getting on the case, and try to convince them that the promoted problem representations make sense. To achieve this, promoters develop "a set of actions by which a group of promoters strives to impose and stabilise the identity of the other actors that it has defined by its problematisation", i.e. "*interessement*" (Callon, 1986). Interessement is based on a certain assumption of who the

actors are, what they want to engage in, and who they associate with: this involves establishing relationships with them. Translators thus spread their problem representations through multiplying social interactions: meetings, etc. On these occasions, translators continuously have to negotiate, persuade, and reformulate their argument to adapt to potentially interested actors, who are themselves in constant evolution (Lavigne Delville, 2013). When the interessement scheme succeeds, problematisation gets validated. This is perhaps one of the most promising conceptualisation of policy actors, yet it has so far relatively been under-used, particularly outside of national/subnational jurisdictions.

Scholars from the field of knowledge transfer have, for its part, developed the concept of *knowledge brokers* (Lomas, 1997). These are middlemen engaged in facilitating the understanding of knowledge they acquired, through interactions with the general population or a specific targeted audience. Building from this, evidence-informed policymaking scholars distinguish *issue advocates* from *honest knowledge brokers* (Oliver and Cairney, 2019). Yet, in our experience, even though some individuals did engage in knowledge brokering activities, these did not always feature the entire evidence base (Gautier et al., 2020, 2019b), which is a condition for being an honest broker (Oliver and Cairney, 2019). In addition, one could argue that norms and knowledge are not the only elements that spread to other countries: problem representations (which reflect underlying belief systems that feature specific perceptions of the world and the reality, rather than actual knowledge), financial flows, and even policy advocates themselves are travelling.

Building on the notion of brokers, development anthropology scholars conceptualised the idea of *development brokers* (Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk, 1993), which offers some very insightful dimensions for development scholars. Development brokers are strategic intermediaries (usually, development experts) who mediate by connecting development policy actors sharing mutual interests in policy implementation (e.g., yielding benefits from the policy implementation). Brokers' role is instrumental in seeking acceptable policy solutions between different policy actors pursuing different objectives, but possibly developing an interest in collaborating with each other (Ségalini, 2014). Nay and Smith (2002) emphasise the social enterprise within brokers' strategic mediation activities, as they are striving to create networks and communities. The concept is also useful to analyse strategies to depoliticise policy ideas (Diallo, 2012), and brokers' ability to call upon and rely on development experts originally coming from the (developing) country of interest, and thus considered more legitimate (Ségalini, 2014). However, international relations and public policy scholars

have so far paid limited attention to the concept (with a few notable — mainly French — exceptions: (Nay and Smith, 2002; Ridde, 2004; Ségalini, 2014)), possibly because it comes from a distinct discipline anchoring. Ridde (2004) emphasises the role of local development brokers who define populations' needs, adapt their discourse to match that of the donors, and even engage in aid capture — to fulfill political or material objectives. This empirically-driven definition partly resonated with some findings of global development research, especially those related to African individuals pursuing career advancement, which clearly included material motives (Deville et al., 2018; Gautier et al., 2021). However, the *aid capture* phenomenon was less salient, possibly because donor-favoured trends and practices are increasingly diversified and fast-evolving (Goetz and Patz, 2017; Parks, 2008). To summarise, while we appreciate the value of the concept, we think it needs nuancing and conceptual anchoring: for instance, there is no taxonomy of the processes they intend to shape (e.g., policy learning). In this regard, policy diffusion mechanisms do provide useful and conceptually coherent categories. In addition, analyses of development brokers emphasise problem representations, but not the brokers' own representation systems.

Lastly, policy diffusion analysts (Mintrom and Vergari, 1998; Smith et al., 2014; Weyland, 2009) have reviewed the role(s) played by formal institutions in diffusing policies, but less that of individual or non-formal organisations. Still, Common (1998a) described how two individuals travelled to diffuse NPM. According to Common, the elite was successful in "control[ing] and direct[ing] the flow of knowledge about government reform" (Common, 1998a, p. 447). Diffusion analysts such as Common and Strang and Soule have looked into *change agents* (Common, 1998b; Strang and Soule, 1998). Change agents diffuse policies by using "coercive mandates" or "cheerleading", and often "a complex balance of the two" (Strang and Soule, 1998, p. 271). As they are conceived as "external sources", these scholars separate their actions from adopters' influence (considered internal). However, we posited in this research that what these authors call external actors may in fact take deliberate actions to influence adopters. These adopters can get influenced because external actors represent prestigious "central actors" (Strang and Soule, 1998, p. 274), or because the social ties between adopters are enhanced by external actors.

Other political scientists interested in global governance use similar terms, such as "*knowledge*" or "*reform*" entrepreneurs (Nay, 2014, 2011). These different concepts have in common the centrality of knowledge and information that (groups of) individuals possess and use to facilitate policy change at different levels of government, including at the global level. These denominations

are mostly of a descriptive, a-theoretical nature (they are primarily interested in defining and describing who the entrepreneurs/agents are).

Why introducing a new concept?

Building on this critical review, we believe that it is worth expanding existing conceptual work by emphasising the context of global policy diffusion and the polycentric governance framework (Gautier et al., 2018). We suggest that these entrepreneurs/agents are not only creators and promoters of political changes, knowledge, or institutional reforms; but also active architects of the diffusion (through their development of a strategic apparatus) because they have clear interests in diffusion outcomes. We therefore offer a new concept, that of *diffusion entrepreneurs*.

The analytical aspect of entrepreneurship is threefold. Firstly, the ways in which they develop their resources and authorities and implement their strategies to increase their impact on the global arena help to understand how diffusion entrepreneurs (DEs) effectively develop their "*entrepreneurial leadership*" (Riddell-Dixon, 2005, p. 1068). The notion of entrepreneurial leadership[1] refers to the ability to sell creative ideas to others, e.g. through networks. Creativity refers here to entrepreneurs' innovative thinking as to how to deal with policy problems (e.g., engineering a policy solution). Secondly, these entrepreneurs implement a wide array of strategic activities (e.g., policy framing, valuing lay knowledge on the policy, and sharing selected policy evidence in multiple fora) so as to effectively foster the diffusion of a given policy matching their representation systems (DEs' *intermediate* objective). They may express their creativity through this second process as well, i.e., coming up with new ways to diffuse their ideas (e.g., finding interactive formats to disseminate and promote lay knowledge). Thirdly, the implementation and the expected effects of this strategic apparatus also reveal particular motivations/interests (financial, professional, etc.) more or less explicitly acknowledged by DEs (DEs' *ultimate* objective). Importantly, the notion of polycentrism (i.e., the recognition that political influence comes from various autonomous units) functions as a key enabler in the realisation of their entrepreneurial potential. In Table 1, we report the key existing concepts, their authors, concepts' main attributes and analytical value, and what the DE concept and framework will allow for in comparison.

1. The concept of *entrepreneurial leadership* was initially developed by Young (Young, 1991).

Table 1. Concepts referring to influential policy actors of global governance

Concepts	Authors	Main attributes	Analytical value	What the DE concept and framework bring
Policy entrepreneurs	J. Kingdon (1993)	Originally-encompassed individuals, but later expanded to organisations	Entrepreneurship in the ability to *couple* streams towards policy agenda-setting in timely manner (e.g., using *windows of opportunity*)	DE concept is explicitly applied to the context of global governance and LMIC policymaking; it expands to networks; one overlooked dimension: motivation
Epistemic communities	P. Haas (1992)	"Network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain" (Haas, 1992, p. 3). Emphasis on belief systems (e.g., shared causal beliefs and shared notions of validity), expert authority and competences	Concept explicitly applied to the context of global governance; experts sharing a common belief systems guiding the formation of communities; features power relations	DE concept expands to individuals; framework offers taxonomies of resources and types of authority, and a typology of processes that influential policy actors seek to shape
Transfer agents	D. Stone (2004)	Encompasses: individuals, organisations (including non-state actors), and transnational networks. Soft policy transfer (e.g., of norms) vs. hard policy transfer	Takes the policy transfer literature away from "methodological nationalism" (Stone, 2004); prominently features the role of transnational networks; offers a typology of modes of policy transfer: 1) ideational, 2) institutional, 3) networks	DE framework features overlooked dimensions: representation systems and motivations; taxonomies provide mutually exclusive distinctions; transnational networks identified not only as a *vehicle* (Stone, 2004) for policy transfer but an actor of such transfer

Concepts	Authors	Main attributes	Analytical value	What the DE concept and framework bring
Policy translators	M. Callon (1986)	Encompasses: individuals and networks	Informs empirical findings; features power relations and changes in discourse	DE concept expands to organisations; framework offers taxonomies of resources and types of authority
Knowledge brokers (including: "honest brokers" and "issue activists")	J. Lomas (1997) and widely expanded by other authors	Encompasses: countries, organisations, networks, individuals. Possession of knowledge as key enabling factor	Offers various taxonomies of knowledge brokering	DE framework goes beyond knowledge transfer; offers taxonomies of resources and types of authority
Development brokers	J-P. Olivier de Sardan & T. Bierschenk (1993)	Encompasses: individuals and organisations.	Informs empirical findings; features power relations	Conceptual underpinning; offers taxonomies of resources and types of authority; typology of strategies
Change agents	D. Strang & S.A. Soule (1998)	Encompasses: countries, organisations, individuals Difference between "external actors" and "central actors" bound to adopt a given policy. Possession and control of knowledge as key enabling factor	Informs empirical findings; features power relations	Actors not only creators and promoters of political changes, but also active architects of the diffusion
Knowledge/ reform entrepreneurs	O. Nay (2011, 2014)	Possession and control of knowledge and information as key enabling factor to shape policy change	Informs empirical findings; features power relations	Conceptual underpinning; goes beyond knowledge transfer; entrepreneurs not only creators and promoters of knowledge or institutional reforms, but also active architects of the diffusion

The concept of *diffusion entrepreneur* (DE) is anchored in the field of the public policy diffusion. While we valued the progress and coherence of the body of knowledge on mechanisms of diffusion — policy learning and policy

emulation or "socialisation", in particular — (Dobbin et al., 2007) there is a lack of attention for the policy actors of the diffusion in this field of the literature (Obinger et al., 2013). Other research fields (e.g., sociology of public action; (Hassenteufel, 2008)) proved very helpful in defining the dimensions of a coherent interdisciplinary framework around this concept. DEs are "individuals, networks, and organisations, who seek to promote a certain policy with a view to gain influence […] [and] therefore develop strategies to shape the perception of a policy innovation and to maximise its diffusion" (Gautier et al., 2018, p. 162). Our definition matches Daigneault and Jacob's fundamental condition demonstrating the soundness of concepts (a minimal definition, i.e. focusing on direct and necessary attributes that suffice to define the concept; (Daigneault and Jacob, 2012)), since it features key attributes (who we are talking about and what their interest is). Intentionally, our definition does not feature the particular thematic area in which we originally applied this concept (global health), thereby leaving open the possible domains for utilisation, and suggesting the potential universality of the DE concept.

Main value of the DE framework: the analytical potential of interactive dimensions

In addition to featuring ideational concepts (which encompasses influential policy actors' multiple forms of power) and social interaction, the dynamic interrelation between all framework components indicates the analytical potential of the framework (Figure 1). Indeed, each framework dimension connects to another, and each dimension also reinforces one another in a dynamic fashion. For example, on the figure, the strategies to foster policy framing, emulation, learning, and experimentation are feeding each other.

Besides sharing similar representation systems that guide DEs' motivations to advocate a particular policy, DEs must also obtain or develop certain resources (resources that are themselves shaped by representation systems — featuring professional or institutional culture in particular) to influence decision-making. Multiple types of resources are important to secure the success of DEs' actions. Among those, social resources are key. Social resources draw on the notion of social capital. This expression originates from economics and sociology (Bourdieu, 1986), and has been widely used by political scientists (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2009). It builds on the reflection that social networks play a crucial role in shaping personal and collective trajectories; and as such, they can be considered critical assets empowering people. Testing the framework to empirical analysis – of the global, continental, and national diffusion of performance-based financing (PBF) (Gautier, 2019) highlighted that strategies fostering policy emulation would not have been effective without

DEs' having a strong social capital. The latter enabled them to build alliances at the global level, create advocacy networks at the continental level, and build political momentum at national level.

Figure 1 Conceptual framework on diffusion entrepreneurs (Source: (Gautier, 2019))



DEs also need to develop legitimate forms of authority (financial / scientific / expert / moral) in order to be recognised by other major political actors navigating in the polycentric context of global governance. These assets represent a solid foundation on which they can build strategies to strengthen the diffusion of their preferred policy. DEs' motivations and representations nourish the actions they take. They convey an initial policy idea, participate to developing its content, co-build knowledge and learning agendas about this policy idea (including around its experimentation), frame it in ways that are politically attractive, and encourage policy emulation from a growing number

of actors. These processes are dynamic: one does not precede the other (i.e., there do not represent incremental stages). They reinforce one another: when a particular diffusion process takes shape, it naturally produces phenomena that foster other diffusion processes. In addition, strategies implemented to foster policy diffusion (policy framing as well as actions that induce policy emulation and certain forms of policy learning and experimentation) may facilitate different diffusion processes at the same time (e.g., impacting both policy learning and policy emulation). All categories of the DE framework are thus analytical in nature because they are interrelated. Such interrelation reflects the (largely informal) interdependency among the policy actors of polycentric governance. The potential of the framework, which dynamically links these different categories, is promising. Moreover, despite an emphasis on actors, the DE framework is useful for describing the processes of policy diffusion through space (i.e., geographic levels) and time (since the end of the 2000s).

Limitations of the DE framework

Testing the DE framework on the diffusion of PBF permitted to show that this conceptual framework that is adapted to a variety of research approaches: poststructural policy analysis (Gautier et al., 2019b), qualitative-dominant mixed methods (Gautier et al., 2021), and longitudinal case study (Gautier et al., 2019a). Global policy scholars wishing to reconstruct policy diffusion processes may therefore find it useful. Yet, by focusing on DEs as key agents of the diffusion, our framework inevitably falls in the category of actor-centered policy frameworks (Hassenteufel and Zittoun, 2014), which may lead to overlooking the policy content as well as the wider environment in which policy changes take place. We showed how Bacchi's poststructuralist approach (Bacchi, 2009) could be both useful to inform the policy content, and coherent with our framework dimensions. Still, what may be missing is a contextualised description of the policy that gets diffused in a given country/region. Indeed, historical, cultural, political and economic structures may or may not create an environment conducive to the emergence and diffusion of politics (Edwards and Di Ruggiero, 2011). Building on this, we could have developed an additional dimension, which would feature these four types of structures that shape a policy's environment.

Set in the scope of a political economy analysis, the DE framework could have built on existing actor-centered power frameworks (Krott et al., 2014). Building on Dahl's definition of power (Dahl, 1957), they suggested the following theoretical proposition: "actor-centred power is a social relationship in which actor A alters the behaviour of actor B without recognising B's will"

(Krott et al., 2014, p. 37). From the onset, we perceived this representation of power interaction as too restrictive. In the case of global health governance (GHG), *hard* power (or coercion) is still occurring, but scholars tend to agree that it is no longer the main form of interaction between actors. In actor-centered power frameworks, *soft* forms of power (e.g., productive power) seemed to be diluted. In the DE framework, the two dimensions featuring power — resources and types of authority — refer to both *hard* and *soft* forms of power. The taxonomies enable us to describe the types of resources and authority at the disposal of DEs. However, in doing so, we may have reduced the possibility to examine more deeply dynamic power interactions between DEs, policymakers, African consultants, and other key actors of policy change. To foresee this issue, we could have developed another framework component, which would have provided the list of possible forms of interaction (e.g., repeated encounters with key policy actors, modes of communication, etc.) that DEs engage in, in order to foster diffusion processes. Even though we were able to provide insights on this very matter through our empirical analysis, conceptualising from the onset the forms of interactions would have possibly enabled us to explain in a more detailed fashion how power operated.

Ideas for improving and advancing the DE framework

We invite socio-anthropologists and political scientists to test the DE framework while using different research designs and methodological approaches. For instance, it would be relevant to adopt a prospective approach to these diffusion processes. Ethnography is an adequate research tool to carry out a prospective study of diffusion processes. We invite other scholars (in particular, those in anthropology) to apply our framework using an ethnography approach by, for example, observing an international organisation that produces and fuels these processes, especially to account for the aforementioned structures. Similarly, it would be interesting to use this framework towards in-depth comparative policy analyses across countries.

Our framework prominently features multiple forms of power (through resources and types of authority, and through the multiple interactions occurring in implementing DEs' strategies). Yet, reflecting on the provocative title of a book on the global diffusion of education policies (Vinokur, 2007), can we still say that the "who pays decides" axiom is true? In our empirical study on PBF diffusion, policy funding was a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy diffusion. The material resources generated though this institutional arrangement had one key effect: making possible the realisation of DEs' agenda. However, when we applied the framework to the diffusion of PBF at the national level (in Mali), we showed that material resources alone

would not have been enough to spark emulation of policy actors (Gautier et al., 2019a). The significance of social interactions, which involves intangible emulation processes, the (co)construction of discourse and knowledge, and a common history around the experience of the policy, proved central to its diffusion throughout the African continent. To improve the DE framework, it would be relevant to draw on relational sociology, which may help develop an even more dynamic and interactive understanding of policies or interventions (Craig et al., 2018). In future studies, scholars could try to incorporate relational sociology concepts into our own framework dimensions.

The future of global policy actors concepts: towards decolonizing the public policy literature?

Our DE concept emerges from the study of power in multi-centric global governance, transcending decision-making levels. Unlike most reviewed concepts (mostly generated in the United States), the originally-intended scope of the DE framework goes well beyond the Western world. As Cairney reckons, policy theories can be informed through observing "a wider political context in which some social groups, countries, and ways of thinking dominate proceedings, from the direct exercise of power to the maintenance of 'hegemonic' or 'paradigmatic' ideas" (Cairney, 2019b). The DE framework precisely features such configuration: the centrality of power (evidenced through resources and types of authority) in the DE framework makes it a handy instrument for documenting or eliciting power imbalance among policy actors of the global South. In particular, the DE framework provides a toolbox to highlight the disproportionate influence of foreign (mostly Western) policy actors and the ways they subtly interact with local actors to frame externally-shaped policies in the logical continuation of local, government-owned strategies (Gautier et al., 2019a).

Recognizing that from the perspective of colonized and formerly-colonized populations, "research" is inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism, we suggest that additional non-Western concepts to describe policy translators in global governance arenas, and the policy transfer process in general, are needed. Recently, policy diffusion scholars from Brazil have offered particularly useful concepts, e.g. "policy ambassadors" (Oliveira, 2020) and "bureaucrat activists" (Abers, 2019). The concept of policy ambassadors (i.e., individual policy translators operating across multiple governance levels) is particularly close to our DE concept, in the sense that it also carries the notion of transnational influence in global policy diffusion processes. On top of these concepts describing policy translators, we need additional South-grown conceptual and theoretical frameworks. For instance,

a scoping review on the use of public policy frameworks in the literature on health financing policymaking in sub-Saharan Africa has showed that only Western-grown models are used (Jones et al., 2021). Noting that public policy scholars have embraced the decolonizing academia movement with relatively less enthusiasm than other social science fields (such as history and psychology), we encourage public policy scholars from the global South to (continue) challenge the available concepts and frameworks. Indeed, the universality of research concepts, including in the public policy literature, is both debated and debatable (Cairney, 2019b; Grosfoguel, 2007; Mbembe and Sarr, 2017; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012). Going beyond "Western models of policy thinking and discourses" might indeed provide a promising breeding ground for a more diverse, richer, public policy scholarship that would pay "close attention to the socio-cultural and historical context" of non-Western countries and jurisdictions (El-Taliawi et al., 2021, p. 4). It is indeed high time that public policy scholars start acknowledging epistemologies of the South and other forms of knowledge (Hall and Tandon, 2017).

4. Conclusion

In this paper, we reviewed the most prominent concepts describing influential actors of policy translation in the context of global, multi-centric governance. We highlighted some of the strengths and weaknesses of existing concepts and suggested an additional concept. We offered suggestions on ways to apply this new concept, and summarized both its potential value and limitations. Finally, we reflected upon the future of global policy actors concepts, in the context of power inequalities and the recognition that the so-called 'universalism' of Western models and research traditions is debatable. We encourage scholars, particularly those based in the global South, to challenge the existing concepts (including, obviously, the one we presented in this chapter) and produce their own.

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CHAPTER 5

Platform Economy in Lisbon During the Pandemic Emergency: Insights on the Circulation of Policy Ideas, in Spite of the Absence of a Specific Policy.

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1. Introduction

The spreading of platforms' economy worldwide has been one of the most interesting developments over the past decade. As clarified in both grey and academic literature (ILO, 2018; Gineikytė et al, 2020; Rani & Dhir, 2020), its irruption caught many countries and institutions off guard in relation to its consequences and effects, soon demonstrating that platform-driven economy is not "simply a new business model, a new social technology, or a new infrastructural formation (although it is also all of those things)", but rather "the core organizational form of the emerging informational economy", which does not limit itself to "enter or expand markets" but "replaces (and rematerializes) them, […] reshaping the landscape of legal entitlements and obligations" (Cohen, 2017, p. 133).

The different patterns of legal-institutional change emerging to face this scenario have been slower and more fragmented than its expansion, either systematically facilitating the platform economy's emergence, or letting it in a sort of "limbo", where it was free of self-regulating itself, thus consolidating single operators or their oligopolies, and generating profound systemic effects.

Chander (2017) proposed an analogy between the slow growth of policy/legal responses to the emergence of platform-driven economy and a process of "baby-proofing a home", which jointly changes the lived experience of the baby, the family, and ultimately of society, as it generates new industrial production practices, new markets, and new cross-border trade flows organized around producing and distributing an ever-growing array of essential

products, replacing "vigilance with architecture" and engendering "different kinds and patterns of risk-taking" to respond to the often "uncoordinated patterns of self-interested, strategic intervention by platform firms [which] are producing new legal-institutional formations optimized to their various projects and goals (Cohen 2017, p. 203).

In Portugal – a "semiperipheric country" (Santos 2011) whose repositionment within the global hierarchy of world economy occurred with a very fast socio-economic transition in the last two decades – "platform capitalism has found fertile ground to take root and rapidly spread", often overlapping "with already existing informal practices" and "taking advantage of existing regulatory gaps" (Leonardi & Pirina 2020). Airbnb (since 2009)[1] and Uber (since 2015) – with their different degrees of dependence from tourism - are the platforms which have prospered more, embedding themselves in the governmental recovery strategy that addressed the aftermath of the financial crisis started in 2008.

Portraying themselves as mere "technological marketplaces" for matching individual-based offer and demand, they soon attracted the attention of political authorities at different levels, and – especially in Lisbon - became part of a wide strategy of benchmarking connected to the digitalization of economy and the proliferation of start-ups linked to services and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)[2].

Several years after the entry of these companies in Portugal (whose gradual and incremental legalisation opened space to less intrepid emulators) the full account of the legal frameworks' accommodation to the platform-based economy is yet to be written, as in many other countries. A certain "deference" of the Government and the municipalities for all market giants which could contribute to the financial recovery of Portugal suggested to let them free to expand, without too many constraints (Seixas et al. 2019; Teles 2018) or privileged legal formulas and policy measures that could favour their permanence and consolidation (Leonardi & Pirina 2020).

However, it is crystal clear that 2020 – dominated by the pandemic outbreak – forced a visible acceleration to the polity dynamics which can address a new and more holistic/systemic solution to the regulation (and the assessment of impacts) of such app-driven business, and – possibly – the platform-based economy as a whole. COVID-19 outbreak acted as a *litmus paper* for stressing how platform economy has played as a significative vector

1. In 2009, Lisbon had 3 properties online, 46 added in 2010 (Fernandes et al., 2019).
2. One of the central moment of this strategy was hosting the Web Summit in Lisbon in 2016 and 2017 (https://websummit.com), which resulted in a 10-year partnership agreement between the organisation and the Portuguese Government, which was announced in October 2018 and will allow the conference to be held in the Portuguese capital until 2028.

of institutional destabilization, and some of its induced important human costs are beginning to visibly materialize. Within this scenario, some germs of a protective countermovement (although not comparable in strength to the weight acquired by companies in the polity scene) have been consolidating during 2020. This pressured institutions to act and seriously reflect on foreign experiences, which could guide to different solutions for reducing the sort of extraterritorial statute conquered (or self-attributed) by some of the major "location-based" companies of Gig economy in the country.

Which direction will the policy and legal measures follow from now on, is difficult to preconise. But – for sure – considering together the interventions (both in terms of rhetoric discourse and concrete actions) which several different State and no-State actors have been undertaking during 2020, as well as their progression and escalation in the time sequence, it is realistic to imagine that different forms of policy transfers' routes can take a central role, as they played in the recent past.

As we deeply agree with Dolowitz (2018), that "compelling stories are essential to policies" and policies can be viewed – at the same time – as *meta-narratives, narrations,* and *narrative-networks*, in the next paragraphs we will try to report some transformations which started to take place in Lisbon in 2020. They can, on one side, (i) enlighten about an ongoing shift that can modify the narrative consolidated in the last 5 years about the 'salvific role' of platforms giants in Portugal; and, on the other, (ii) discuss to what extent new preconditions can prefigure the way in which different agencies, suggesting a diverse set of reference policy models to face the issue, can convey future policy initiatives in a coherent plot. Thus, we will start our story explaining why Portugal and Lisbon are meaningful for analysing limits and challenges of how the "year of the Apocalypse in slow motion" (Santos, 2020) affected - and partially inverted - the relation between State institutions and some platforms giants. The short essay will close visualising a multiplicity of possible policy routes which are emerging thanks to the specific "temporality" of described phenomena (Shipan & Volden 2008; Kerlin, 2009; Gullberg & Bang 2015) as to "the interpretive actions of street-level and other actors who actively narrate a policy into existence" and the "active communities or narrative-networks, which coalesce around a policy initiative, further its realization [and] can challenge dominant policy narratives (Dolowitz, 2018).

Based on the evidence produced during the "Plus" project[3], this article focusses on Portugal's capital, whose monocultural economy based on

3. PLUS Project (*Platform Labour in Urban Spaces*), led by the University of Bologna under the Horizon 2020 Programme. Grant agreement no 822638. See https://project-plus.eu/the-project.

touristification served to recover from the 2007-2014 crisis (Rodrigues et al, 2016; Conti & Perelli, 2007; Sequera & Nofre, 2018; Pavel, 2020) but has been severely hit by the economic recession connected to the unexpected pandemic outbreak[4]. It aims to contribute to a better understanding of a series of diverse effects of the pandemic on the relations between Airbnb and Uber's ride-hailing, their workers, the urban environment where they operate and the policy measures that started in the end of 2020. We anchored the narrative around 22 semi-structured interviews collected during the three main phases of the pandemic emergency (from March to Dec. 2020) with a diverse range of workers of the two platforms, and some members of the Portuguese Parliament and of local institutions.

2. Lisbon before the pandemic

Portugal is an almost unique context, and a laboratory for platform capitalism at the continental level (Tommasoni & Pirina 2019), also due to a specific legal framework. The latter, for the touristic accommodation sector, counts already on a multilevel governance (which in 2018 passed to municipalities the right to regulate licenses and maximum quotas), while the mobility sector is still centralised at national level, although municipalities are exerting growing pressures to be entitled to an active role – especially for having rights to access big data collected by companies.

Unlike in other countries, Portugal managed to quickly approve a national Law for regulating platform-based transportation[5]. This unveils another peculiarity: the low level of conflict which marks the country and makes it a suitable stage for experimenting *aggressive innovations*, even when they can initially face opposition by groups strongly threatened by them (as was the case of taxi drivers, which organised a 2-weeks strike in Sept. 2018 before the "Uber Law"'s approval).

Namely, Lisbon (509,000 hab.) constitutes a vital study-field, being that its metropolitan area hosts 2.860.000 inhabitants and 44.4% of the whole immigrant population, which is an important component of several activities linked to platform capitalism in a country that represents an essential turntable for the absorption and distribution of immigration in Europe (Baganha, 2007). The development of platform economy in Lisbon is strictly tied to the process of "startup urbanization" (Carvalho & Vale 2018) and the goal of forging a smart city (Seixas et al. 2015). In the last 5 years, several scholarly works

4. See reports by PROSPER: https://clsbe.lisboa.ucp.pt/economiacovid19

5. It happened just four years after July 2014, when UberBlack service started in an unregulated context, being followed by UberX in December, and then blocked by a court for some months as a precaution.

investigated the impacts of Airbnb on the real estate market and the urban geography of Lisbon, within a larger ecosystem of "Local Accomodation" (AL) and short-rental facilities for tourists[6]. Conversely, studies on Uber, and the dense ecosystem of digital urban transportation platforms using light vehicles, are still residual. Nevertheless, they are made significant by the installation in Lisbon, in 2017, of an Uber pilot Centre of Technology and Excellence, which provides support to trips across all Europe and test innovations in Uber's offer, employing (as in the end of 2020) almost 500 persons, with more investments declared to come (Allegretti et al., 2021).

As Leonardi & Pirina (2020) stress, Portugal confirms some general tendencies "related to the way in which IT firms using online models tend to form oligopolies". For example, in 2019, the digitally-driven ride-hailing sector saw the exit of Cabify from the market and the merger between Kapten and Free Now[7]. Other peculiarities refer to the way in which digital platforms territorialise themselves, as is well exemplified by how – few months after Uber's entry in Portugal - the Ministry of the Environment created a Working Group for legalizing electronic platforms for transport, guiding to the approval of Law 45/2018, which defines the legal framework within which Uber and other ride-hail apps are allowed to operate. Its popular name ("Uber Law") is a recognition of the dominant actor that self-imposed a leading role in the transportation digital platform subsystem, opening the way to the entry of other companies – as Chauffeur Privé - that preferred to stay in the rear until the new legislation could offer "balance and security to the investment that is being made" (Pereira, in Lusa, 2018).

The Uber Law's main specificity is the introduction of a third party, an entity called TVDE partner[8], between the platform and the worker: it could be either a collective company or a sole proprietorship (thus, often coinciding with the driver himself/herself). Several of the Law's purposes have failed (including due to the lack of monitoring by part of the institutions in charge of it), and the normative is currently under revision. According to IMT (Institute for Mobility and Transportation) on 01.03.2021 there were 29,410[9] drivers who had received their certificate for the activity (and,

6. See, for example, Rio Fernandes et al. (2019); Cocola-Gant&Gago, 2019; Gainsforth, 2019; Mendes, 2017; Seixas and Guterres Brito, 2018.

7. The significant process of reshaping that characterised the mobility-platform sector in Portugal in early 2019 saw Cabify ceasing operating, while Kapten was integrated into My-Taxy, a taxi service app, that was renamed as Free Now.

8. The acronym TVDE means: remunerated and individual transportation on non-characterized vehicle via digital platform service (*transporte individual e remunerado de passageiros em veículos descaracterizados a partir de plataforma eletrónica*).

9. https://imt-tvde.webnode.pt/numero-de-certificados-de-motoristas-tvde/

surely, not all of them are in operation nowadays), and a total of 8,241 TVDE partners/companies[10].

Law 45/2018 reproduces in the mobility ecosystem a dynamic of regulation of platforms through companies which reduces the responsibilities of the platform, and grant the intermediation between those who operate through it (Uber drivers or Airbnb hosts) and the platform itself. This transformation - aligned to the type of dominant entrepreneurship culture of Portugal (family-based and micro-companies) – created a new chain of command *digital platform > TVDE partner company >TVDE driver*, shaping a hierarchical system with diversified levels of investments, sizes, managerial strategies and types of contracts (Table 1). It is an almost unique solution in Europe, and is being regarded as interesting by Uber Itself[11] when courts – in other countries – started to impose to platform companies the hiring of their workers as employees.

Table 1: Profiles of workers and Labour instruments in the Uber and Airbnb platforms (Source: PLUS Portugal, 2020)

	Owned/loan		Third party	
UBER	**TVDE Company**		**TVDE drivers**	
	Large business entrepreneurs	Company profit	Freelance driver	Percentual (Recibo Verde/informal)
	Small Business entrepreneurs/drivers		Fulltime driver	Fixed rate (Recibo Verde/informal)
	Self Employed		Subordinated driver	Long term contract
AIRBNB	**Small businesses**		**Intermediation company**	
	Single Freelance host	Individual rental	Intermediation entrepreneurs	Company profit
	Small entrepreneur	Company profit	Intermediation managers and workers (large companies)	Long term contract
			Intermediation ancillary services	Freelance (various contracts)

10. http://www.imt-ip.pt/sites/IMTT/Portugues/Documents/TVDE_ListaDeOperadoresPorDenominacao.pdf

11. See the Report "A Better Deal" presented to the EU Commission in 2021: uber.app.box.com/s/tuuydpqj4v6ezvmd9ze81nong03omf11?uclick_id=6d9ab030-b509-440b-baa3-9bbeed26f33c

The peculiar relational model that characterizes Portugal has been defined as "*intermediary platform capitalism*" (Rodrigues et al., 2021) as it represents a "hyper-outsourced model […] that enables a monopoly rent to be gained" (Srnicek, 2017), whereby workers, fixed capital, maintenance costs and even training are all outsourced. The optimisation of these multiple outsourcing mechanisms is granted mainly by the legalisation of the intermediary figures. The result is an atypical model based on a working relationship that is usually criticised as *false self-employment*, combined with a typical feature of platform capitalism, known as multi-homing, allowing customers/workers to switch between platforms according to their convenience. Multi-homing (or multi-app) is common among accommodation providers (Gineikytė et al., 2020): for the transportation system the concept represents a new challenge, because it questions the platforms' capacity to induce and maintain customer loyalty (Demary et al., 2020: 34) and even drivers' loyalty. In Portugal's case, the renunciation of competing platforms to combat the phenomenon of multi-homing (for instance, by contractually binding partners/drivers of exclusivity) has been strategically used as proof of the 'real self-employment nature' of contractual relations between a provider and its drivers (Allegretti et al., 2021).

At the beginning of 2020, when the outbreak occurred, this intermediation system had worsened[12] the precarious conditions of workers, multiplying the number of withdrawals on the amount paid by clients and failing to control working hours, despite the daily workload being regulated by law, requiring companies to regulate and monitor the enforcement of the established limits. In the case of transportation platforms, for example, its respect is ruled algorithmically (through an automatic logoff imposed after 10 hours daily), so multi-homing becomes the tool used by TVDE partners to push their drivers to extend their shifts, limiting the possibility of the control and application of fines from public institutions (Tomassoni & Pirina, 2019). The ambiguity of the legal framework of TVDE also includes the minimum value of each trip to allow cost-recovery, which is not defined, and does not allow public control on the decency of another pivotal part of working conditions.

As far as it regards Airbnb, the government's strategy in collaboration with local administrative authorities made a large market for short-term rentals emerge, which has increased competition among big players, as investment funds and foreign investors stimulated by the visa and fiscal incentives created during the economic crisis and never removed by the progressive

12. See the LISBON CITY REPORT - WP2 (Annex to D2.2) of PLUS Project delivered in November 2020.

governments elected in 2015 and 2019 (Cocola-Gant 2019). Consequently, the number of small hosts shrank and an intermediary business sector for the management of short-term rentals through platforms had emerged (PLUS-Portugal 2020). Many municipalities – in a copy-paste mechanism started by Lisbon, and then codified by national Law in 2018, started to create "special plans" with maximum thresholds/quotas of tourist accommodation in different neighbourhoods.

It is likely that this peculiar way of governance of platform economy could have resulted in a further weakening of social conflict, through a *"divide et impera"* approach that tended to fragment the workers' front, while exacerbating the competition among the increasing number of available drivers and TVDE partners (which in the end of 2019 had reached peaks of 21,000 and 6,672, respectively – being 3,873 enterprises registered in Lisbon[13]) and with the 25.834 registered taxi. Until the end of 2019, collective practices of resistance and conflict with respect to platform labour conditions remained scattered and intermittent, counting on informal associations of small TVDE partners (as ANTUPE, AEOTVDE, APNVD) and – only later – on a group related to CGTP union[14]. The multiplication of mutual-support groups for sharing experiences on social networks (ILO 2020) occurred, casting frequent doubts on their usefulness, as they are seen as unreliable sources of information, when not directly boosters of fake news (PLUS Portugal 2019). However, they had a role in conveying the malaise of the drivers onto the first strike against the unilateral lowering of Uber fares, which happened on January 3-4, 2020.

As for the ecosystem of short-term rentals, at the end of 2019, Airbnb had registered almost 117.000 properties active on Portuguese market, of which over 31,800 in Lisbon, which received from them 10,000,000 € of tourist tax[15]. It has a more solid organisation in terms of representation of owners in interests, both through the ALEP (National Association of Local Accommodation) and is local branches, as through Forums of small owners. These were active during the negotiations with Lisbon municipality on its Regulation on Local Accommodation (approved in October 2019), containing absolute and relative contention zones were new licences could not be issued.

It is worth to underline that, as far as it regards the antagonists of the above-mentioned associations, the activism of taxis' representatives (as ANTRAL[16]) has being declining after the approval of "Uber Law", while the

13. https://expresso.pt/revista-de-imprensa/2019-12-15-Motoristas-TVDE-ja-sao-mais-de-21-mil
14. See: https://strup.pt/index.php/2-destaques-strup/129-aos-trabalhadores-dos-tvde
15. See: https://www.airdna.co/covid-19-data-center (week 24 Feb/1 Match 2020). Fernandes et al. (2019) show active units in the metropolitan area were 48,700.
16. http://www.antral.pt

protagonism of social movements linked to the right to housing has been quickly growing (Mendes, 2020), catalysed by the approval of the New Generation of Housing Policies (2018) and the Basic Law on Housing (2019).

3. Uber and Airbnb during the pandemic

Recent literature has been reflecting on whether the pandemic offered a transformational opportunity (Sigala, 2020) of platform economy's relations with workers and places. Katta et al. (2020) consider that COVID-19 compelled several gig companies, at least temporarily, 'to face up to the precarity of [their] drivers' work', reducing what Graham (2020: 1) defined as *the strategic use of 'conjunctural geographies'* - that is, a way of 'selectively existing at the conjuncture of multiple geographies' and 'of being simultaneously embedded and disembedded from the space-times… [a company] mediate[s]', thus circumventing labour laws, tax jurisdictions and even court systems of the localities it serves.

The mounting public pressure that COVID determined on gig giants obliged Uber and Airbnb to offer some measure of support to their workers: small signals of re-embeddedness and decommodification that implicitly recognised as merely 'tactic' their claim to be extraterritorial, while admitting that they are inextricably tied to the local (Katta et al., 2020; Allegretti et al., 2021).

In Lisbon, the dramatic shrinking of tourism, summed to a widespread breakdown of purchasing power[17] and repeated lockdowns, dramatically reduced the request of short-term rentals and the needs of individual transportation. GDP fell by 7.6% in 2020 (according to INE data). The city suffered stricter rules than other parts of Portugal, due to the highest numbers of contagions and casualties: nevertheless, measures continuously oscillated between the hope a fast recovery of "normality" and the need to find immediate exit strategies to the risks of a permanent crisis. As a matter of fact, the pandemic emergency stressed that its impacts on Airbnb and Uber can only be understood in relation to the two different ecosystems they belong to, which share the "unity of place" represented by the urban space, but articulate differently several platforms and their owners, workers, customers and representative institutions, showing different levels of stiffness and resiliency to context changes. Ride-hail drivers and riders have been allowed

17. During this period, around 2 million workers loss their income; 1.3 million entered in layoff and more than 300,000 requested Extraordinary Support for compensating the shrinking of economic activity of self-employed workers. See: https://www.dinheirovivo.pt/economia/crise-cortara-rendimento-a-2-milhoes-dos-trabalhadores/0/0/00 0:00:00 AM

to work as services of public interest[18], being often recognised as "essential category" of workers in public rhetoric and imaginary (i.e. the "stay-home" campaign, with giant outdoors in public spaces); but they obtained very low financial support – both from the State and from their companies – and faced concrete difficulties and a plummeting in average incomes. From April to June 2020, contributions from TVDE companies to the State fell 71% in relation to 2019[19]. Furthermore, a measure, undertaken on October 29 by UBER in response to the growing competition with other operators (as Bolt, which had recently introduced a cheap fare "XS" for small city-cars) in a suffering market, was the unilateral reduction of rides-fares in the metropolitan Lisbon area, through the creation of a multiplier to adjust rates[20]. A slow-march, on November 6, gathered 500 participants, and delivered a workbook of claims to Parliament, alleging a violation of Law 45, which requires previous negotiations with workers on so important topics, especially because the untransparent algorithm management attributes rides first to those that reduce fares more drastically, revealing that optionality of the measure was a lie.

Indeed, 2020 – despite the COVID crisis – has been strategically used by Uber to reinforce its dominant position in a broader series of gig economy activities, due to the need of moving the more than 27,000 potential drivers[21] to activities of business-to-business (like Drop-off, launched in March 2020[22]), micro-logistics (covered by Uber Connect[23], opened in June 2020 to transport small goods) and food-delivery (Uber-Eats). This generated an "oligopolistic drift" among the major TVDE partners of Uber, as business-to-business services and Uber-Connect had been practically entrusted to the BlueWalk Lda company, due to preliminary agreements it had signed with big supermarket chains as Continente and Mercadona/Pingo Doce. The drift rewarded TVDE companies with more cars, which can easily dilute costs (insurances, safety protections, high rates of dead-hours with no rides, etc.), pushing many small companies to close. Between March and August,

18. Article 11 of the State of Emergency Decree

19. Close to 181,000 € were collected, compared with 622,500 in the same three months of 2019. See: https://eco.sapo.pt/2020/10/02/impacto-da-pandemia-nos-ubers-afunda-receita-do-estado-em-71/

20. At the moment, fare in Lisbon were: € 0.90 base rate, € 0.09 per minute and € 0.59 per kilometre. The Art. 15 of Law 45/2018 say that "final prices should cover all costs associated with the service", but threshold values have never been established.

21. https://www.publico.pt/interactivo/portugal-meio-gas-que-mudou-pais-suspenso

22. eco.sapo.pt/2020/03/27/uber-eats-vai-ter-mercearia-no-catalogo-motoristas-da-uber-farao-entregas-dos-hipermercados/

23. https://www.uber.com/pt/blog/uberconnectpt/

151 companies closed (being 95 in the same period of 2019) and only 322 opened (were 1,583 in 2019)[24].

As far as it regards Airbnb, a study by AHRESP[25] revealed that 49% of companies linked to the tourism sector had moved to lay-off, while local accommodations micro-enterprises filed 24% of the applications received by the 60,000,000 support line created by the Government through the agency Turismo de Portugal[26]. In the beginning of July, bookings on Airbnb and rival platform Vrbo had dropped 76% in Lisbon compared to the same period in 2019[27], being that foreign tourism fell down 60.3% (8,000,000 persons less) from January to August compared to 2019. Despite the short recovery during the summer[28] (mainly due to national tourist and some from EU countries[29]), in September a report of the Real Estate Agency Confidencial Imobiliario[30] registered that 1,744 small apartments were removed from the market. Exit-strategies for owners have been variated: although no clear statistics exist to calculate how many units went to the mid-long term rental market, the possibility offered by the Municipality of temporary suspend the licences for tourist accommodation could have spontaneously guided towards a "precautious behaviour", opting for substituting the short-term with a mid-term business (rental of 3-6 months), maintaining open the possibility of getting back to the usual in case of a fast-recovery of touristic flows in 2021. Real Estate investments – seen as a safe haven – resisted. Data from AirDNA, Bloomberg and other real estate players underlined a substantial persistance of the stock dedicated to touristic accommodation activities (that was of around 25,000

24. https://eco.sapo.pt/2020/10/09/ubers-estao-em-recuperacao-apos-grandes-quebras-da-pandemia/

25. See: https://eco.sapo.pt/2020/04/03/metade-das-empresas-de-turismo-vai-recorrer-ao-lay-off-um-terco-nao-pagou-salario-em-marco

26.http://business.turismodeportugal.pt/pt/Investir/Financiamento/mais-oportunidades-financiamento/Paginas/covid-19-linha-apoio-empresas-turismo.aspx

27. https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/detalhe/bloomberg-lisboa-tem-um-plano-para-tirar-casas-ao-airbnb

28. INE data show that overnight stays in Local Accomodation lost 59.4% in Portugal, and income fell 65%, due to the need of discount to attract tourist. In April overnight stays fell to 58,421, gradually becoming 94,856 in May, 205,960 in June, 417,128 in July and 760,068. See https://www.dn.pt/edicao-do-dia/16-out-2020/alojamento-local-cai-60-ate-agosto-houve-menos-oito-milhoes-de-turistas-estrangeiros-12926572.html

29. INE Data (October 2020) show that 54,8% of clients were national residents, with peaks of 78% in the three months of summer. Rural tourism fel less sharply (losing 41%), but this did not touch the urban metropolitan area of Lisbon.

30. www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/imobiliario/detalhe/rendas-pedidas-descem-em-25-das-casas-no-pais-e-em-33-dos-imoveis-em-lisboa

units, at the start of 2020, i.e. 8% of the total Lisbon housing stock[31]), possibly fuelled by the summer parenthesis, which renewed trust in a possible rebound. Different public institutions offered some options to explore. For example, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education and Movijovem in September signed an agreement with hotels and LA associations to provide 4,500 bed to students (being that social COVID safety measures had affected the capacity of student-residences for 2020/2021)[32]. Lisbon Municipality reinforced the "Safe Rent" programme, conceived in 2019 to facilitate migration of apartments to long-term rentals: but the three calls have attracted only a small number of stakeholders (327 from March to December[33]). The fact that only 25% were ex-LAs[34], reinforce the idea that investors in the sector still bet on the rebound of tourism, and, so, the mid-term alternative is preferable to that of accepting the municipal benefits[35], conceived only to those that accept to sign long-term contracts[36].

Small owners seem to be those more worried about the delay of tourism recovery, as proved by a national study DINÂMIA'CET/ISCTE[37], in which 80% of LA owners/managers recorded a drop in turnover of more than 75% (with peaks of 93% in Lisbon, and lower rates of 56% in the countryside) during the second quarter of 2020, compared to the same period of 2019. Figures are scaring, if 40% of respondents indicated that LA income represented for them more than half of the household income and 38% stated is their only profession. However, 46% expects a return to pre-pandemic levels as early as next year, and 28% from 2022: so, 74% of owners intend to continue with short-term LA, and only 17% is interested in opting for a long-term lease in the private market. Regulation and inspection (by some platforms as well as by the Portuguese State) declined in the COVID emergency period, and both

31. www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-airbnb-short-let-reforms-lisbon/?srnd=premium-europe

32. www.publituris.pt/2020/09/21/hoteis-e-alojamento-local-disponibilizam-4500-camas-para-estudantes-universitarios

33. Data from CML (03/12/2020)

34. https://headtopics.com/pt/camara-de-lisboa-arrendou-muito-menos-casas-a-privados-do-que-esperava-17224438

35. With the program, owners can register for lease with the municipality, which finds tenants through a housing program for young people and low-income families. Lisbon City pays owners from 450 up to 1000 euros depending on apartments' size. Units included in the program do not pay taxes (IRS/IRC or IMI). The contracts must be of minimum five years.

36. Some Airbnb owners switched informally to long-term rentals (that is, without the establishment of legalized lease agreements; example. See https://www.publico.pt/2020/12/03/opiniao/opiniao/lisboa-alhecimento-local-renda-acessivel-wishful-thinking-realidade-1941447

37. The survey was carried out on 868 hosts and managers of LA in the country by the Center for Studies on Socioeconomic Change and Territory at ISCTE - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (Nov. 2020).

sanitary rules and other requirements were let a bit in the hand of social self-control. Informal practices tended to grow, as shown in a study by Nova IMS released in December 2020, according to which 30% of Lisbon properties listed on Airbnb don't have a valid license to operate, and 17% share it with others, informally[38].

4. Institutional (re)actions

The declaration of "state of emergency" represented an important act (unique for Portugal in peaceful times) for remarking the centrality of politics in fighting the public calamity, reinforcing legal certainties and institutional solidarity. The constitutional coverage to the restriction of some rights and freedoms (especially rights of movement and economic liberties, including ownership and private economic initiative[39]) was presented by the President and the Prime Minister as a conquest – temporally limited, although renewable – for making public interest prevail. However, prudence advice to be cautious on requisitions[40], coupling with three other phenomena: (1) the predominance of governmental initiative on the proposing capacity of legislative organs (Griglio, 2020), which "tended to concentrate the thematic focus of the institutional debate on a reduced number of topics related to public safety, employment, and health and social-issues at large (including house, social protection of workers, safety of public transportation etc."[41]; (2) the paralysis of all the external activity of parties (their relation with their bases, and the organisation of events in the public spaces which could mobilise larger audiences on specific issues) and of traditional participatory processes; (3) the slow-pace needed for restructuring the procedural operationality of many institutions, and their full-capacity of interacting with civil society and the media, that had always played as a "pressuring" factor – especially in the two sectors (transportation and housing/tourist accommodation) here scrutinised.

Legislative institutions in Lisbon followed the world trend, dramatically reducing their accountability, the interaction with civil society organisations (audits, open councils, etc.) and the visibility and rebalancing role of smaller parties and independents politicians (Peixoto 2020). Regulations did not

38. https://eco.sapo.pt/2020/12/14/quase-metade-dos-al-no-airbnb-em-lisboa-nao-tem-licenca-valida

39. See Presidential Decree 14-A/2020, March 18th, points a),b),c) and d), at: https://dre.pt/home/-/dre/130399862/details/maximized

40. Actually, in the beginning of the pandemic, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 10-C / 2020 recognized the need to proceed with the civil requisition of port workers, on March 16, 2020.

41. Interview to a Portuguese MP on 23/12/2020.

allow to set a "virtual parliament", so it worked "at half speed […] a sort of ´minipublic´ in permanent contact with their parties", and missing "the scenic part of the interaction with guest-citizens in the tribunes"[42]. Unlike it, the Lisbon Municipal Assembly (AML) operated online since April, but – paradoxically – livestreamed sessions stopped for technical difficulties, and citizens only in July were readmitted to sessions. The council continued to collect petitions – which predominantly shifted online – whose number of minimum requested signatures was lowered from 250 to 150.

Yet, during the period 2016-2019, AML – and especially its Permanent Committee n. 5 on housing and local development[43] - had played a very active role, issuing "recommendations" to the National Parliament for legislating on right to housing, and decentralising competences to municipalities for facing problems posed by the proliferation of tourists' accommodation or AL (Santos, 2019). After the approval of Laws 62 and 71/2018, that transferred these competences to cities, 2019 was dedicated to approve the Municipal Regulation on LA (n.214/2019). During COVID emergency, the Commission on Housing met 5 times, to approve amendments to that Regulation[44], which had been conceived based on expectations of a never-ending growth of tourism; the pandemic made necessary to offer owners the possibility of easily suspend their licences, in order to put their properties on the mid/long-term rental market. AML decided in 2020 to finally activate the mixed commission for monitoring LAs (which include members of local authorities and external observers), and gave it the responsibility of elaborate and release frequently updated data on the situation of tourist accommodation in Lisbon, so that future transformations of rules could be anchored to data. In the world of a local politician:

> *Platforms produce many data, but they do not publish them, and the municipality acts as a gatekeeper and does not even share with the Assembly. COVID served to advocate for a more transparent and targeted distribution of data, that now will circulate for the sake of social movements, the media and the academy. Reopening the Regulation of LA was a victory, and some parties would like to extend the contention*

42. Interview to a Portuguese MP on 18/12/2020. See also CoE reporto n the functioning of parliament during Coronavirus: https://www.ipu.org/country-compilation-parliamentary-responses-pandemic

43. The Committee met 6 times in 2020. See: https://www.am-lisboa.pt/251500/1/,000442/index.htm

44. Proposal n.º 648/2020. See: https://www.am-lisboa.pt/documentos/1604684529X8mJY5ct1Xa07ZG6.pdf

areas for tourism to the entire metropolitan area. But if the emergency will stop soon, possibly we will not manage to impose this vision, and everything will get back as it was. We are a very slow and not powerful institution, unfortunately: and by many this virus is seen just as a mere parenthesis to be left behind soon[45].

If the debate on the ecosystem involving Airbnb was limited (but important in terms of challenges), no provisions were taken by AML on issues related to mobility platform. National Parliament also did not take significative measures. As summarized by an MP:

By consensus, the Parliament gave priority to the legislative initiative of the government. We have been a reactive organism; our agenda has shrunk. […] The central point is data, often very controversial and criticized. Oppositions often feel that the government "pulls out" the data just when they need to have the last word or build a favourable narrative, and not as a basis for planning well and together. (…) From COVID emergency we learnt that, for the future, each sector will have to produce meaningful and transparent data: on housing, mobility, on medical care, on the extent of social aid. And yes: platform economy must be at the forefront in sharing data[46]

Another colleague, commenting the caveat given by the Governor of the Central Bank to the Government, to "intervene at the margin" of the crisis, echoes:

We cannot get back to "budget as usual", filling holes with EU extraordinary money, and then getting back to austerity and Maastricht parameters, without any deep reorientation of our development model (…) In the debate on State Budget 2021 we insisted for all workers to have their working contract and social protection guaranteed. About platforms, we need an inward liberalisation of the sector. Possibly we have to work on two tracks: granting contracts and protection according to general laws, but also maintain a specific channel that take into account specificities of a more flexible model of commitment, and the interaction with algorithms, that must entail some element of transparency and minimum guarantees. Platform workers must be recognised

45. Interview to a Member of the Municipal Committee n. 5 of Lisbon, collected on 15/12/2020
46. Interview to a Portuguese MP, collected on 07/12/2020.

the right to equality and to difference (…) Luckily there was a delay in updating Law 45, but this is good, because now we know what we want to ask to platforms: on workers' rights and protection, as on data release[47].

In November 2020, the 6th Parliamentary Committee on Economy, Innovation, Public Works and Housing (CEIOPH)[48] received the Workbook of Claims of TVDE drivers, and composed the Working Group for the Revision of Law 45/2018. Other institutions started working on contiguous issue, as did IMT, which in June completed the Preliminary Report of the Working Group for Modernization focused on Taxis (which includes hypothesis of a special regime for platform services)[49] and AMT (that proposed modifications to the data-collection and transmission, which also include platforms data[50]).

In November, in a supporting document for the State Budget 2021, the Leftist Block party asked the Government to force platforms to contract their workers as employees, but was ignored. Meanwhile the Government started working on a "urgent" law proposal for increasing the protection and contractual positions of gig workers – respecting EC and ILO guidelines, and reinforcing transparency and access to information for allowing adequate inspection mechanisms[51]. On November 25, the Minister of Labour presented the Basic Document for the "Green Paper on the Future of Work", whose recommendations also discuss how "atypical" platforms' workers will share opportunity of social protection, social dialogue and collective contracting[52]. She added that these topics will be priority during next Portuguese presidency of EU in 2021, and in the EU Social Summit to be held in Porto on May 7, 2021. In mid-December, the Ministries of Infrastructures and of the Environment (after AMT and IMT) received the Working Group of STRUP/CGTP Trade Union in charge of the Claims Workbook of TVDE drivers[53], and this opening facilitated their meeting with Uber's managers. Initially, Uber managers were neither directly

47. Interview to a Portuguese MP, collected on 18/12/2020.
48. https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/com/XIVLeg/6CEIOPH/Paginas/default.aspx
49. Despacho nº 6560/2020, of 23/06/2020
50. Aviso n.º 20519/2020
51. See the interview to the Secretary of State for Employment in: https://expresso.pt/economia/2020-10-23-Governo-prepara-lei-Uber-para-reforcar-direitos-dos-trabalhadores-das-plataformas-digitais
52. https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc22/comunicacao/noticia?i=governo-apresenta-base-do-livro-verde-sobre-o-futuro-do-trabalho-aos-parceiros-sociais
53. http://www.cgtp.pt/accao-e-luta-geral/15304-grupo-de-trabalho-fez-avancar-caderno-reivindicativo-dos-parceiros-e-motoristas-tvde-strup?fbclid=IwAR3Mn1E67pojribT8F1x-bUYBGFoBSYl-seTJF3l2bAWubBjK3uoxTSrk4eQ

informed[54], nor audited: only on March 31st, negotiation started on the base of a proposal of social protection and "presumption of workmanship" of drivers and riders that Government emulated from Spain. This happened only after the European Union (on Feb. 24th, 2021) started a public consultation on the same issue (Tomassoni & Allegretti, 2021)[55].

As for the tourist sector, on December 21, 2020, the Minister of Economy and Digital Transition declared that Residence Permits for Investment (ARI), or gold visas[56], are not a fundamental tool for attracting investments, and the day after the Council of Minister stated[57] they cannot be conceded anymore for investments in real estate in Lisbon, Porto and on the coast, but – starting on July 2021 – only in the inner country. The measure had already been approved for the State Budget 2020, but its implementation was blocked in April and postponed, due to the strong lobbying of entrepreneurial association claiming that the end of COVID emergency could require their contribution to recovery the economy[58]. Finally, although slowly and late, the measure was confirmed, being appreciated by social movements which adverse all measures that threaten the to increase touristification and gentrification.

Such a change of pace, shows a deep shift in the institutional positions on the need of a public intervention in regulating sectors where gig economy operates with rules that are seen more critically after the pandemic. Lisbon Mayor also took some strong public positions: in July 2020 (in a provocative article on "The Independent"[59]) he proposed that essential workers – including hospital staff and transport workers, increasingly forced out of a touristified Lisbon - could re-enter in "Airbnb-style holiday rentals" transformed into "safe rent" [60] homes. On November 20, he declared he would file a com-

54. https://eco.sapo.pt/entrevista/em-2021-queremos-passar-de-eats-para-distribuir-tudo-dizo-novo-general-manager-da-uber-eats/

55. Ver: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_686 e https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=23655&langId=en

56. Since 2012, ARI program concedes residence permit (and then citizenship) for pursuing investment activities to extracomunitarians, by transferring capital, creating jobs or acquiring real estate. Accumulated investment amounts to 5.6 billion euros (being 5.0 linked to the acquisition of real estate). Since 2012, 9,340 visa were conceded: 1,245 in 2019 and 1,133 in 2020 (data from SEF, 2020).

57. https://vidaimobiliaria.com/noticias/investimento/aprovada-limitacao-vistos-gold-lisboa-porto/

58. See: https://www.idealista.pt/news/financas/investimentos/2020/02/10/42367-travao-aos-vistos-gold-so-entra-em-vigor-em-2021, and https://www.idealista.pt/news/financas/investimentos/2020/04/13/43023-vistos-gold-continuam-a-funcionar-da-mesma-forma-pelo-menos-ate-afinal-do-ano

59. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/coronavirus-lisbon-portugal-airbnb-homes-key-workers-a9601246.html

60. See: rendasegura.lisboa.pt

plaint with the Competition Authority against delivery platforms as Glovo and Uber Eats for the high commissions imposed on restaurants to provide home delivery service[61]. Although both declarations looked more as bombastic marketing initiatives than real political interventions, they boosted a large debate, maintaining social oversight alive in a period in which public attention could be distracted by the "monoculture" of COVID news in national media. Furthermore, the second was accompanied by the promise of committing the municipality to experiment an alternative costless solution, a cooperative platform on the base of what Bologna and other cities committed in networks as C40 or Cities for Adequate Housing are doing.

5. A BRIEF DISCUSSION

The pandemic outbreak in Lisbon hosted two different performances of the main platform economy giants that operates in the urban scene, both severely hit by the restriction to movements and the stagnation of the economy. Uber appeared more adaptable and proactive in exploring a large range of complementary activities that consolidated its image of a dominant and reliable player in the metropolitan scene, thus speeding-up a transition (that was already pre-structured) from a single 'core business' to a diversified presence in contiguous sectors – through a variated set of partnerships and agreements. Nevertheless, it tried to maintain its business model untouched, taking advantage of "the acceleration in the digitalization of consumers" and the acquisition of "new habits" in purchasing "that are slowly becoming part of people's lives"[62], but without facing the asymmetries existing among its different "partners", which have been showing a tendency to a Darwinian differentiation, that is consolidating the position of the bigger intermediaries, in relations to other categories proposed in Table 1.

Airbnb took a more "wait-and-see position", letting its advocates work to convince the political actors that a return back to business-as-usual is still possible, and is worth not to take too radical measures to change the regulatory panorama of rental and the privileges granted to tourists and foreign investors in the past. Somehow, investments remained "suspended", and the brief summer break 2020 – with the partial return of tourism (at least the national one) – was used to feed trust in this narrative, so that hosts could avoid the

61. See: https://www.nit.pt/fora-de-casa/na-cidade/medina-vai-fazer-queixa-da-ubereats-e-quer-criar-uma-alternativa-para-os-restaurantes and https://observador.pt/2020/11/20/medina-abre-guerra-com-a-ubereats-e-promete-alternativa-sem-custos-para-restaurantes/?fbclid=IwAR1DLEs5atwh6yA5fZ41mEYy4uaV_LbOzWnTPLKMttv7HCHPfqr1eNeuYuY

62. See interview to the Portuguese General Manager of Uber-Eats, Diogo Aires Conceição, in Barbosa&Amaral (2020)

temptation of searching for individual-based "exit strategies" (as entering the market of long term rental) which could put them "out of the system" dominated by the platform. A differentiation emerged between big investors (who can wait more patiently to see their income coming back) and small owners. The platform tried to secure the latter, offering some insurance solutions – although lately and inadequate –which could secure their permanence in the system. So doing, Airbnb clearly recognised that the pandemic hit differently – and with more or less severe consequences – a range of diverse actors, who had been artificially threated too much homogenously until now.

In this panorama, what made the difference between the two gig-giants – during COVID-19 emergency - seems to have been a combination between the pro-active attitude to change of each company, and the characteristics of the "ecosystem" in which it operates. In this perspective, Uber seems to have survived better to the crisis, thanks to 3 factors: (1) the osmotic flows of workers and customers between the contiguous service-domains of multimodal transportation, micrologistics and food delivery; (2) the possibility to build its core business on local clients/inhabitants, continuously remarking their centrality in the change of rules; (3) the higher degree of centralisation of its decision-making structures, and the more authoritarian approach of its gatekeepers.

Conversely, the platforms operating in the domain of home-accommodation proved less resilient to dramatic changes imposed by COVID-19 emergency. This was not only because they depend more on touristic flows, but also because their ecosystem has not major possibilities of expansion until saturating the public space (as transportation does), but it's based on a finite urban patrimony, where it competes for the same "assets" (the built heritage) with the primary housing systems, whose advocates – the social movements for the right to housing and the right to the city – strengthened and sharpened they struggles methods during the pandemic (Mendes, 2020), consolidating their alliances with political forces.

Somehow, the differences among Uber and Airbnb in Lisbon during the pandemic, are also a photo of two different types of algorithmic management. In fact, the first is a totally customer-centred one, which organises the complexity of the ecosystems (and the collected data) to maximize the profitability of the service offered for the platform owner and capitalizing the loyalty of clients, but almost ignoring the human factor constituted by the workers. They are almost viewed as a negative externality, and completely interchangeable, within a pool of workforce which is larger enough to be forced to accept an internal competition to bottom. Conversely, the Airbnb algorithmic management (despite some new rules added during the pandemic to

make the hosts more responsive and fast in tackling clients' needs) acts as a mediator between the customer's preferences, the interest of the technological company and the finite number of hosts who decide to make their living units available on the platform, whose "desire of maintaining control on their properties and their timing and mode of use is often very high, and it translates into specific requests, constraints and limits posed or imposed to the management of Airnbn itself by people than can only threaten to leave the platform if their priorities are not respected[63]".

It must be acknowledged that – while diverse Portuguese forces where trying to face the challenged posed by the pandemics to platform economy – things where moving faster elsewhere: i.e., on November 2020, California approved a referendum recognising to mobility APP-based companies the right of having legalised a system based on partnership with autonomous drivers[64], while in the UK an opposite decision was taken by the Supreme Court on February 2021, obliging UBER to contract 70,000 drivers as employees with social benefits (and similar decisions were ruled by courts in Italy and Holland to the sake of riders)[65]. Such events fed intense debates in Portugal, being the pressures intensified by the Portuguese EU Semester which gave to the Government – as coordinator of the European Union – a moral duty of being the facilitator in find solution to a series of common problems shared by many members States.

This specific conjunction requires to identify the main lines of convergence of different actors, who have been intervening in the Portuguese debates with strong agency but different power in the last year, and is an opportunity to identify which mechanisms of policy diffusion are at work, in relation to consolidated models (Shipan and Volden, 2008; Evans, 2009) and transfer routes (Minkman, 2018; Marsh and Sharman, 2009), or to more innovative regards (Stone et al., 2020).

In fact, as an "early adopter" of an almost unique solution for formalising the presence of giant platforms (what we defined as "intermediary platform capitalism"), Portugal could be the protagonist of its own proposals to respond to common challenges of other countries, in front of the frequent courts' rulings, which seem feeding their "legislative void". But – at the same time – there has not been enough emphasis on monitoring and assessing the

63. Interview of the authors with a Portuguese host of Airbnb, female, 39 years old (collected on 19/12/2020)

64. https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_22,_App-Based_Drivers_as_Contractors_and_Labor_Policies_Initiative_(2020)

65. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/19/uber-drivers-workers-uk-supreme-court-rules-rights

years in which Portuguese legislation operated, and is clear that the followed path was largely incomplete for at least 3 reasons: (1) it did not have enough negotiations with a broad range of social partners; (2) it did not face "platform economy as such", but concentrated on single policy sectors (as transportation or tourist accommodation), so losing the broad interconnections with other domains; (3) it almost ignored the centrality of data collection and elaboration, which represent the main specificity for evaluating the added value of platform-driven economy.

In this perspective, a *bricolage* solution (Stone, 2017) would be the most suitable and likely approach to the reconstruction of the policy framework in Portugal. *Imitation* is, at the moment, the perspective chosen for the solution of the specific issue on "how to balance system flexibility with workers protection: and the reference model seems the Spanish one (based on "*presumption of employee status*"), which has been discussed with social partners since February 2021 as a more welfarist version of the British proposal, which includes "zero-hour contracts"[66]. Such a solution needs to be complemented by ideas coming from other sources, and cities like Barcelona (Morozov and Bria, 2018) or Bologna[67] have been visualised as possible references – respectively – for emulating solutions referred to the topic of data production and sovereignty, and the implementation of cooperative-driven or ethical-based business models, where State entities (as municipalities, for example) can have a central role of engine in fostering new approaches to digitalised service-provision.

Under this perspective, it seems that the visible role played by local authorities (as Lisbon's Mayor) and their national and transnational networks (the RAP-Network of Participatory Municipalities, or Cities for Adequate Housing[68]) had an important role in the debate on problems and solutions for platform economy in Portugal, that can be accommodated in the rich analyses proposed by a more recent and heterodox literature on policy diffusion and transfers that focuses on the pivotal role of "ideation" and "knowledge circulation" through ambassadors and entrepreneurs (Porto de Oliveira, 2017; Stone et al., 2020) rather than on the centrality of fixed formulas and legal protocols.

At the moment, local institutional actors in Portugal are still in the process to gain a space at the negotiation table opened by State decision-makers, for a comprehensive and systemic reform of platform economy. But two advantages stand by their side: (1) the fact of having already been cooptated as central players in

66. https://expresso.pt/economia/2021-03-11-Espanha-alcanca-acordo-para-rever-Codigo-do-Trabalho-e-reforca-protecao-aos-trabalhadores-das-plataformas

67. https://www.legacoop.coop/quotidiano/2020/09/18/nasce-a-bologna-la-piattaforma-consegne-etiche-in-collaborazione-con-coop-idee-in-movimento-e-almavicoo/

68. See: www.portugalparticipa.pt, and https://citiesforhousing.org

some of the platform economy sectors (for example in the local tourist accommodation in private apartments/homes, as in housing provision); and (2) the fact of having been outstanding protagonists – especially during the pandemic – of innovative solutions in sectors where they are still marginally involved by State norm, as is the case of mobility – where Lisbon emerged for an advanced project of "mobility-as-service" that reorganised all micro-mobility services (bike, moped, skates) and started to integrate public transportation and private complementary services. In such a panorama, obviously big cities will have a central role for the reorganisation of the platform-economy, especially when they have (as Lisbon or Porto; but is partially through also for Faro in the regional-territory of Algarve) a formal responsibility in articulating metropolitan areas, and interconnecting the effort of smaller political/administrative units.

Under this perspective, although – up to now - the main policy for dealing with platform economy in Portugal has been that of *not having a policy* – or having just *partial and fragmented sectoral policies* - the horizon which is taking shape promises much more. It appears, in fact, as a multipolar arena (Baker & Walker, 2019) where dynamics of competition and cooperation (Mawdsley, 2017) meet with translations (Hassenteufel et al., 2017), and a plethora of diverse agents and narratives (Porto de Oliveira & Pal, 2018; Cabral et al., 2013), which show they want to avoid a model learning only from successes (Simmons and Elkins, 2004), and could favour a creative and holistic solution, more adequate and tailored to the peculiar conditions of time and place (Peck & Theodore, 2015; Weyland, 2007).

Possibly, when the present "rush hour" will be over, calmly reflecting on which type of policy circulation has prevailed in a country whose semiperipheral nature encourages the appeal to Southern Epistemologies and different perspectives on the ecology of knowledges (Santos 2011; Stone et al. 2020) will be possible. And it will be clear if (and to what extent) a policy transfer "from below" (Towns 2012) has been possible. In the moment of writing this essay, the debate existing in the country – and especially the contributions coming from some of the most affected stakeholders (as Uber drivers in their support chats) – show that the ideas which meet in the public debates have a strong focus in common: (i) they come both from on-policy and off-policy learning rather than from imitation (Sharman, 2006), and (ii) they pose a *caveat* on any solution marked by coercive isomorphism (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983), indicating a path that values legal provisions which offer multiple choices - instead of standardized answers to problems - recognising freedom to choose among different tailored solutions as "an added value of our democracy"[69].

69. See chat exchanges quoted in Tomassoni and Allegretti, 2021

6. Final remarks

The pandemic breakout has exposed the contradictions of the Portuguese urban economic recovery model of the last decade (Teles, 2018), which - grounded in the dynamics of real estate and the touristification – has generated a rapid growth, but with reduced environmental, social and economic sustainability. It also reconfirmed that Portugal can be seen as a laboratory for what Leonardi and Pirina (2020) have defined as *varieties* of gig economy, shaped in "a fruitful dialogue between digital platforms and political institutions", included local authorities which acted as a sort of "ambassadors" and "entrepreneurs" (Porto de Oliveira, 2017) to favour new solutions and the adoption of different perspectives on platform economy in the specific and unique setting created by the formalised Portuguese model of "intermediary platform capitalism".

During 2020, national institutions – imprisoned in their own difficulties of a "normal functioning" – had few merits, as they continued to wait for a re-normalisation of sanitary conditions, which could put the clock hands back and restart "business as usual". Thus, COVID-19 remained a still "untapped opportunity" for a paradigm change in the relations between gig economy giants, their workers and the urban environment: this is, somehow, a paradox and another "lost opportunity" for a State that –since the first declaration of the "State of Emergency" – rhetorically claimed its centrality over any other driving force of society, but then did not use these broadest legislative powers ever seen in peacetime. But some policy changes, mainly induced by diverse external pressures, happened between December 2020 and March 2021.

If the last word is still not written, it is because the political environment is much more than the will of formal representative decision-makers, and includes media pressure and oversight, independent authorities and several forms of "counter-democracy"[70] that – in the case of Lisbon – proved to be rich in providing stimuli to politics. In Lisbon, the COVID-19 emergency – with its non-linear time, that alternated fears and hopes of a future normalisation (Santos, 2020)[71] – saw the growth of newly-equipped social movements, especially in the domains of the right to housing, and an unexpected strengthening of sindicalisation dynamics in the sector of people transportation and good/food deliveries. Their critics contested the poorly-conceived assistance packages created by the government for employees and entrepreneurs, as the prevalence of a nostalgic imaginary of the recent recovery (concretely based on a disqualification of working skills and relations, on acritical incentives

70. See: Rosanvallon (2008)
71. See: Santos (2020a)

to any form of foreign investment, as on a rentist, extractivist and predatory model of austerity urbanism); but also brought to the debate possible solutions coming from other cities and more oriented towards a cooperative and commons-oriented imaginary.

Clear requests come from different spaces, asking for a revision of the reglementary framework that could focus on equity-based approaches, grounded on the recognition of the differentiated impacts – made clearly visible by COVID-19 outbreak - that changes in the market trends can generate for the diverse ranges of actors that we tried to depict in Table 1, and their different types of investments and risks.

Undoubtedly, the enforcement of the recently updated new Municipal Regulation of Local Accommodation of Lisbon (2019) and the revision of Law 45/2018 (expected for 2021) constitute an unmissable opportunity to develop their still unexplored potentials and make sense of the large production of data that platforms produce and are still unused. Institutions will have to strive to obtain the release of meaningful data from the gig-giants, and learn to use them to monitor the laws' application and imagine their transformation in tight collaboration with the entire public governance structure, but also unions, social movements and academic institutions.

The required shift means abandoning a sort of subservient approach to the gig investors showed by different government levels until now, and the inertia that prevents to reshape public decision-making procedures and capabilities[72], to show real will of control of private entrepreneurship in order to foster platform workers' rights and genuinely prioritise common goods in the planning and management of Lisbon. The latter, for sure, can play a significant piloting role not only for the entire country (now that both platforms are operating on a nation-wide scope), but also valuable for finding innovative ways for regulating the gig economy elsewhere.

It is still hard to say which routes (Minkman et al. 2018) will be followed by policy transfers in the two direction (inward and outward), but it is clear that the present debate is rich in suggestions coming from a wide circulation of ideas and a large ecology of knowledges, supported by different agencies. The latter make difficult to consider the pandemic just a "parenthesis" between the previous normality and an attempt to return back to something pretty similar, rather than "a point of no return", whose legacy must be taken advantage of, for reducing the asymmetries existing in the relations between platforms and workers/partners and renegotiating their presence in the specific territory.

72. Mazzucato&Kattel (2020).

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CHAPTER 6

Assessing multilateral defense policy diffusion in South America: the South American Defense Council unpacked

Thales Carvalho

Introduction

The South American Defense Council (SADC) was the first regional institution created to deal with security and defense issues, with neither presence nor direct intervention from the United States (US). Its creation dates from December 2008, and it worked until November 2016 – the date of the last meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers. Increasing defense cooperation and supporting confidence measures were among its main objectives (Union of South American Nations, 2008a). SADC was a council within the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) structure. When some members abandoned the organization after (center)right-wing governments took office, the same happened to SADC.

As an international organization (IO), it was expected that the Council could propose, coordinate, and consequently diffuse policies among its members in order to achieve its objectives (Carvalho et al., 2021; Faria, 2018; Jakobi, 2009). I claim that the main ways through which SADC engaged in these processes were through its initiatives. According to the literature, there was plenty of them (Bragatti, 2019; Carvalho, 2018; Mijares, 2018; Vaz et al., 2017; Vitelli, 2017, among others), which means that we have lessons to learn from the Council's activities, to be applied in potential future regional defense cooperation initiatives. However, most contributions deploy the lenses of regional integration or security policy frameworks, which provide a rich understanding of the regional security environment. Still, these lenses provide little capacity to understand the mechanisms through which a regional organization can work towards coordinating its members' policies.

In this chapter, I intend to answer how the South American Defense Council acted towards engaging in policy diffusion processes by applying a policy diffusion framework. I claim that the Council tried to act as a facilitator of these processes most of the time, intensifying interactions among its members, increasing the circulation of information, and building confidence among policy-makers from different countries. In some specific situations, it also tried to formally diffuse policies, setting standards to be adopted by the South American countries, and monitoring the implementation of some measures by its members.

In order to find it, I analyzed all the documents related to SADC available on the UNASUR[1] website – which is currently offline. Then, I unpacked the Council's processes while also building a dataset containing all the proposed initiatives and the related data. Here, I present these results.

Before starting, it is important to introduce a caveat: this is not a chapter about whether or not SADC successfully diffused policies. Analyzing if it succeeded in these processes would require a more specific discussion about particular issues, as well as a different methodology, which extrapolates my objective here. I assume, according to the literature about international organizations, that UNASUR and its Defense Council, as any IO, acted towards coordinating and diffusing policies to its members, whether succeeding or not (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Joachim et al., 2008). Therefore, my focus here is to identify the mechanisms through which the Council engaged in these processes, does not matter if it succeeded or not.

The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss SADC's origins and objectives to understand its *raison d'etre* and what we could expect from its action. Then, I rely on policy diffusion literature to understand the mechanisms through which the Council could act towards coordinating its members' policies to reach its objectives. Third, I present the data and methods deployed for the analysis. Fourth, I unpack the Council's processes to understand how decisions were made and in which steps policy diffusion could take place. Finally, I present statistical evidence regarding the mechanisms of SADC's action, based on its initiatives.

SADC inception and objectives

The regional multilateral dialogue regarding security and defense issues dates, at least, from the 1940s. At that time, the United States led the creation of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) within the context of the Second

1. I thank Yulieth Martínez (UFMG) for having downloaded all of these documents and shared them with me.

World War. After the end of this conflict, at the beginning of the Cold War, the US also led the elaboration of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR - 1947), the creation of the Organization of the American States (OAS - 1948), and the Inter-American Defense College (IADC). These institutions were connected to American views about Western hemispheric security, primarily based on opposing the Soviet bloc and fighting communism (Abdul-Hak, 2013; Martins Filho, 1999).

Since then, there were some attempts to shift regional visions and increase dialogues among the South American countries (at least those in the Atlantic) and even include other regions. Two examples were the failed effort to create a South Atlantic Treaty Organization and the successful formation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS). Both initiatives were related to an increasing dialogue with African states. However, neither converted into effective institutions to concert security policies (Carvalho and Souza, 2019).

It was only after the end of the Cold War, in the context of reducing American influence in the region, that multilateral dialogue regarding security and defense issues was effectively included in the regional agenda. In 1999, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay formally declared a peace zone. In 2002, during the Second Meeting of South American Presidents, a peace zone was declared for the entire subcontinent (Abdul-Hak, 2013). Also, since 2001, there were yearly meetings of Mercosur members' army commanders.

During the 2000s, this process was enhanced by the left-wing governments that took office in most Latin American countries - during the so-called "Left Turn" or "Pink Tide." These governments introduced a renewed conception about South American regionalism, which became known as "post-liberal" or "post-hegemonic." It summarily consisted of extending regional cooperation and integration to other areas than the economy, such as infrastructure, social, security, and defense policies; while also contesting the American influence over the region (Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2015; Riggirozzi and Grugel, 2015; Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Sanahuja, 2012).

Within this context, in 2006, there was the first Conference of Defense Ministers within the newly created South American Community of Nations (CASA). Until then, the only multilateral forum for these ministers to meet was the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, within the OAS's umbrella. At the occasion, they discussed the exchange of information, the circulation of scholars and militaries, and the need to create a permanent mechanism to coordinate defense policies in the region, as well as to enhance confidence among them (Abdul-Hak, 2013). Then, when CASA became the

Union of South American Nations in 2008, the intention to increase regional dialogues along these issues was explicit in its constitutive treaty (Union of South American Nations, 2008b).

Finally, there was a critical juncture that boosted SADC formation. It is essential to consider that Latin America is not as peaceful as people think it is (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 2007; Mares, 2001). There are several security problems either at the interstate (such as territorial claims and even ideological disagreements), the intrastate, and the transnational levels - such as guerrillas and transnational crime. Militarizing these disputes is common practice in the region (Mares, 2012, 2001; Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Therefore, increasing the confidence among South American countries would be important to avoid this kind of dispute and the consequent militarization.

The fact is that one of these militarized disputes occurred in 2008 when the Colombian armed forces illegally trespassed the Ecuadorian border to attack leaders from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). An interstate crisis took place among these two states, with the direct participation of Venezuela, which joined the Ecuadorian side. Ideological differences should also be considered in the background of this crisis. Colombia, a US ally, accused the radical left-wing and anti-American governments of Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and Hugo Chávez (Venezuela) of supporting FARC. On the other side, both leftist presidents accused Colombia of violating the Ecuadorian sovereignty (Abdul-Hak, 2013; Galerani, 2011).

Within this context, Brazilian officials, especially its Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, led the creation of a permanent institution to promote the regional multilateral dialogue regarding security and defense issues. Not a military alliance, such as proposed by the Venezuelan president, but a forum to exchange information, build confidence, and produce cooperation among the South American countries on these issues. It was supposed that, by sharing and coordinating defense policies, these countries could have avoided this (and other) interstate crisis and disputes (Abdul-Hak, 2013; Fuccille and Rezende, 2013; Galerani, 2011; Mijares, 2018).

After the Brazilian-led negotiations and a working group to design a proposal, in December 2008, all the South American countries agreed to create the South American Defense Council[2]. It became a forum within UNASUR, aiming to consolidate the region as a zone of peace, develop consensus, increase cooperation in defense and security issues among its members, and build a common identity among its members regarding these issues. The Council had

2. Colombia was the most reluctant country to accept the initiative, conditioning its participation on the need for consensus in decision making, for example (Abdul-Hak, 2013).

as its specific objectives to promote the exchange of information, military training, and to promote a shared vision about security and defense policies; to produce common positions on these issues in multilateral fora; to promote confidence-building measures; to increase the cooperation on defense industrial and academic issues; to share experiences on actions towards natural disasters, demining, and peace operations (boosted by the South American participation at the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti – UNAMIH/MINUSTAH); and to promote gender issues within defense policies (Union of South American Nations, 2008a).

Several authors discuss SADC's actions towards accomplishing its objectives, providing us with preliminary evidence about it. Saint-Pierre and Palacios Junior (2014) note the Council's role on confidence-building measures, increasing shared information regarding defense issues, especially the standard methodology to report SADC members' military expenditures. Vitelli (2017) analyzes how important the seminars were to increase confidence and build a regional identity towards defense and security issues. Bragatti (2019) mentions that the Council increased the exchange of information about peace operations and dialogues regarding the defense industry. He also highlights the role of the Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED) on diffusing policies (such as the standard methodology regarding military expenditures) and the courses that occurred within the South American Defense School (ESUDE). Hence, it is possible to say that the Council conducted several actions towards reaching its objectives.

International organizations and policy diffusion

International organizations (IOs) are created because states acknowledge they must exist in order to promote the common welfare and collective advantages. These institutions are expected to act towards providing these benefits either because they are supposed to detain knowledge to recommend some good practices or because they are often seen as "neutral" actors, working for improving the well-being of all their members - or both. It is, thus, expected that members comply with institutional actions to obtain benefits. This capacity to increase the predictability of actors' actions is also a benefit from the IOs existence (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Zürn et al., 2012; Carvalho et al., 2021).

Consider SADC's example. A necessary condition for its creation was the fact that South American countries shared at that time, to some extent, the perception that it would be beneficial to have a regional institution to deal with security and defense issues, as well as to support confidence-building among its members, thus increasing the capacity to predict their actions

(Abdul-Hak, 2013; Galerani, 2011). Therefore, by receiving from states the mandate to act towards some issue area, an IO (in our case, SADC[3]) become responsible for improving dialogues and for coordinating actions among its members, influencing their policies (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006; Zürn et al., 2012; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Joachim et al., 2008). This process in which a state adopts a policy that is entirely or partially adopted or recommended by other actors, such as international institutions, is what we call policy[4] diffusion (Carvalho et al., 2021; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Graham et al., 2013; Marsh and Sharman, 2009).

Both policy diffusion and international organization literature have been discussing how can these institutions act towards spreading policies to their members (see Carvalho et al., 2021; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Faria, 2018; Fang and Stone, 2012; Joachim et al., 2008; Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 2012). Jakobi (2009) provides us with one of the most successful efforts in this sense. She proposes that these institutions can formally deploy five instruments to spread their proposed policies to a system: (1) discursive dissemination, by proposing ideas and agendas for their members; (2) standard-setting, by adopting recommendations and guidelines to be followed by states; (3) coordinative functions, by monitoring and coordinating its members' actions towards an objective; (4) technical assistance, providing knowledge for those who want to adopt a policy; and (5) financial means, either by donations or lending financial resources for states to implement a policy.

Carvalho et al. (2021) note that these are useful instruments to observe how these institutions work formally. Still, we also need to consider that these actors can contribute to these processes in a more informal sense. It is especially useful in the case of the South American Defense Council, which had no bureaucratic structures along part of its existence. Its first bureaucracy was officially inaugurated in 2011 - the Center for Defense Strategic Studies (CEED) - and, as I will further discuss, it supported SADC to diffuse policies in a formally institutionalized way. However, we must also acknowledge the Council's capacity to disseminate practices in an informal sense.

Pouliot and Thérien (2017) note, for example, how the UN conferences enable policy circulation among its participants, not only through formal channels but also by allowing for informal dialogues among policy-makers. We can also observe this mechanism while looking at South American

3. I approach SADC as an IO, instead of UNASUR, because the Council was the UNASUR's interface regarding defense and security policies, which are the focus of this chapter.
4. By "policy diffusion", I refer not only to the diffusion of a complete policy but also of any of its elements, such as goals, contents, instruments, programs, and lessons (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

institutions. Pereira et al. (2018) show that the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) facilitated the diffusion of educational, health, and migration policies by increasing dialogues and interactions among its members. Agostinis (2019) demonstrates the same mechanism regarding UNASUR while discussing the diffusion of health policies. As shown by these authors, increased interactions among policy-makers from different states allow both for building confidence and intensifying information flows, thus making more likely the adoption, by a state, of policies already implemented in other countries. As SADC produced several meetings among defense policy-makers from all South American countries, we could expect that it made policy circulation easier among them.

In addition to actors' interactions during meetings, Adler (1998) also provides us with a useful notion about IOs' duty on policy diffusion. The author points to the role of seminars involving policy-makers and experts from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These events allowed for an increased flow of information among its participants and the above-mentioned examples - since it consisted directly of sharing the presenter's experiences regarding some issues.

Seminars differ from ordinary meetings because sharing information is the former's objective, while it does not apply to the latter. Meetings enable policy-makers to interact and build confidence among each other while discussing the agenda. Seminars allow for this to happen but also consist of a moment in which presenters show the visions of their governments regarding an issue. It is directed to circulate information about governmental views on a given topic.

Based on this mechanism, seminars could pave the way towards building a common identity, values, and, to our interests here, diffuse policies among them. Some outcomes from this "seminar diplomacy" could be seen in institutional innovations, while others became norms or policies in member-states. It is crucial in our case since Vitelli (2017) presents evidence that it was a highly used mechanism within SADC.

Hence, my objective is to identify which instruments were used by SADC to allow for security and defense policy diffusion in the region. Considering the discussion presented in this section, I look for evidence that the Council engaged in policy diffusion processes through formal means by proposing actions and monitoring their implementation. Also, I try to identify the role of informal channels by allowing for increased interactions and information flows among its members during SADC meetings or to the role of "seminar diplomacy."

Data and methods

In order to assess how the South American Defense Council used to act, I relied on primary data provided by the Council. It totalized 105 documents, including the records of the Executive Instance's[5] meetings, as well as reports from some workshops and working group meetings, declarations from defense ministers, statutes, and action plans.

I analyzed all the documents qualitatively, using document analysis to extract data (Bowen, 2009; Pimentel, 2001). My objective in this step was to trace SADC's procedures and initiatives. Therefore, to better understand the Council's functioning, I extracted the actors and instances involved in these procedures while tracking the cycle of each initiative, from being suggested to being implemented (or failing). In each of these steps, I identified if the mechanisms presented in the last section were present. I present the results in the next section.

Then, I searched for SADC's projects contained in these 105 documents. It totalized 128 initiatives, and each of them was included as an observation in the database. To improve our observation and to leverage our capacity to make descriptive inferences (King et al., 1994), I included in the database the following variables, based on the documents: the leader of each initiative, the date of its proposition and finish (whether it was implemented, merged with another initiative, sent to another council, or failed); the sources about its finish (i.e., in which document one can find this information); and if it was implemented. Regarding the latter, there are four different manifestations in the database: (1) implemented, when it was possible to confirm that it was put into action; (2) failed, regarding initiatives that were not put in practice; (3) transferred, including initiatives which SADC decided it was more appropriate to sent to other councils within UNASUR; and (4) merged, concerning the projects that were included in other initiatives, because of some convergence of objectives.

I also included two variables for each initiative based on my own codification. The first is "issue," which consists of the topics approached in each initiative (e.g., cyberdefense, peace operations, environment). The other is the "proposed outcome" to clarify each initiative's immediate objective (e.g., to promote a seminar, a workshop, a common document or protocol, a common policy). Codes were based on the titles of each observation. For example, consider the initiative called "*Crear un Grupo de Trabajo para reunir en un mecanismo de respuesta a los desastres naturales*." In this case, the issue was coded as "Natural Disasters," and the proposed outcome is a "Common

5. I will approach it in the next section.

Document/Protocol" for members[6]. The final dataset is available online (Carvalho, 2021).[7]

Hence, in the next section, I present SADC's decision-making procedures. Then, I show and discuss data related to the initiatives, using a descriptive statistical approach to produce related inferences.

Unpacking SADC's structure and processes

In this section, I identify the instances and procedures within SADC's policy cycle. I consider each initiative as an institutional action towards accomplishing institutional objectives. An initiative is an output from the Council's action, while a public policy is basically an output from state action (Dye, 2017; Rua, 2014). Therefore, I claim that the process of formulating and implementing each initiative is similar to the policy cycle. Also, there must be actors in charge of carrying each of these procedures. Thus, identifying actors and processes helps describe if, how, who, and in which stages policy diffusion may occur. I begin by introducing the instances that appeared in at least one step of the decision-making processes related to at least one initiative. Then I turn to the processes themselves.

First, we need to consider that, in its inception, the Council did not have a permanent technical bureaucracy. Despite the two attempts to construct this staff, both failed. There was only the *pro tempore* presidency, represented by the *pro tempore* president of UNASUR. Each SADC member occupied this function for a one-year term. The presidency was responsible for organizing and presiding meetings and representing UNASUR in external meetings.

The most frequent forum on SADC was the Executive Instance, composed of the Deputy Defense Ministers of its members. They were responsible for defining the agenda, as well as debating and proposing initiatives and decisions to be taken by the central decisory instance of the organ: the Council of Defense Ministers. The ministers always gave the final word since they were the actors in charge of Defense policies in their countries. In specific situations, we could see direct influences from the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary-General of UNASUR, or the Defense Ministers themselves on the SADC agenda and indirect inputs from the Council of Heads of State and Government, as I will further discuss.

Considering the lack of a permanent technical bureaucracy, the Council used to establish working groups to advance its initiatives. These groups

6. For this version, coding rules are available in a Supplementary Material, submitted with this file. For the book chapter, coding rules will be available on my website. It was not included here because of space limitations.

7. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ATCX64

were composed of experts and representatives indicated by SADC members. After the inauguration of the Centre for Strategic Defense Studies (*Centro de Estudos Estratégicos de Defesa* – CEED) in May 2011, it divided tasks with working groups. According to its statute, CEED was a technical instance created to support the construction and diffusion of defense knowledge by South American nations. Its creation was also to provide advice to SADC instances when requested (Union of South American Nations, 2010). Finally, in 2014, the South American Defense School (ESUDE) was inaugurated to promote Defense education initiatives in the region. ESUDE was composed of representatives indicated by SADC members and became in charge of some courses given within the Council.

In Figure 1, I present the observed steps through which these actors and instances carried the process of elaborating and implementing initiatives within SADC. I present different options for these procedures, as they varied according to each set of initiatives (e.g., seminars, workshops, common documents, or policies themselves). In order to provide a systematic understanding of these processes, explaining the role of each actor, instance, and step within these processes, I divided them into five "phases," according to the policy cycle: (1) problem definition and agenda-setting, (2) policy formulation, (3) formal decision-making, (4) policy implementation, and (5) monitoring and evaluation.

Figure 1 – The policy cycle within SADC



Source: own elaboration using Dia Diagram Editor, based on SADC documents.

Regarding the first stage (problem definition and agenda-setting), the Council of Defense Ministers, the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and the Secretary-General of the UNASUR proposed problems, ideas, and policies to be discussed and developed by the Council in specific situations, whether or not by a suggestion from the Council of Heads of State and Government. Nevertheless, the most common source of proposals within SADC was the Executive Instance. Having ideas on the table, this instance concentrated all of them on Action Plans, is to say, the Council's agenda for each year. These Plans consisted of documents containing what activities would be developed, who was in charge, and the next scheduled events regarding each initiative. Formal policy diffusion is unlikely at this stage since it only concerns deciding what to be discussed within the Council. Meanwhile, informal mechanisms can act because of the increasing interactions among state representatives at these meetings.

While deciding Action Plans, the Executive Instance also defined who would be in charge of each initiative. Then, the policy formulation stage began. The most common path was to constitute working groups to debate each proposal, with representatives of a few members. For each working group, at least one member should be responsible for its activities, with the possibility of having "co-responsibles" - what often happened. They were supposed to raise information about issues, elaborate reports, and promote meetings to discuss proposals. In these meetings, members could send their representatives to hear and share their impressions about the topics discussed and elaborate, collectively, decisions to be proposed to the Executive Instance. As I presented in the last section, this mechanism tended to facilitate policy diffusion by increasing interactions among state representatives.

After the creation of CEED, some objectives were sent to the Center, searching for technical advice. For example, it provided reports and analysis to support the implementation of a standard methodology to report military inventories, searching for refining the form proposed by the Executive Instance. There were also documents elaborated within the Center to spread specific ideas, especially regarding environmental and gender issues. By spreading ideas, we could expect the Center to support policy diffusion formally, based on recommendations from a technical instance. Therefore, while working groups were arenas for informal policy diffusion, CEED was a mechanism to enable formal action regarding these processes. In a single case (to analyze initiatives to South America at the "White Book of the Air Mobility Command," published by the United States Air Force), a report of the *pro tempore* presidency was requested because there was no consensus to approve the creation of a working group.

On several occasions, the realization of courses and workshops was the objective. In these cases, both formulation and decision-making stages consisted, basically, of preparing these events. The most common procedure regarding these initiatives was that countries in charge elaborated the schedules, syllabus, and contents. ESUDE also became in charge of this kind of activity after its creation. Working groups were not common when these seminars were the objective.

There was no need for approval from Defense Ministers before the courses; the only approval happened when they agreed with these initiatives to be in Action Plans. The implementation stage consisted of the realization of the events themselves. As I already discussed when approaching "seminar diplomacy," policy diffusion might occur in these initiatives by increasing interactions among state representatives and allowing them to expose their visions during presentations at the implementation stage.

In cases in which these events were not the objective in itself, then working groups provided recommendations for the Executive Instance to make decisions. The most common procedure was that Deputy Defense Ministers approved the recommendations, as the debates were supposed to have occurred within working groups. When delegates perceived that some initiatives were related to each other in a few opportunities, they merged them into a single project. Also, in some rare situations, they sent projects to other councils. An example concerned measures regarding organized crime when delegates considered it was not on SADC's scope and recommended that it should be conducted by a council related to these crimes.

In the cases in which the Executive Instance accepted recommendations from working groups or CEED, then they were sent to Defense Ministers, who should also approve them and make the final decision about the implementation[8]. After this approval, the initiatives should be implemented. This approval means an instrument to diffuse policies because high-level state representatives set standards to be followed by all members. Voting procedures within SADC were based on consensus, which is to say, every member should agree with a decision. Then, decisions became rules, approved by all members, and it was expected that members followed them. After approval, initiatives were implemented. States (as usual) were responsible for implementing policies and, after its creation, CEED also supported these processes.

Finally, in some specific cases, the monitoring stage took place. It occurred on the confidence-building measures (after the US-Colombian agreement)

8. In a single situation (the Mutual Confidence Measures after the Colombia-US agreement), the approval from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs was also requested.

and the standard methodology to report defense expenditures. In the case of the former, the *pro tempore* presidency was in charge of verifying its implementation since CEED did not exist yet. In the case of the latter, CEED became in charge of monitoring them. At this stage, we could see policy diffusion instruments by checking if initiatives were implemented and, when not, by exposing non-compliers.

Therefore, in this section, I unpacked SADC's procedures and verified that policy diffusion could occur in almost all of them. I claimed that informal mechanisms could act on the formulation step because of the interactions among delegations within the Executive Instance (Deputy Defense Ministers) and the working groups (Delegates nominated by states), as well as the implementation step, in the case of seminars and workshops (Delegates). Also, I presented in which steps formal policy diffusion could take place - after formal decisions and by implementing and monitoring (CEED or *pro tempore presidency*) actions. Having understood who, how, and in which steps we can observe policy diffusion, we now turn to the initiatives themselves to assess in what areas the Council acted, and through which means.

How did SADC act?

At the first meeting of the Executive Instance, delegates decided to divide SADC initiatives into four axes: (1) Defense Policies, approaching more general aspects regarding defense and security policies in the region and sharing knowledge about institutional structures related to these issues; (2) Military Cooperation, Humanitarian Action, and Peace Operations, based on training and increased interactions about these specific issues; (3) Defense Industry, discussing how to promote more integration and complementarity among South American defense industrial base; and (4) Education and Capacity Building, which included courses provided for militaries from all SADC members. As presented in the meeting records, it was supposed to allow for a better classification of each initiative, as well as to make it easier for each country to choose which of these axes were more important for them.

According to each axis and its respective leaders, in Figure 2, we can see the total initiatives. A first impression is that, indeed, countries focused their efforts on the areas they judged more important. It is to say that states could choose in which areas they wanted to participate in policy diffusion processes, either by sharing or receiving information. For example, Colombia and Venezuela acted mostly on initiatives related to Defense Policies, supporting the exchange of information about these issues in a more general way. While the former presented more diversified attention within Axis 1, approaching issues such as natural resources and pensions, the latter was

more concerned with organizing events to discuss the construction of common conceptual frameworks and a South American identity regarding security and defense issues.

We can also perceive that Defense Industry matters were concentrated on Brazilian and Argentinian leaderships, with marginal participation of Venezuela and Ecuador. Finally, Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador had the most diverse focus regarding SADC axes. The Chilean and Peruvian actions also deserved attention, engaging in three axes. It denotes that these countries had the objective to promote dialogues and cooperation in different areas regarding defense issues. To our interests, Figure 2 confirms that axes allowed members to act closer to the areas in which they had the interest to share or learn about some policies.

Figure 2 - SADC Initiatives by leader and axes



Source: own elaboration, based on SADC documents

The attention on each axis differed not only across countries but also across the years, as shown in Graph 2. Axis 1 (Defense Policies) was the one with the most initiatives during most of the time, which denotes that SADC members attributed a significant focus on sharing and hearing about each other's views about defense and security policies and structures, in a general sense. On the other side, the Defense Industry received decreasing attention after the Action Plan 2010-2011. If we consider that two countries concentrated the leadership of most of them, we can infer that there was not a considerable interest by the South American countries as a whole in cooperating

on these issues. Initiatives regarding humanitarian action and peace operations were relatively constant, while defense education became more prominent in 2013 and 2014. The creation of ESUDE in 2014 itself shows a relative interest in joint military education towards defense issues, socializing knowledge, and supporting a shared vision towards these issues.

Figure 3 - SADC initiatives by year and axis



Source: own elaboration, based on SADC documents

Most of these initiatives were implemented, as we can see in Figure 4. I also included the confidence-building measures proposed after the US-Colombia agreement, so we can also assess their implementation rates. It means that SADC was reasonably efficient in delivering the items proposed in the Action Plans. Axis 1, 2, and 4 represented a high success rate, having more than 80% of its initiatives implemented, including seminars, workshops, measures, and common protocols. It does not necessarily mean that each of these items represented a policy diffused. Still, it is interesting to note the Council's capacity to deliver most initiatives included in its agenda. It makes it harder to say it was an ineffective institution.

Also, it is mentionable that the exception was Axis 3 (Defense Industry), which had most of its initiatives failed. It denotes a relative disinterest in these activities and strengthens the claim that only Argentina and Brazil seemed to be interested in this axis. Finally, the high implementation rate regarding the confidence-building measures after the US-Colombia agreement suggests that initiatives perceived as highly necessary by the Heads of State, Defense Ministers, or Ministers for Foreign Affairs tend to be implemented.

Figure 4 - Implemented initiatives by axis



Source: own elaboration, based on SADC documents

Most of SADC's initiatives were related to confidence-building measures, as we can see in Figure 5. Considering that several of them became implemented, it shows that the Council acted towards accomplishing one of its main objectives. Peace operations and natural disasters were also significant issues in which SADC worked, occupying a considerable part of its agenda. It shows that the Council effectively tried to advance in several issues, as presented when South American states decided to create the institution (Union of South American Nations, 2008a).

Actually, while having a relative focus on these issues, Figure 5 shows that SADC's action was very diverse. There were more general debates regarding defense issues, sharing information about these policies, ministerial structures, or strategic thinking regarding these issues. Specific matters regarding security and defense policies were also debated, such as national mobilization, intelligence, and pensions. This diversity shows that SADC was directed to discuss as many elements as possible towards producing cooperation and confidence among its members while also making possible policy diffusion in a wide range of issues.

The functioning of the Council itself, as well as developing bureaucracies and other institutional mechanisms (codified as "operational"), was also very discussed within the organization. It denotes an effort towards its institutionalization, including proposals to create bureaucracies (such as CEED, ESUDE, and a secretariat) and improve communication with the civil society (considering electronic communication and sharing information to civilians). Last

but not least, it is also mentionable that topics considered important to most left-wing governments in the region, such as gender and environmental matters (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Sanahuja, 2012), also appeared in SADC's agenda. It denotes the diffusion of a more comprehensive conception about security (Buzan and Hansen, 2013; Ullman, 1983) to the Council.

Figure 5 - Issues debated within SADC



Source: own elaboration, based on SADC documents

While discussing multiple issues, SADC also found different ways to implement each initiative, as shown in Figure 6. Most initiatives consisted of seminars and workshops, which discussed issues as diverse as shown in Figure 5. It corroborates Vitelli's (2017) claim about the role of seminar diplomacy within the Council. There were also a considerable number of courses and joint-military training within SADC. General defense issues and views about security matters were discussed within the former, while actions towards peace operations and natural disasters were the focus on the latter.

Considering SADC's objective to advance towards a South American identity regarding security and defense issues, both Figures 5 and 6 confirm that, indeed, the Council deployed several initiatives to accomplish it. It is also possible to say that SADC's action towards diffusing policies to its members was based, within more than 60 initiatives (seminars + workshops + courses

+ training) - not to mention 16 meetings of the Executive Instance and 7 meetings of Defense Ministers - on informal means. The Council increased interactions and dialogues and improved access to shared information among defense policy-makers (either Defense Ministers, Deputy Ministers, or delegates nominated for specific events) from the South American countries.

Figure 6 - Outcomes intended by each SADC's initiative



Source: own elaboration, based on SADC documents

In Figure 6, we can also detect SADC attempts to diffuse policies through formal instruments. For example, there were efforts to develop common equipment, such as unmanned aircraft, training airplanes, and medicines within the defense scope, to be used by all of its members. All of these efforts failed - or, at least, did not succeed until the end of the Council's activities. Still, these were multiple attempts to socialize policies and views among members.

Actually, when we look at Figure 7, formal mechanisms were mostly concentrated on the Defense Industry, Natural Disasters, and Confidence-Building Measures[9]. SADC members advanced in developing common protocols,

9. I do not mention the Operational issues at these points, because these initiatives were more concerned with SADC institutionalization than with diffusing some measures. Of course, the Council's increasing institutionalization could produce effects on policy diffusion in the long term. However, it should be investigated in further opportunities.

documents, and platforms to deploy their capabilities on natural disasters or databases about their defense industries. While it is possible to say that these initiatives became approved and implemented, I cannot affirm they caused policy diffusion because it would require further investigation about the uses and impacts for the South American countries. Still, we can observe that SADC used these instruments to engage in policy diffusion processes.

Figure 7 - Implemented initiatives, according to issues and outcomes



Source: own elaboration, based on SADC documents

Finally, SADC proposed policies for its members, all of them concerning confidence-building measures. The set of initiatives after the US-Colombia agreement[10] and the standard methodologies to report defense expenditure and military inventories account for the 11 initiatives we see in the figure. The *pro tempore* presidency became in charge of monitoring the first, while CEED supervised the standard methodologies. I need here to introduce the same caveat as in the case of the common protocols: we cannot infer policy diffusion from these data since it would demand further diagnosis. However, it shows that SADC used formal mechanisms to engage in policy diffusion processes.

10. It included, for example, providing information about defense ministries, information about military forces (personnel, weapons, and equipment), and notifying UNASUR members about military exercises which included external armed forces. I included each of these measures separately at the database, totalizing 12 initiatives. 8 of them became implemented.

Considering all I exposed in this section, we can conclude that SADC initiatives approached several issues. It means that the Council acted to promote a comprehensive dialogue towards security and defense issues, making policy diffusion more likely from more general and frequently discussed issues. Topics discussed varied from peace operations and natural disasters to more specific matters, such as national mobilization and cyberdefense. Also, it was able to act through diverse mechanisms, from the informal ones, increasing contacts among policy-makers, to the formal instruments, by producing standards and verifying their implementation, especially in the case of confidence-building measures, as it was prescribed in its objectives (Union of South American Nations, 2008a).

Conclusion

In this chapter, after analyzing all SADC documents formerly available at the UNASUR website, I presented evidence about how the Council was able to engage in policy diffusion processes, supporting the adoption of similar measures by its members. This was not a chapter to demonstrate if it diffused policies but to discuss how it tried to engage in these processes. By unpacking SADC's action, I was able to present evidence about it.

Several different issues were discussed within SADC - as it was proposed on its creation (Union of South American Nations, 2008a) - and its procedures allowed states to focus their actions in the areas they had more interest. Most of the Council's capacity to act within policy diffusion processes related to its role as a facilitator. It was a forum that increased dialogues and interactions among defense policy-makers, increasing confidence among these actors and allowing information and ideas to circulate between them. Seminar diplomacy and the meetings themselves were essential tools within this context by increasing confidence and shared information among delegates. Informal mechanisms were deployed to deal with several issues, from Defense Ministries' structures to peace operations, and presented a high implementation rate.

The Council also engaged in policy diffusion through formal means. It promoted standards and monitored members' compliance with confidence-building measures. There were also attempts to develop common equipment and protocols, coordinating states' policies, and socializing their practices among themselves.

Understanding how multilateral defense dialogue and cooperation can occur in South America is a crucial debate, which may lead us to understand how to make our region more peaceful or even how these countries could improve their capacity to develop in this area. My objective here was to contribute to this understanding by looking at data of the most successful initiative

we had in this sense until this moment. There is still much to advance in understanding SADC and UNASUR as a whole. For now, an important conclusion is that regional cooperation and dialogue towards security and defense policies can assume different forms and mechanisms, reach several issues, and can, indeed, happen.

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CHAPTER 7

Overlapping Agency in the Security Sector Reform of Haiti? An Analysis of the Key Actors and Processes

João Fernando Finazzi

Introduction

Considerations of Haiti as a laboratory for international tutelage go back to at least the U.S. occupation of 1915-34 and the views of Arthur C. Millspaugh (1931)[1]. As a U.S. Government envoy to reform Haiti's economic institutions in the 1920s, Millspaugh, an academic and advisor to the State Department, helped frame a vision that a century later would be shared by many actors that passed through Haiti since 1994, when a chapter of almost continuous multilateral interventions would start taking place in the country's history[2].

Nonetheless, if the formation of the new Haitian security force at the first half of the 20th century was a byproduct of a direct and unilateral occupation by a foreign power, contemporary efforts in the domain of international security assistance and governance in Haiti have taken the form of Security Sector Reform (SSR). As a practice distinguished from other historical experiences, Haiti's SSR has its origins in the 1994 intervention led by the U.S. to reinstate President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, under the authorization of OAS and UN

1. "Thus, since 1915, but more particularly since 1922, Haiti has been in a peculiarly intimate and quasi-dependent relation with the United States; and the country has constituted in fact a unique laboratory for social, economic, political and administrative paternalism." (Millspaugh, 1931).

2. Contemporary references of Haiti as a laboratory in many spheres of government and public policy, especially in the security field, are extensive in media commentary by specialists, politicians, military officials, diplomats, police officers, and researchers.

Security Council. At that point, even if the term SSR was not yet defined and its practices did not yet compose a well-known doctrine of multilateral intervention under the UN DPKO auspices, a series of multilateral endeavors put into use were, as Mobekk (2016) defines, SSR efforts.

In the context of the ascendance of the liberal peacebuilding agenda of the 1990s, SSR came to be defined as one of the main efforts to stabilize and reconstruct – according to democratic principles – States and Societies passing through internal conflicts. Thus, proponents of SSR efforts highlight the distinction between SSR, as a multilaterally accepted project under the aegis of UN, and other historical and unilateral engagements in similar, but not equal, practices. In 2014, for example, UN Security Council recognized the importance of a "broad coalition" of international actors in SSR processes (UN, 2014), as it is currently part of a "standard operation procedure for [security and development] donors operating in fragile, failed and conflict-affected states" (Sedra, 2018, p. 1). The "Capstone Doctrine" defines SSR as part of a more encompassing "exit-strategy" for foreign troops and as an "essential component of efforts to re-establish and strengthen the rule of law", a condition critical to the success of operations (UN, 2008, p. 27).

These main SSR characteristics are also one of the main characteristics of contemporary security assistance in Haiti. From the earliest multilateral international interventions since 1994 to the most recent peace operation beginning in 2019 (Binuh), Haiti's security sector has been the object of a wide range of SSR endeavors, executed or elaborated by international state and non-state actors, whether in efforts of drawing up plans jointly with the Haitian government, in the daily execution of property and personal security or even in providing aid from a strategic perspective.

Among state actors, the predominant role that the U.S. has played since the intervention of 1994, together with Canada and France, stands out. Particularly in selling and/or donating equipment and arms; building law enforcement facilities; training police doctrines; and selecting and vetting new police officers. When considering the U.S., most programs were developed by the Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID, and, especially, the Department of Justice – through its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).

U.S. agencies, on the other hand, seem to rely rather on non-state actors for the daily execution of such programs, in which we can highlight the role of security contractors such as DynCorp Corporation, Tetra Tech, PAE Contractor, Steele Foundation and Chemonics.

Notwithstanding, since 2004 Minustah has inaugurated a significant engagement of southern actors, especially the Brazilian military and police,

both in managing the political crisis and providing training and armaments to the Haitian security forces. However, even if we consider the existence of efforts towards the intensification of exchanges between Haitian and Brazilian police, these initiatives seem timid when we compare with the depth and endurance of Haiti-U.S. security cooperation.

Finally, another two layers of Haiti SSR international actors might also be included in this framework: international governmental (such as the UN, OAS, International Organization for Migration, and the World Bank) and non-governmental organizations.

Considering this multitude of actors and the increased involvement of southern security actors in Haiti during the Minustah context, we intend to highlight northern and southern agencies in this multilateral security cooperation context.

Analyzing the context of SSR in Haiti from 1994 to 2016, Mobekk (2016) argued that each donor and organization had their own agendas and interests which not always were harmoniously and coherently organized in a single SSR agenda. On the contrary, according to the author, this overlapping of hyper-specialized actors in the SSR contributed to the fragmentation of efforts, undermining more structured forms of progress in core areas and enhancing difficulties to achieve key mission benchmarks. Even by the first years of Minustah (04-08), the incoordination between local and international actors in reforming Haitian National Police (HNP) was manifest and recognized by reformers (Fortin and Pierre, 2008).

Such a problem might appoint to one important limitation of the liberal agenda, in its multilateral state-building efforts, especially on the doctrinal balance between the respect of state sovereignty (a key point to distinguish it from previous empire systems) and the promotion of democratic norms.

The international thrust to "resolve" the recurrence of the security crisis in Haiti by the liberal global governance paradigm (grounded on multilateral interventions to promote liberal democracy and market-oriented reforms) painted Haiti as an important case study for international peacebuilding and state-building literature. The analysis of different pacifying and stabilizing efforts has grown even more after the intensification of another security crisis in the country, at the beginning of the 2000s, and a second withdraw of then-president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004. Considering the previous international efforts during the 1990s, many authors started to research what could have gone "wrong" in the formulation and execution of SSR in Haiti.

From the point of view of policy formulation and institutional field actors, the engagement in Haiti seems to be constantly emphasized by Armed Forces,

NGOs, private companies, and police officers as a laboratory to experiment, develop, export, import, and reassess security policies.

A relevant bibliography concerned with policy improvements recognizes the failures, lessons, limitations, and transformation of SSR strategies in Haiti, considering the recurrent crisis (Burt, 2016; Cockayne, 2009; Donais, 2005; Mendelson-Forman, 2006; Mobekk, 2001; Mobekk, 2016; Muggah, 2005). Still, it seems that a systematization of this transnational effort in a historical perspective, considering the dynamic role of a multitude of actors has not yet been produced, especially if we take into account the extent of contentious politics and conflict in a globalized world (McAdam et al., 2009). Mobekk (2016) also recognizes the relative absence of literature emphasis in the roles played by different States and their agencies during SSR in Haiti.

With this brief work, we intend to map and present the main actors and processes that make up the international architecture of SSR in Haiti, attentive to its transnational linkages and unequal distribution of power and capacities (Dolowitz et al., 2019). The intention of this paper is to chronologically present facts and actors articulations that compose social and historical links which may in the future help students and security researchers alike. Considering a historical perspective, in the concluding sections we intend to make quick commentaries about southern and northern actions in the SSR of Haiti. It is evident the presence of limitations, generalizations, tendency, and arbitrariness in choosing certain historical events at the expense of others, but the main purpose of this work is solely to help illuminate some aspects of the SSR process in Haiti.

The first experience: SSR in Haiti through the 1990s

Relations between the United States and the security sector of Haiti have a long history, dating back to the beginning of the 20th century (Trouillot 1990; Robinson 1996). However, during the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the end of the Cold War, the preponderance of the U.S. in the International System, the emergence of the "liberal peace" project over the international society, and the intensification of neoliberal globalization helped transform the international security studies and practices related (Buzan and Hansen, 2012).

A byproduct of the "liberal peace" project[3], SSR is presented as a multilaterally lead effort to democratize the security sector and to guarantee the full

3. The "liberal peace" project is based on the achievement of deregulation and liberalization of the market economy, liberal democracy and the construction of states. It is based on the conception that global peace and security would be better achieved in a world in which the organization of societies have the form of liberal democratic states, with economic regulation oriented towards the free market, while also taking an active stance of international state-building (Hirst, 2014; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Pureza, 2012).

observance of human rights, according to "sound principles" of "good" governance in societies transitioning from conflict and/or dictatorship (Jackson, 2018; Sedra, 2018). In Haiti, since the 1994 intervention, SSR continues to be implemented by a coalition of state and non-state actors under the leadership of the U.S. and assuming different forms over time.

First SSR experiences in Haiti during the 1990s assumed a strict form of institution-building, focusing on the construction, reconstruction, or demobilization of the Army and police, and legal and judiciary institutions (Mobekk, 2016). The objectives of the UN/OAS Mission were to change Haiti's regime and government *de facto,* which was constituted after a *coup d'état* and reinstate president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The professionalization of Haitian police, with help from the UN, was accorded between the leader of the military junta who deposed Aristide, Raoul Cedras, and Aristide himself in the Governor's Island Agreement of July 1993, supervised by the U.S. Despite its history of human rights violation and violence against Haitian civil society, both parties agreed to the maintenance of the Haitian aitHArmed Forces.

After being reinstated as president of Haiti in 1994, Aristide issued two presidential decrees in 1995 that had a profound impact on the SSR of the country and in the history of Haitian politics. Contrary to the Governor's Island Agreement, the first decree (January 6th) reduced the Armed Forces to 1.500 members and incorporated it into the interim police force, and the second (April 25th) consolidated its full formal demobilization (Mendelson-Forman, 2006). During the process, factions of soldiers organized themselves in diverse groups to defend the existence of the Armed Forces, such as the *Rassemblement des Militaires Révoqués Sans Motif* and the *Rassemblement des Militaires Démobilisés*. Some even considered high-rank exiled officials as responsible for the demobilization (Mobekk, 2001).

With the demobilization of the Armed Forces, only 1.500 of its 7.000 members came to be part of the newly-formed police force. Most ex-soldiers started to resort to several other ways of acquiring economic resources, including some creating, maintaining, or deepening extortion, drug and arms trafficking, and private security networks, and many also refused to recognize the abolition of the Armed Forces. Part of the soldiers and some new-formed police officers maintained and cultivated their social bonds and organized themselves as the paramilitary group Front for the National Liberation and Reconstruction of Haiti (FLRN) at the beginning of the 2000s, which was the main armed actor in the second removal of Aristide in 2004 (Sprague 2012). According to Mobekk (2001): "The dissolution of the Armed Forces of Haiti was a success in the sense of achieving the objectives set by the US, among them protecting US forces in Haiti".

These SSR efforts were carried mainly under the supervision of the U.S., especially through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program of the Justice Department and the USAID's Office for Transition Initiatives (Girard, 2004; Bailey et al., 2002). Besides the U.S., the Canadian Royal Mounted Police, and the French Gendarmerie Nationale, France also had an important role in providing police monitors to help establish and train the new police force.

On the other hand, non-state actors such as private security companies and international organizations have also had key roles in the process of SSR since the 1990s. Since awarding contracts with the U.S. Government during the 1994 intervention and its subsequent SSR initiatives, DynCorp Corporation has a growing footprint in these efforts, providing monitors, furniture, equipment, and logistics and training support to HNP in different historical contexts (Bailey *et al.,* 2002; Dyncorp, 2008; Dyncorp, 2013). Between other main private companies that orbit around SSR in Haiti are: MVM Inc., partly responsible for the security of Aristide in the first months of his return to Haiti in 1994 (Girard, 2004); Steele Foundation, partly responsible for the security of the Haitian government between 1998 and 2004 (Democracy Now, 2004); Civilian Police International LLC; PAE Contractor; Tetra Tech; and Chemonics International; which provided training to the Haitian Police and Judiciary in several occasions (PAE, 2011; Tetra Tech, 2013; Chemonics, 2021;).

Despite being an effort under the leadership of the U.S., United Nations Development Program, International Organization for Migration, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank were also key SSR actors in Haiti, even in supervising and financially supporting international private SSR initiatives, or in the direct execution of tasks.[4]

Thus, despite the failures in pacifying and stabilizing the country, the first experience of SSR in Haiti was marked by an intense and profitable involvement of private security companies, which were contracted through different US agencies. This process was accompanied by security-development-nexus rationality (Duffield, 2001), in which the reordering of the relations between the State and Society through peacebuilding-as-state-building efforts presented a complex ensemble of state and non-state, local and transnational, actors. Finally, during those initiatives, southern actors were relatively absent or located at the fringes of such SSR processes – a fact that, at first glance, might have been changed with the Brazilian engagement in Minustah.

4. The International Organization for Migration was also responsible, with other actors, for the demobilization of Haitian armed forces during the 1995 process (Girard, 2004; Bailey et al., 2002). As stated below, the IOM also participated in the Haiti Stabilization Initiative between 2008 and 2010, in a program funded by the US Defense Department.

The second experience: SSR in Haiti in the new century

1990s SSR main actors continued to be present during the next renewed international engagement of Minustah (2004-2017). Yet, the Haitian political conditions and context were significantly different. If in 1994 the intervention was to reinstate a former government deposed by a coup d'état, in 2004 the U.S.-led intervention of February, followed by Minustah in June had the effect of reinforcing the new government after the second oust of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. This reality brought another layer of challenge to pacification and SSR efforts, once some militant groups, in a context of a deep fragile government, promptly comprehended the international intervention as a multilateral imperialist endeavor and identified themselves as freedom fighters, especially in the poor Port-au-Prince slums.

During the period preceding the formal start of Minustah, between February and June 2004, the coalition led by the U.S. military was responsible for reorganizing the police structure of different cities and administrative units in Haiti, notably Port-au-Prince. Soldiers from the Multilateral Interim Force selected, installed, and supported new police commissioners while removing others from their duties (Cooper, 2013). Even during Minustah, the U.S. government continued its engagement in the reform of Haiti's security sector. Through programs of the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the U.S. government also maintained and promoted agreements between U.S. security corporations and the Haitian government for the construction of prisons and police stations, training and logistical support to the HNP, and training of criminal justice officers, with the stated objective of combating drug trafficking (Dyncorp 2008; Dyncorp 2013; PAE, 2011; Radio Metropole Haiti, 2016).

Between June 2004 and 2017, the Minustah coalition, militarily led by Brazil, was responsible for a series of interventions with the HNP in the slums of Port-au-Prince (such as Cité Soleil, Bel-Air, Delmas, Martissant, and Carrefour-Feuille), bastions of the groups opposed to the deposition of Aristide and considered as "red zones", from where revolts could arise that would put the new Haitian government in check and the continuation of the operation (Neiburg et al. 2011).

Considering the recurrence of the Haitian crisis, the failure of past UN mission efforts to stabilize the country, and of SSR efforts to achieve a democratic and responsible security sector, experts started to think over past errors, suggesting alternative SSR strategies. The new ascending SSR efforts started considering a more encompassing approach, needed to deal with non-state armed groups and sources of violence, especially considering the Haitian "urban gangs" as mission spoilers (Mobekk, 2016). After 2006, the

UN Security Council framed these armed groups as a threat to international security, highlighting the "role of crime prevention on the part of Minustah", in face of "urban gangs" (UN, 2006).

Under the new strategy, one SSR program addressed to Port-au-Prince's "urban gangs" was the Haiti Stabilization Initiative, promoted by the U.S. Defense Department and State Department in the Cité Soleil slum between 2008 and 2010 after the initial intervention of Minustah military and Haitian National Police. According to its coordinator, David C. Becker (2011), it was an urban counter-insurgency tactic that consisted of the creation of a series of social projects through the International Organization for Migration, with funding from USAID. The initiative formed and articulated different neighborhood committees and small-scale NGOs in several blocks of Cité Soleil to compete with the "gangs" in providing services to the population. According to Becker, the aim was to undermine social support and the legitimacy with which these groups were seen by the local population.[5]

The Minustah context (2004-2017) also inaugurated a significant engagement of southern actors, especially Brazilian military and police[6], which might not present deep differences with northern positions. This engagement, as the military leader and the top contributor country, manifested imports and exports effects between internal public security and the actions in Haiti in terms of doctrine, equipment, knowledge transfer, and strategies by police and the military to deal with non-state armed groups, such as the UPPs (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora*) program in Rio de Janeiro and the "*Ponto Forte*" military tactic (Harig 2015). An important actor during the promotion of these efforts was the Brazilian NGO *Viva Rio*, which mediated accords between the HNP and the Rio de Janeiro State Military Police. The Brazilian engagement also helped to promote exchanges of military officers and instructors for actions in peace operations and academics between different training centers in the Southern Cone (Souza Neto, 2010). Even though, if Brazil was by far the main troop supplier to Minustah and had its

5. This program was enabled due to transformations in political and economic daily life of impoverished Haitian masses. During the 1990s and the enhancement of major forces of neoliberal globalization, NGOs became increasingly articulated with politics in Haiti as they came to be the main suppliers of services such as nurture, education and health care, usually substituting related Haiti' state structures (Mobekk 2016, p. 6) and representing intermediaries between the impoverished masses that compose Haitian civil society in the local level and transnational donor elites (Schuller 2012). As such, NGOs became fundamental actors for the realization of the interests (whatever they may be) of their donors and funders, as well as privileged observers of local politics and social dynamics, due to their proximity in the daily life of that social strata.

6. Jordan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan were also important troop and police contributors.

military leadership when compared with those of the most important donors, the role of Brazilian police and military in Haiti Security Sector Reform seems to be minor in scale, having their attention focused mainly on actions related to the intervention process of Port-au-Prince slums.

The Brazilian police (which represented only 2.3% of all international police in Haiti) was submitted to the mission's overall framework, and managed the employment of UN Police; patrolled street, trained and made arrests with HNP; helped planning and to execute joint operations in Haitian slums (with the UN Police, foreign military and HNP); developed and implemented HNP reform plans; engaged in humanitarian action in the context of the 2010 earthquake; and headed security teams authorities (Carrera Neto e Morais, 2017).

Another SSR program addressed to Port-au-Prince's "urban gangs" which deserves more attention was developed in Carrefour-Feuilles slum between 2006 and 2011, promoted by the Brazilian diplomacy with UNDP/IBAS funding. It was implemented through successive phases of pacification and development initiatives: mediation of peace accords between local gangs; promotion of informational and awareness campaigns; the creation of a neighborhood committee; professional capacity-building of local inhabitants and their hiring as street cleaners and sweepers; and the organization of a local garbage collection and recycling system. Brazilian diplomat Daniel Pinto qualified this poverty reduction and jobs-for-peace initiative as based on a mutual reinforcement of security and social activities, a vision shared by Brazilians military Force Commanders such as General José Elito and General Augusto Heleno (Pinto, 2015).

Initiatives such as those developed in the slums of Carrefour-Feuilles or Cité Soleil expose the permeability of Minustah SSR efforts, sustained by security-development rationality of job stimulation and offer of public services as political means to pacification. Through this perspective, considering the role of Brazil, the main Minustah actor, as a "southern representative", its efforts were close to "traditional" SSR (such as those implemented by the U.S. in the 1990s), despite its minimal relevance when we account the low number of police officers. Otherwise, counterinsurgency and pacifying initiatives were the focal point of its security engagement, accompanied by the security-development nexus perspective. The main difference is when it is considered the military operations of intervention and occupation of slums. For the U.S., despite keeping the same kind of engagement with the Haitian National Police through bilateral accords in the context of Minustah, programs such as the Haiti Stabilization Initiative also show its concurrent approximation and complementarity with the Brazilian security-development efforts practiced by an ensemble of state and non-state security actors.

Closing remarks

Between the most important bilateral (directly supporting the Haitian National Police) and multilateral (through international governmental and non-governmental organizations) SSR donors and executors of the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, we must highlight the U.S., followed by Canada and France (Mobekk 2016). The role of Brazil during the Minustah context was closer to counterinsurgency operations in city slums than to the execution and supervision of police and judiciary reforms in the country. Notwithstanding, what this work inted to show is that the SSR architecture in Haiti reproduced the effects of neoliberal fragmentation and pluralization of state and non-state (private and international organizations) actors in international endeavors.

Thus, Haiti and more precisely Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital, became an important hub and testing ground for security initiatives, assuming the place of a stage where global and local actors and networks of security governance, expertise, knowledge-building, repression, and resistance encounters, disseminating and converging flows of a multitude of programs and techniques (Hönke and Müller, 2016).

Cockayne (2009, p. 81) highlights that during the Minustah context, between 2004 and 2009, international actors and the Haitian government promoted a liberal system of protection, in which the external assistance to Haiti has become a forum for international politics. That also seems to be valid when we focus our attention on SSR efforts.

Transcending the "territorial trap" and the geographical assumptions of mainstream international relations theories (Agnew, 1994) seems like a special challenge to the student and researcher of international security, especially when dealing with transnational actors and efforts that go over State-centric boundaries. Nevertheless we might advance in SSR efforts analysis by following Heathershaw and Lambach's (2008) definition of post-conflict spaces. According to the authors, they are contexts of complex figuration of networks, authorities, and relations that co-constitutes the "global" and the "local" simultaneously. As such, Haiti' security sector might be seen as one important hub in a cartography of global circuits of security and violence (Adamson, 2018), where a multitude of multi-layered transnational security actors encounters, allying and/or disputing the realization of different agendas and projects, under the sign of SSR. Even if the U.S. role stands out, this pluralistic but tense form of security assistance existent in Haiti assumed contours of an overlapping agency.

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CHAPTER 8

Brazilian Cooperation in Africa: Portuguese–Speaking African Countries and the Cooperation Projects Diffusion (1995–2014)

David Beltrão Simons Tavares de Albuquerque

1. Introduction

The article seeks to investigate and support Brazilian foreign Policy in Africa qualitative studies, analyzing the diffusion of Brazilian cooperation projects between non-Portuguese speaking African countries and Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP). What would explain the increasing speed by African States to demand cooperation projects from Brazil? What factors can influence a country to join a cooperation project with Brazil?

The globalization in the 1990s opened an unprecedented exchange of ideas, knowledge, and policy models between governments around the world. Different traditions of social science research followed this movement, providing important explanations for these phenomena.

New geopolitics was restructured at the beginning of the 21st century, through multilateralism and the development of South-South Cooperation (SSC), as strategies for the States international insertion.

The Brazilian foreign policy historical oscillation towards Africa has influenced the objectives between Brazil and Africa. The adoption of historical principles by Brazilian diplomacy, such as the respect for autonomy, non-intervention, horizontality, absence of conditionalities and cooperation demand-driven, favor the African institutions. The search, in this sense, for a common characteristic, the Portuguese language, through the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), as a sufficient condition to establish

cooperation projects, demonstrates a pragmatic choice of reconnection to the continent between 1995 to 2014 (Albuquerque, 2018).

The Brazilian cooperation projects temporal and geographical distribution on the African continent shows, at first sight, a neighboring and subsequent reception by non-Portuguese speaking African countries in relation to the PALOP.

The interdependence and the increase of information networks through diffusion directly belong to the globalization process definition, causes and consequences (Garrett, 1998). The Brazilian cooperation projects diffusion in Africa, in this sense, is a policy strategy which, through its limited capacities, aims to establish mature relations with African States.

2. Context and Literature

Cooperation between emerging states must be understood at two levels: systemic, related to the international system, and at the State, through its Foreign Policy agenda. The systemic analysis observes the discourse of historical legitimacy, given the colonial past and economic underdevelopment, as a way of addressing similarities in the perception of socioeconomic problems. The State analysis perceives the existing opportunities around the international system, through policies that represent, in principle, a bargain between partner States (Milani, 2018).

The Brazilian insertion strategy in the African continent through the Portuguese-speaking African Countries, respectively, Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe, all members of the CPLP, corresponds to the two levels foreign policy behavior paradigm. The 1996 CPLP creation represented Brazil's opportunity to reconnect, through an institutional mechanism, with these countries. Brazilian interest in Africa is, at first, extremely concentrated in Portuguese-speaking States, represented by its historical and cultural connection, which could raise doubts as to whether the search for the continent is due to its level of poverty or whether it is due to other Portuguese-speaking countries location (Rowland, 2008; Albuquerque, 2018).

Brazil's strategy, however, seems to have reverberated in PALOP´s neighboring states. According to figure 01, it can be seen the concentration of projects in Portuguese-speaking States. Temporal and geographical diffusion, however, would be a contemporary phenomenon, which can be observed through the belt around the PALOP.

Figure 01 - Distribution of Brazilian Cooperation projects in Africa.



(Brasil, 2016)

Portuguese Africa, in this sense, was Brazil´s initial movement within an African continent insertion strategy. Initially, these were modest projects that, after the years, developed as Brazil matured its African policy.

Figure 02 represents the comparison between the total number of projects in Portuguese Africa and in non-Portuguese Africa. From 2005 onwards, a large increase in the number of projects for non-Portuguese African states can be observed, which corroborates the previous paragraph.

Figure 02 - Distribution of projects in Africa in relation to the spoken language.



(Lima, 2014)

What would explain the increasing speed by African States to demand cooperation projects from Brazil? What factors can influence a country to join a cooperation project with Brazil?

The political science literature has developed in diffusion studies, particularly on case studies, through robust research on the different processes of diffusion and policy transfer (Oliveira and Faria, 2017). These studies allowed to know more about the diffusion or transfer objects; the actors involved, namely, international organizations, national governments, federal and local authorities, academics, businessmen, politicians, among others; the different levels, national or regional; bilateral or multilateral channels for policy circulation; the different mechanisms, for example, learning, emulation, or coercion, which characterized the diffusion and the transfer of policies.

The transnational policy (policies) diffusion basic concept is the influence, on one State, of policies developed by other States. The Brazilian theoretical understanding of international cooperation, however, is incipient in analyzes of diffusion policies. The understanding that foreign policy, as a public policy, is characterized by the process between actors, institutions, interests and ideas (politics) limits the approach to the demands on cooperation projects by African States and their respective dissemination (policies) (Milani and Pinheiro, 2013). Milani (2018) considers it a sui generis policy, given that it has elements of both public policy and State politics.

The factors are manifested through the simultaneous impacts of internal political, States economic and social characteristics, in addition to channels of regional influence, which identify the use of internal and external variables in the probability of a given policy being applied (Berry and Berry, 2006).

The regional diffusion model initially postulates that states are influenced by geographically close states. Research models assume that the neighborhood effect has a positive influence on the adoption of a policy. These models specifically raise the hypothesis that the probability of a State to adopt a policy is positively related to the number (or proportion) of limiting states adopting it. Care must be taken, however, not to simply accept the adoption of similar policies by neighbors as evidence of policy diffusion. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt other independent variables (Berry and Berry, 2006; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter, 2008; Gilardi, 2016).

Bilateral trade and the prior adoption of projects, in this sense, are possibilities to complement the neighborhood analysis. As the present article addresses a continent marked by conflicts between neighboring states throughout history, where there are serious unresolved border problems, these measures would make it possible, as proxies, to analyze the previous trade patterns and adoptions of a policy, hence would give greater weight

where there are better bilateral relations and, therefore, would indicate a stronger connection between countries (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016).

Finally, in this project, the mechanism of joint membership in various types of institutions, organizations or groups will be addressed, under the assumption that co-participation is associated with direct contact or interaction. There are, in Africa, a set of international regional organizations that make it possible to bring together its members (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016).

States do not negotiate agreements in a vacuum but are embedded in a larger context of cooperative relations. This context conditions the costs and benefits of subsequent cooperative efforts, so that the likelihood of cooperation for a given pair of States directly affects cooperation efforts.

Brazilian cooperation is in general compatible with typical institutions of south-south cooperation. Emma Mawdsley (2012), in the gift theory, identifies five fundamental characteristics to classify this regime, namely, the opportunity for both States; solidarity among developing countries; expertise based on similar experiences; empathy based on shared identity, rejecting the establishment of a hierarchy; the virtue of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

It is important to note that these processes are not static, but are inserted in relations, normally unequal, of power. Dolowitz et al (2019) verifies this when questions what is generally considered to be a direct process, where the actors preferences are considered and the whole process is rational. Rarely can a single actor dominate the entire transfer process. It is not enough, therefore, to examine the transfer as a one-off event. Diffusion should be seen as a developing process where there is an interpenetration of domestic policies among the internal and external actors. Some situations allow dominant actors to control most of the time; in others, domestic actors gain the power to reform imported solutions.

3. Research Design and Preliminary Results

Brazil had a cooperation project with 42 of the 54 African states in the period between 1995 and 2014. The literature review section identified that a diffusion mechanisms valid measurement cannot generally be achieved simply at the indicator level. Therefore, care must be taken in assessing the variables used. The measure's validity, instead, may depend on the research design, not just on the selection of appropriate indicators.

Data analysis will be performed using the Survival Analysis Model and the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a meta-analysis tool after the use of the first model.

It is essential for statistical research and multiple case study (multiple case study research) to develop an explicit methodology of case study

through an interaction term (Goertz, 2018). The QCA, by default, generates logical results and, thus, incorporates terms of interaction in its structure. The QCA has interaction analyzes at its core and seeks causal combinations. The interaction terms are optional in statistical analysis, have important methodological challenges and are difficult to interpret. The interactions of three associations, for example, are extremely rare in statistical analysis, but are common in the results of QCA.

A multi-method study should estimate causal effects using data from many cases, as well as a more detailed examination of the processes that occur in a few. In this project, the survival analysis represents the former and the QCA represents the latter. The rewards for this integration are diverse. Based on any combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence, the project structure produces inferences on a wide range of causal issues, including average causal effects at the level of the case population, case-specific causal explanations, and the validity of theories of the causal process. In addition, the approach allows qualitative evidence to update the assumptions underlying quantitative analysis and vice versa. Finally, when modeling the learning processes that flow from different inference logics, the framework provides practical guidance on research design, specifically on the conditions under which the dataset or additional observations of the causal process are likely to generate greater explanatory advantage (Humphreys and Jacobs, 2015).

The dependent variable is the speed of adherence to Brazilian Cooperation Projects over the proposed period from the PALOP countries to other African countries. This dependent variable is suggested by the temporal and geographical diffusion hypothesis, which is reported several times to be significant in the literature. Observing the number of members will allow to observe the expansion of the Brazilian insertion strategy in the African continent. Non-Portuguese-speaking African states, as they join the projects, will be removed from the analysis, as in the Survival Analysis Models (Lins, Figueiredo, and Rocha, 2017). The speed, in this way, will be measured as the number of years that the respective State took to receive a project.

The data on Brazilian cooperation projects in African countries, related to the dependent variable, came from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency reports. The systematization of those was carried out in the work by Lima (2014) and complemented by Albuquerque (2018).

3.1. Survival Analysis Model

Proportional risk models are a class of survival models in statistical analysis. Survival models relate the time that passes before an event occurs in one or more covariables that may be associated with that amount of time. In a

proportional risk model, the single effect of an increase in unity in a covariate is multiplicative in relation to the risk rate.

The calculation of the variables, therefore, will be carried out using the Cox proportional hazards model, so one can comprehend the effects of those interest covariables in the non-Portuguese African states' adherence to Brazilian cooperation projects from the PALOP diffusion models. The variables can be called covariables, because they work together, that is, internal and external variables to explain a certain fact.

The article´s original research design underwent changes according to the data profile and its availability. The only variable that could not be fully constructed was "bilateral trade between African countries". It is necessary to know, in order to build it, what was the commercial exchange value between each of the countries with all the others, to know which had more bilateral trade and to see how many projects took place in that country, repeating this process for all countries in each one of the years. In this sense, it could not be found a trustful data source that has this information in the proposed time range for all African countries.

This variable is theoretically very important and thus must be observed in future works. Therefore, a case study is recommended in one of the PALOP countries and a limited number of African countries.

Table 01 shows the database with the variables and the codebook informing the name of the variables.

Table 01 – Codebook with variables and source

Information	Variable	Source
Time (years) until the first project	anos_contagem	Albuquerque's Thesis (2018) - Cooperation Projects
Geographical proximity between Portuguese-speaking African countries and non-Portuguese-speaking African countries	distancia_2palop	Distance calculated using an algorithm based on the latitude and longitude of each country
Institutions Joint membership by African countries[1]	instituicoes_proj_noano instituicoes_proj_acumulados	UN Economic Commission for Africa and institutions official websites
African countries institutions Quality	icrg_qog (descrição da variavel)	Quality of Government-Government quality indicator
Speed of adherence to Brazilian Cooperation Projects in African countries	inicio_projeto	Albuquerque's Thesis (2018) - Cooperation Projects
Number of previous adhesions to projects by region	regiao_proj_noano regiao_proj_acumulados	Albuquerque's Thesis (2018) - Cooperation Projects

1. The formal institutions considered were The African Union (AU); The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); The East African Community (EAC); The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC); The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD); The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Also, due to its importance, the informal group Cotton 4 +Togo was also included on the analysis.

3.1.1 Analysis of the diffusion from PALOP to non-PALOP

Table 02 - Survival model

	Coefficient	Exp(Coef)
	(1)	(2)
distancia_2palop	−0.0001	1.000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
icrg_qog	−1.048	0.351
	(2.390)	(2.390)
regiao_proj_noano	0.001	1.001
	(0.023)	(0.023)
instituicoes_internacionais_proj_noano	0.002	1.002
	(0.027)	(0.027)
N	219	219
R^2	0.005	0.005
Log Likelihood	−63.993	−63.993
LR Test (df = 4)	1.128	1.128
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 4)	1.142	1.142

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Source: Own elaboration

In the first tested model, observed in table 02, we have the following variables, namely, *distancia_2palop* = distance between the country and the two Portuguese-speaking countries closest to it; *icrg_qog* = Institutional quality of the country; *regiao_proj_noano* = number of projects carried out in the country region each year; *instituicoes_internacionais_proj_noano* = number of projects carried out in the international institutions to which the country belongs each year.

In Cox's extended models, the exponential coefficients must be interpreted as a risk ratio (or relative risk). Values above 1 indicate variables that increase the chance that the event will occur. In this work, they would indicate a greater possibility of starting a new project. Values between 0 and 1 indicate defense against the event. That is, they are variables that would make it difficult to start the project. As can be seen, the results indicate that the government's quality and geographic location variables would act against the adoption of the project, while the project variables by region and by international institutions would act favorably.

However, none of the variables are statistically significant. The p-values vary between 0.661 and 0.967. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the low p-value should not be taken as a panacea. Recent studies demonstrate that no p-value can reveal the plausibility, presence, truth or importance of an association or effect. Therefore, a label of statistical significance does not mean or imply that an association or effect is highly likely, real, true or important. A

label of statistical non-significance also does not lead to an unlikely, absent, false or unimportant association or effect. However, the dichotomy into "significant" and "non-significant" is taken as an authoritative argument about these characteristics. In a complex world, on the other hand, it becomes untenable to affirm dramatic differences in the interpretation of inconsequential differences in estimates (Altman and Bland, 1995; Wasserstein, Schirm, and Lazar, 2019).

The Schoenfeld's residual analysis serves to observe whether the Cox model´s proportionality risks was respected. The simplest way to analyze this is to perform a correlation between the parameters and the time. Table 03 presents the results.

Table 03 – Correlation

	rho	chisq	p
distancia_2palop	0.1808	0.963	0.326
Icrg_qog	0.1663	0.878	0.349
Project by region	0.1848	0.721	0.396
Project by institution	-0.0769	0.233	0.629
Global	NA	3.945	0.413

As can be seen from the p-value, none of the covariates is time dependent. This implies that proportionality has been observed. This same proportionality can be seen visually.

Table 04 – Survival model (second version)

	Coefficient	Exp(Coef)
	(1)	(2)
distancia_2palop	−0.00004	1.000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
semelhanca_quali_institucional_icrg	0.419	1.521
	(0.388)	(0.388)
instituicoes_com_palop	0.169	1.184
	(0.309)	(0.309)
regiao_proj_acumulados	0.002	1.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)
N	291	291
R^2	0.009	0.009
Log Likelihood	−83.695	−83.695
LR Test (df = 4)	2.719	2.719
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 4)	2.791	2.791

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Source: Own elaboration

Version 2, as shown in table 04, used the same methodological tool as the previous version, Cox extended model, but with different independent variables. It is used as variables *distancia_2palop* = distance between the country and the two Portuguese-speaking countries closest to it; *semelhanca_quali_institucional_icrg* = similarity between the quality level of the country's institutions and the quality level of the PALOP institutions; *regiao_proj_accumulated* = number of projects carried out in the region of the country, accumulated over the years; *instituicoes_com_palop* = number of international institutions that the country shares with the PALOP.

Here, the geographical distance would act against the event again. This is a counterintuitive result and, in a way, goes against to what the theory has observed so far in the process of diffusion and Brazilian cooperation in Africa, as noted in the previous topic. The other three variables, namely, "Similarity between the country's institutions quality level and the PALOP institutions´ quality level"; "the country´s number of projects carried out in the region"; and "the number of international institutions that the country shares with the PALOP", were favorable to the event. This means that the theory would be confirmed for those.

None of the explanatory variables were shown to be statistically significant, but, as previously mentioned, this does not mean that there is no explanatory potential for causality.

As in the previous model, the analysis of the Schoenfeld residue was also performed. The correlation between parameters and time follows:

Table 05 – Correlation

	rho	chisq	p
distancia_2palop	0.166	1.101	0.294
Icrg	0.115	0.496	0.481
Institutions.Palop	-0.007	0.002	0.969
Acumulated projects	0.182	1.082	0.298
Global	NA	1.824	0.768

As you can see from the p-value in table 05, none of the covariates is time dependent. This implies that proportionality has been observed.

3.1.2 Analysis of the diffusion from PALOP to non-PALOP and other PALOP's

Table 06 – Survival model

	Coefficient	Exp(Coef)
	(1)	(2)
distancia_2palop	−0.0001	1.000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
semelhanca_quali_institucional_icrg	0.620*	1.859*
	(0.344)	(0.344)
regiao_proj_acumulados	0.002	1.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)
instituicoes_com_palop	−0.036	0.964
	(0.301)	(0.301)
N	322	322
R^2	0.017	0.017
Log Likelihood	−103.946	−103.946
LR Test (df = 4)	5.371	5.371
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 4)	5.414	5.414

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Source: Own elaboration

In Cox's extended models, again, the exponential coefficients must be interpreted as a risk ratio or relative risk. Values above 1 indicate variables that increase the chance that the event will occur. In this work, they would indicate a greater possibility of starting a new project. Values between 0 and 1 indicate "defense" against the event. That is, they are variables that would make it difficult to start the project. This would indicate that the variable "institutions shared with PALOP countries" and "geographical distance" would act against the adoption of the project; while the other variables, "similarity in institutional quality" and the "number of projects carried out in the country's accumulated region" would act in a favorable way. However, it is worth noting that none of the variables present statistical significance at a p-value less than 0.05.

The analysis of Schoenfeld's residuals serves to observe whether the Cox model´s proportionality risks was respected. The simplest way to analyze this is to perform a correlation between the parameters and the time. Figure 05 shows the results.

Table 07 – Correlation

	rho	chisq	p
distancia_2palop	0.3417	5.625	0.0177
semelhanca_quali_institucional_icrg	-0.0514	0.107	0.7431

	rho	chisq	p
regiao_proj_acumulados	0.1917	1.228	0.2678
instituicoes_com_palop	0.1871	1.617	0.2036
Global	NA	6.003	0.1989

As can be seen from the p-value in table 07, only the distance_2palop variable is time dependent. This implies that proportionality was observed in 3 of the 4 independent variables.

It is worth noting the different results in separating PALOPs from Non-PALOPs, including or excluding other PALOPs, according to the models presented in topics 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. The results were different.

In the first model (3.1.1), in both versions, the geographic location variable would act against the adoption of the project. The result is different, however, for Institutional Quality in the two versions, considering that they are similar but different variables. There is also a subtle difference between the two variables of international institutions, giving the values of the two versions favorable to the event.

In the second model (3.1.2), the variable "institutions shared with PALOP countries" and "geographic location" would act against the adoption of the project. There is, therefore, a small difference with the second version of 3.1.1.

The variables "projects accumulated in the region of the country over the years" and "similarity between the quality level of the country's institutions with those of the PALOP" would act in a favorable way. A possible explanation for the similarity of institutional quality, for example, may be related to the change in perspective of African states, through modernizing reforms at the domestic and regional levels.

3.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis

The intention to apply QCA as a meta-analysis is to observe the possibility of using the independent variables as a general analysis. However, the QCA is not limited to hypothesis testing, but it can also serve other purposes. This method aims to identify the participant settings, conditions and contextual characteristics that may be associated with a given result. There is a necessary dialogue between data, theory and context. This is very important in a complex configuration such as Brazil's relations in Africa. Nevertheless, this article´s intention is to describe the results and briefly interpret them.

The QCA is suitable for this type of meta-analysis because it identifies parsimonious regularities, through the identification of necessary and sufficient

conditions for the result to be obtained. It can be used to briefly describe cases, check data for consistency and gain knowledge about individual cases, explore data and develop new ideas and develop new theories. The QCA will be used as a heuristic tool to explore, map, and find systematic patterns through how the difusion mechanisms are operationalized between non-Portuguese-speaking African States and Portuguese-speaking African countries (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016).

The work of Thomas, O'Mara and Brunton verified the method potential as a tool for meta-analysis. This work demonstrated that current statistical synthesis methods work well for homogeneous data sets, but poorly where there are few repetitions and where interventions are complex. The QCA, as stated, is a promising method that must be considered when the quantitative synthesis cannot explain the heterogeneity observed between the studies; in these situations, it can usefully replace the standard return of a narrative synthesis and suggest ways in which particular combinations of intervention characteristics can be associated with better results. As the QCA assumes that several pathways can lead to the same result and does not assume a linear additive model in terms of changes to a specific condition, it does not seem to suffer from some the limitations of the statistical methods frequently used in the meta-analysis (Thomas, O´Mara-Eves, and Brunton, 2014).

The dependent variable, again, is the speed of adherence to Brazilian Cooperation Projects over the proposed period from the PALOP countries to other African countries (*velocidade_adesao_projects*). All variables were calibrated with reference to the mean, the first quartile (exclusion threshold) and the third quartile (inclusion threshold), except for *semelhanca_quali_institucional_icrg*, which is a binary variable. The "~" symbol and the word "not" mean the condition´s negation.

Table 08 – Variables Calibration

Variable	Average	Exclusion Threshold	Inclusion Threshold
velocidade_adesao_projetos	7.25	6	9
distancia_2palop	2953	1425	4054
regiao_proj_acumulados	49.82	10	63
instituicoes_com_palop	2	2.35	3

Table 09 – Necessity Test with Individual Conditions

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance
distancia_2palop	0.434	0.518	0.700
regiao_proj_acumulados	0.337	0.380	0.621
instituicoes_com_palop	0.827	0.628	0.488
semelhanca_quali_institucional_icrg	0.425	0.581	0.774

There are four categories of conditions, formed from the presence or absence of sufficiency in relation to the presence or absence of necessity. Necessity and sufficiency are generally considered together because all combinations of the two are significant. A cause is necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause that produces the result and is unique, that is, it is not a combination of causes. One cause is sufficient, but not necessary, if it is capable of producing the result, but it is not the only cause with this capacity. One cause is necessary, but not sufficient, if it is capable of producing a result in combination with other causes and appears in all of these combinations. Ultimately, a cause is neither necessary nor sufficient if it appears only in a subset of the combinations of conditions that produce a result. (Ragin, 2014).

Table 10 - Necessity Test to deny the conditions individually

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance
not distancia_2palop	0.638	0.676	0.733
not regiao_proj_acumulados	0.727	0.810	0.839
not instituicoes_com_palop	0.304	0.652	0.890
not semelhanca_quali_institucional_icrg	0.575	0.547	0.606

Table 11 – Conditions Sets´ Necessity Test

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage	Relevance
~regiao_proj_ acumulados+~distancia_2palop	0.921	0.666	0.464
~regiao_proj_acumulados+~semelhanca_ quali_institucional_icrg	0.933	0.625	0.341
~regiao_proj_acumulados +instituicoes_com_palop	0.972	0.621	0.268

First, the necessity tests results, on tables 10 and 11, indicate that the condition for a low number of projects accumulated in the region is necessary for a greater speed of adherence for cooperation projects. Care must be taken in this analysis, since there is a temporal effect on this variable: the speed of adherence to projects in a country is related to the time for other countries to adopt the projects, thus, if the speed of adherence of a country is high, the number of projects accumulated in the region may be low regarding this time factor.

Second, the Sets´ Necessity Test, as presented on Table 11, indicates the absence of the geographical variable, the institutional similarity between the countries and the accumulated projects on the region as conditions for the establishment for diffusion between the PALOP´s and the other African States. The only condition presented is the institutional proximity through regional organizations.

The QCA employs truth tables. It allows researchers to visualize and analyze central characteristics of causal complexity, such as equifinality and short-term causality. The QCA also use the principles of logical minimization, a process by which empirical information is expressed in a more parsimonious but logically equivalent way, looking for common points and differences between the cases that share the same result (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).

The truth table observes whether the four conditions causal configuration corresponds to the cases. The outcome value (OUT) is the result. "N" is the number of cases in each configuration. "PRI" means proportional reduction in inconsistency. Finally, "incl" is the inclusion value for sufficiency. The value of 0.8 was used for inclusion in the sufficiency tests.

Table 12 – Truth Table

regiao_proj_acumulados	distancia_2palop	semelhanca_quali_institucional_icrg	instituicoes_com_palop	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases[2]
0	0	0	1	1	1	1.000	1.000	15
0	0	1	1	1	3	0.933	0.929	4,6,24

2. [1] "South Africa", [2] "Namibia" , [3] "Mozambique", [4] "Angola", [5] "Cape Verde", [6] "Guinea-Bissau", [7] "Sao Tome and Principe" , [8] "Algeria", [9] "Benin", [10] "Burkina Faso" , [11] "Chad", [12] "Mali", [13] "Togo", [14] "Botswana", [15] "Ghana", [16] "Kenya", [17] "Tanzania, United Rep. of", [18] "Zambia", [19] "Congo (Democratic Republic of the)", [20] "Congo", [21] "Cameroon", [22] "Egypt" , [23] "Ethiopia", [24] "Gabon", [25] "Gambia", [26] "Guinea", [27] "Equatorial Guinea", [28] "Liberia", [29] "Sierra Leone", [30] "Malawi", [31] "Morocco", [32] "Mauritania", [33] "Nigeria", [34] "Rwanda", [35] "Uganda", [36] "Senegal", [37] "Sudan", [38] "Tunisia", [39] "Zimbabwe"

0	1	1	1	0	2	0.787	0.685	8,16
1	0	1	1	0	1	0.622	0.488	21
1	1	0	1	0	2	0.594	0.401	10,11
1	0	0	1	0	6	0.539	0.377	9,13, 20,25, 27,29
1	1	1	1	0	2	0.320	0.181	23, 35

Adopting the sufficiency inclusion threshold of 0.8, the conditions explored are (1) regiao_proj_acumulados; (2) distancia_2palop; and (3) instituicoes_com_palop. Below is the sufficiency analysis for the intermediate solutions for each condition individually.

Table 13 – Sufficiency Test for Intermediate Solutions

Conditions	Inclusion for Sufficiency	PRI	Coverage	Cases
not distancia_2palop	0.676	0.616	0.638	4,6,15,24
not regiao_proj_acumulados	0.810	0.770	0.727	4,6,15,24
instituicoes_com_palop	0.628	0.540	0.827	4,6,15,24

The intermediate solution result is, as its name implies, between the conservative and the most parsimonious one. The logic for creating intermediate solution terms is that, on the one hand, the conservative solution often tends to be too complex to be interpreted in a theoretically meaningful or plausible way and, on the other hand, the most parsimonious solution term has the risk of resting assumptions about logical remnants that contradict theoretical expectations, common sense, or both. The results of the intermediate solution, therefore, seek to find a balance between complexity and parsimony, using theory as a guide (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).

It is important to recall the results from the survival model analysis in order to compare to the ones presented on this section. First, the geographical condition, in all versions, was not a relevant independent variable. Second, the number of projects in the region and the institutional similarity, presented on the second version of 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, were regarded as having a positive relation with the dependent variable. Third, the regional institutional variable had different results, having a negative relationship with the independent variable on the 3.1.2 model.

In the QCA observed results, the cases indicate the countries Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Gana and Gabon. Most importantly, however, is the sufficient condition for regional institutions and reaffirms, in part, the survival model analysis.

The QCA results, therefore, due to its ontological difference from the Survival Model, through the necessary, sufficiency conditions, and the conditions Sets indicate as a solution the regional institutions importance on the Brazilian strategy on the African Continent.

4. Conclusion

In general, the data only points one way forward. The results, in this sense, indicate that, in a complex world, it becomes untenable to assert only on those. It is therefore necessary to seek research strategies that combine quantitative and qualitative forms of evidence. Based on this evidence, a successful approach allows qualitative evidence to update the assumptions underlying quantitative analysis and vice versa. Finally, when modeling the learning processes that flow from different inference logics, the framework provides practical guidance on research design, specifically on the conditions under which the dataset or additional observations of the causal process are likely to generate greater explanatory advantage (Humphreys and Jacobs, 2015).

The present article intends to describe some quantitative mixed-method analysis results, in order to support the qualitative studies on the area. It is impossible, however, to make an extensive analysis of those results here. Therefore, it is highly indicated that it needs further research.

Overall, the geographic variable indicates, in all versions, no relation to the diffusion of Brazilian projects in Africa. This should be investigated if it was an accident or if other regional factors, such as the institutional ones, were more relevant and ended up replacing it. As stated, it is a very counter-intuitive result.

One variable, however, that had an interesting result was the Institutional Quality and should be investigated more. While the country's simple institutional quality is not relevant to having a project, the variable that addresses the institutional similarity between PALOP and non-PALOP countries is positive and relevant to the phenomenon in the survival model analysis, but not on the QCA. The International institutional variable, however, was positive and relevant in the QCA and on 2 of 3 Survival Model Analysis. This can demonstrate the international convergence of these countries on a regional level.

Finally, this article on policy diffusion also suggests that globalization and policy diffusion are phenomena that tend to reinforce each other (Oliveira and Faria, 2017). The data, so far, indicated the importance of the recent approximation of African countries in multilateral spaces, such as regional international organizations, which would certainly have created a convergence. Brazil may have taken advantage of this phenomenon.

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CHAPTER 9

Southern African Development Community (SADC): Regional Integration and Development

Kelly Cristine Oliveira Meira

1. Introduction

The regional integration process involves policies aimed at eliminating barriers to the circulation of goods, capital, people, and services, it is important to note that as integration advances the agenda expands to include the development of common policies at the micro and macro levels (Hurrell, 1995). In addition, Calich (2018) argues that regional integration is a great tool for creating intra-block trade and to encourage the industrialization of countries.

For a long time, the development of a country was seen as an economy focused only on macroeconomic indicators such as national income and its growth, it was from the publication of the first Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1990 that the focus of development expanded to cover people-centered policies (Gaygisiz, 2013).

This paper attempts to describe the relationship between regional integration and development based on the description of socio-economic development indicators of the ten founding countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the socioeconomic variables used, specifically the Human Development Index (HDI), the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the rate of the adult population, between 15 and 49 years old, living with HIV. The choice of these indicators is due to the fact that they point to the development of a country beyond the economic issue, without, however, ignoring this aspect.

2. Regional integration

the definition of the concepts of the region, regionalism, regional integration, and regionalization are not fixed and have multiple interpretations being changed throughout history and giving rise to fluid perceptions, even according to Fawcett (2005), understanding of region and regionalism requires a flexible definition. The definition of these concepts proposed by Fawcett (2005, p. 24) is "multilevel and multipurpose definition, one that moves beyond geography, and beyond states", this study will be used the definitions of the region, regionalism, and regionalization proposed by Fawcett (2005). However, the awareness that there is an expressive number of studies in different fields (geography, history, sociology, political science, international relations, economics...) that conceptualize these terms, as well as there, is an extensive discussion and divergence within each field of research regarding their meaning.

The delimitation of the concept of the region goes beyond the simple territorial definition to include common elements, interaction, and the possibility of cooperation, thus, the region is seen as a unit based on groups, states, or territories that share some features (Fawcett, 2005). According to this definition, both Southern Africa is a region, and the African continent, the global 'South', and others. Still, according to Fawcett, this unit or zone is larger than the individual state, but smaller than the international system of states, and can be permanent or not, institutionalized or not.

The definition of region triggers the concept of regionalism which is defined "as a policy and project whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region" (Fawcett, 2005, p. 24). In addition to Fawcett, Hurrell (2005) states that "even if its form and dominant rhetoric are economic, regionalism is an extremely complex and dynamic process made up of not one but a series of interacting and often competing logics". (Hurrell, 2005, p. 40).

Regionalism seeks to promote common goals in one or more fields, therefore having many positive characteristics, promoting economic, political, cooperation, security, and community aspects, in addition to the fact that the behavior of strong states and institutions generate and maintain norms and values, and make other states and institutions more accountable. (Fawcett, 2005).

Fawcett (2005) differentiates between what she regards as soft regionalism (soft regionalism) and rigid regionalism (hard regionalism). Soft regionalism is one that promotes a sense of community, while rigid regionalism is shaped by the formation of groups and networks formalized by state agreements and organizations. Also according to Fawcett (2005), a

successful regionalist project requires connections between state and non-state actors.

Regionalization, in turn, is considered primarily as a process, a concentration of regional activity (trade, conflict, ideas, peoples...) that can occur by spontaneous forces and this interaction, consequently, will give rise to the regions that will trigger, for in turn, in the emergence of regional actors and organizations. (Fawcett, 2005). In the area of security, regionalization has acquired a specific meaning and is used to refer to the regional response, as opposed to the global response, to conflicts that are often regionalized. (Fawcett, 2005).

Regional integration is a term that is often used as a synonym for regionalism, Richard (2014), however, highlights that although they are related concepts they are not the same thing. Regional integration, according to Richard (2014) "designates the process by which territories... gradually form a regional group distinct from the rest of the world" (Richard, 2014, p. 20, own translation). Mwithiga (2015) approaches regional integration as a process in which countries agree to cooperate in areas that are of common interest, this cooperation is formalized by agreements, although it has already been stated above that different aspects lead to regional integration, the economic issue is the most important for a country to join a Regional Economic Community (REC), the African continent has eight REC recognized by the African Union (AU).

In Africa, economic communities are understood as a way of leveraging the capacity of small countries, in addition, regional integration and consequently intra-Africa trade would contribute to structural transformations and economic and social development, in addition to increasing the bargaining power in a globalized world (Mwithiga, 2015).

2.1 Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was officially created in August 1992 through a treaty signed in Windhoek, Namibia, and are founding members of the Community: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe subsequently entered the Community in South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles in 1998, Madagascar in 2005 and, more recently, Comoros in 2018. (SADC, 2021).

Figure 1 - SADC Member States

Source: SADC (2021)

Returning to the creation of SADC, two integration initiatives preceded it directly, the Frontline States (FLS) alliance was created in 1975 in a period whose main concern in the region was the anti-colonial struggle with Angola and Mozambique becoming independent in the same year and Seychelles in the following year (Cilliers, 1999), it is also noteworthy that since 1960 several countries in the southern region of Africa have achieved independence. In the following years, the economy became an aspect that required attention, which resulted in the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, the SADCC and FLS remained as separate forums, the first as responsible for economic coordination and the second as political and military support (Cilliers, 1999).

3. Development

Patricia Mukiri Mwithiga (2015) points out that regional integration is the desired objective based on the principle that free trade is fundamentally positive, however, Balefi Tsie (1996) in the article "States and markets in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Beyond the Neo-Liberal Paradigm" brings a fundamental discussion about the roles played by the State and the market in the development process, the author rejects the neoliberal paradigm that minimizes the State's action in favor of the market for

the development of Southern Africa. Tsie (1996) argues that the selective and coordinated intervention of the State is fundamental to direct market forces to achieve the targeted regional objectives.

The expanded scope of the objectives of the SADC Treaty, which includes environmental protection, consolidation of cultural, historical, and social ties, common political institutions, self-sustained development, promotion of peace and security, in addition to poverty reduction and economic growth, allows us to infer a concern on the part of the Community with development beyond financial aspects.

The SADC Treaty sets out the principles and objectives to be pursued by members of the Community, as presented in table 1.

Table 1 - SADC Principles and Objectives

Principles	Objectives
a) sovereign equality of all Member States;	a) achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
b) solidarity, peace, and security;	b) evolve common political values, systems, and institutions;
c) human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;	c) promote and defend peace and security;
d) equity, balance, and mutual benefit;	d) promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of Member States;
e) peaceful settlement of disputes;	e) achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programs;
	f) promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the Region;
	g) achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment;
	h) strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social, and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the Region.

Source: Elaborated by the author based on Treaty of SADC (1992)

In 2011 The Consolidated Treaty of the Southern African Development Community was launched. The Consolidated Treaty is a consolidation of the texts: The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (1992); The Agreement Amending the Treaty (2001); The Agreement Amending Article 22 of the Treaty (2007); The Agreement Amending the Treaty (2008); The Agreement Amending Article 10A of the Treaty (2009); The Agreement Amending Article 10 and 14 of the Treaty (2009). (Consolidated Treaty of the SADC, 2011).

The Consolidated Treaty of the SADC brings an expansion of the Community's objectives, in relation to the 1992 Treaty, as shown in table 2.

Table 2 - Objectives from the Consolidated Treaty of SADC

a) promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
b) promote common political values, systems, and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions that are democratic, legitimate, and effective;
c) consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security, and stability;
d) promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of Member States;
e) achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programs;
f) promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the Region;
g) achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment;
h) strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social, and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the Region;
i) combat HIV/AIDS or other deadly and communicable diseases;
j) ensure that poverty eradication is addressed in all SADC activities and programs;
k) mainstream gender in the process of community building.

Source: Elaborated by the author based on Consolidated Treaty of SADC (2011)

From table 1 to table 2, it is possible to notice the expansion of the Community's scope, and consequently of what is possible to be understood as development. In the Consolidated Treaty of the SADC (2011) it is possible to identify a concern with gender equity through the "mainstream gender in the process of community building" objective, as well as the fight against sexually transmitted infections such as HIV/AIDS.

4. Method

This study is characterized as descriptive, using bibliographic and documentary research. The descriptive character is derived from the purpose of the research, which is to verify the relationship between some socioeconomic indicators and the regional integration block. Currently, SADC has sixteen member countries, however, for this research, it was decided to include only the ten founding members in the analysis due to the period of time covered.

The data used covers the period between 1992 and 2018 and was collected on websites of international institutions. HDI was collected on the UNDP website (2021). The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate and the rate of the adult population (15-49 years old) living with HIV were collected on the World Bank website (World Bank, 2021).

The Human Development Index (HDI) is the average of the key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2021) and was created to demonstrate that people's capacities should be the main factor in assessing the development of a state, and not just economic growth (UNDP, 2021). HDI is a measure of countries' average performance in the main dimensions of human development: health is measured by life expectancy at birth; education was measured by the literacy rate and schooling rate, as of 2010 this dimension of HDI started to be evaluated by the average of the years of adults (25 years or more) and the expected schooling for children of school age and the dimension income was measured by GDP per capita and since 2010 it has been measured by gross national income per capita. (UNDP, 2010; Gaygisiz, 2013).

The GDP is the sum of all national production, plus taxes on products and reduced subsidies not included in the value of products, regardless of whether the value will revert to national or foreign institutions. (World Bank, 2021).

The variable rate of the adult population (15-49 years old) living with HIV was chosen because it is a variable of socioeconomic development and because in the Consolidated Treaty of the SADC (2011) the fight against HIV is one of the objectives.

5. Discussion

Table 3 shows the variation in the HDI level of the SADC founding member countries between the years 1992-2018, with the exception of Angola, whose HDI started to be measured in 1999. From the HDI values, it is identified that some countries had a steady evolution of the HDI such as Angola and Mozambique while several countries showed an increase in the index, followed by a reduction to then increase again such as Zimbabwe and Eswatini.

Among the ten countries in the analysis, the one with the best HDI in 2018 was Botswana, while Mozambique showed the worst index. In 2018, the countries classified with an average human development index were those with HDI equal to or greater than 0.634 and less than 0.750, according to this classification only Botswana and Namibia had an average HDI, while all the others were classified as low HDI. (UNDP, 2021).

Table 3 - The HDI of SADC Member States (1992-2018)

	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ang.					0,400	0,426	0,446	0,473	0,501	0,517	0,544	0,565	0,578	0,582
Bot.	0,577	0,570	0,575	0,580	0,581	0,579	0,592	0,615	0,641	0,663	0,689	0,711	0,720	0,730
Esw.	0,539	0,527	0,515	0,490	0,465	0,442	0,445	0,469	0,487	0,510	0,539	0,568	0,588	0,605
Les.	0,493	0,486	0,477	0,470	0,459	0,446	0,440	0,436	0,446	0,460	0,480	0,498	0,512	0,522
Mal.	0,348	0,356	0,376	0,395	0,388	0,357	0,363	0,377	0,405	0,431	0,446	0,465	0,472	0,478
Moz.	0,227	0,241	0,263	0,287	0,307	0,327	0,349	0,366	0,387	0,401	0,403	0,425	0,441	0,452
Nam	0,587	0,587	0,573	0,557	0,544	0,541	0,545	0,551	0,567	0,589	0,613	0,631	0,639	0,645
Tan.	0,367	0,366	0,369	0,377	0,390	0,407	0,426	0,447	0,465	0,481	0,496	0,504	0,520	0,524
Zam.	0,416	0,414	0,416	0,416	0,425	0,441	0,460	0,482	0,503	0,527	0,549	0,561	0,571	0,582
Zim.	0,467	0,460	0,453	0,442	0,430	0,423	0,411	0,414	0,422	0,482	0,525	0,547	0,558	0,569

Source: Elaborated by the author based on Human Development Reports, UNDP (2021)

Figure 2 shows the GDP variation of the ten SADC founding member states between 1992 and 2018. In this period, Zimbabwe was the country that showed the greatest variation in the value of GDP.

Figure 2 - GDP of SADC Member States (1992-2018)

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, (2021)

Figure 3 shows the percentage of the adult population, aged 15-49 years, living with HIV in each of the ten founding member countries of SADC. The incidence of HIV in the population is an important piece of information because, in addition to being an indicator of socio-economic development in the country, it also indicates whether the Community is managing to fulfill its proposed objectives, in this case, the fight against HIV/AIDS.

As can be seen, Lesotho and Eswatini are the countries with the highest prevalence of HIV in SADC and in the world (Corno and Walque, 2012), including a steady increase in the number of people with HIV, although Lesotho has started a slight decrease from 2015 and Eswatini from 2017.

Zimbabwe, on the other hand, has witnessed a reduction in the number of people with HIV since 1997. Angola is the country, among the ten evaluated, with the lowest population index with HIV, unfortunately, however, the country has been witnessing an increase in the number of infected people since 1992.

Despite all this, it is important to highlight that it is not possible to say whether the numbers of infected people are actually decreasing or if there is a failure in the diagnosis, that is if the population is not being tested. The same can be said about Angola, whether the number of people living with HIV is increasing or whether the population is being tested in greater numbers and frequency than before.

Figure 3 - Adult population living with HIV in the SADC Member States (1992-2018)



Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, (2021)

Unfortunately, these variables were not enough to suggest that the regional integration process had a positive impact on the socioeconomic indicators of member states.

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CHAPTER 10

Digital platforms for South-South cooperation: WWP knowledge translation of Brazilian social policies

Marianna Rios Franco

Introduction

Since the late 1980s, facing a transition to democracy and the promulgation of its New Constitution Brazil has implemented innovative social policies, such as the *Bolsa Família* Programme, which improved inequalities, reducing poverty and hunger[1]. This prosperous scenario was also observed in several emerging economies from Latin America, Africa and Asia, leading to high expectations on a new global order that could shift the traditional and vertical power relation from North-South Cooperation of policy transfer to a new and horizontal South-South Cooperation (SSC)[2]. In addition, this change in perspective put into practice the concept of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries. The TCDC is an effective tool to promote development, mobilizing and distributing resources and expertise, based on horizontality and knowledge exchange among developing countries[3].

The domain of technical knowledge in social policies has become a recognized expertise and has increased the power of the Southern states in relation to international institutions. International organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations have started to recommend some social policy strategies and best practices implemented by developing countries to

1. Porto de Oliveira, 2020.
2. Porto de Oliveira and Pal, 2018.
3. Souza, 2014.

be exported over the Global South, creating an optimistic perspective for policy promotion within the scope of SSC initiatives.

Brazil, which was already being recognized as an emerging global player and a regional power, also benefited from the direct interest and participation of international organisations, becoming a global policy exporter[4]. The country developed a broader international strategy to export its social policies, including the creation of institutions designed for policy transfers and proactive engagement in development cooperation – whose "DNA" was the transfer of "ideas, social technologies, expertise, policy models, and instruments to other countries, in particular those in the South"[5].

The innovations made by developing countries in the social field have built international and regional policy networks on social protection dedicated to facilitating voluntary exchange and mutual learning among policy makers[6]. These policy networks have found even more potential for growth and dissemination with the help of information and communication technology tools (ICTs)[7], such as digital platforms aimed to strengthen the diffusion of social policies between developing countries, by providing knowledge, evidences and best practices through digital materials, webinars, discussion forums, online training courses, interactions on social networks, and so on.

These online platforms benefit from technology to disseminate low-cost, accessible, inclusive and autonomous knowledge expertise to SSC. These initiatives are transnational and digital and are presented in bilateral and triangular cooperation formats, involving communities of practices made of state and non-state actors, such as international organizations, research centers and think tanks. Therefore, due to a new and complex scenario and a lot of potential involved in these digital platforms, there are challenges to be observed and delivered[8].

One of the challenges is: how can these digital platforms for SSC better capture and document public policy experiences, so that other countries adapt them to their realities and meet a real need? In other words, what are the possibilities of knowledge translation in digital platforms for SSC? Literature review identified that there are an increasingly number of research focused on knowledge diffusion within the scope of SSC and/or TCDC[9].

4. Porto de Oliveira, 2020.
5. Porto de Oliveira, 2020, pp. 6.
6. Bender et al., 2014.
7. Janus et al., 2015.
8. Socialprotection.org, 2020.
9. Porto de Oliveira, 2020, 2017, Constantine and Shankland, 2017, Bender et al., 2014.

Nevertheless, little has been addressed on knowledge translation[10], and also has been neglected by literature. Knowledge translation is an intermediary process to avoid incomplete and inadequate transfers and diffusions. Without some kind of translation, policies simply would not fit into different contexts, nor would be accepted by heterogeneous groups[11].

There is, therefore, a research gap in this field that needs to be identified and explored so that it can target empirical issues on knowledge translation. This paper will analyse the knowledge translation process adopted by the Brazil Learning Initiative for a World Without Poverty. WWP was a digital platform, active from 2013 to 2017, whose main goal was to disseminate Brazilian poverty reduction policies. It was funded by the World Bank and managed by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), the Institute for Applied Economic Research of Brazil and the Ministry of Social Development of Brazil.

The main question to be addressed is "how did the WWP translate the knowledge of Brazilian social policies?". Based on literature review and interviews with five WWP staff members, this paper focuses on the hypothesis that the great effort made by a complex inter-organisational governance structure and its experts to translate robust knowledge of Brazilian social policies was not enough to succeed in its main goal of reaching the target audience and transferring policies from Brazil to Latin American and African countries.

Knowledge generation for South-South Cooperation

South-South Cooperation (SSC) emerged shortly after World War II, in a context in which developing countries were dealing with their decolonization processes and being aware that their inequality and poverty issues are historical and structural characteristics of the Global South. They were also seeking innovative strategies towards autonomy, self-sufficiency and less dependency on international aid. SSC has been responsible for changing the perspectives of developing countries, showing cooperation between the South as an alternative to assistance from the North. This counter-hegemonic model is partnership-based, rather than donor-recipient-based, which means that it lies on mutual exchanges and benefits, as well as horizontal and interactive transfers[12]. According to the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, SSC "is a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, and technical domains […] [in which] developing countries share knowledge, skills,

10. Kuhlmann, 2019, Stone, 2012.
11. Porto de Oliveira, 2018.
12. Souza, 2014.

expertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts"[13].

One of the reasons for boosting SSC among developing nations was their confidence about the value of the knowledge derived from "direct experience of policy making and implementation in the provider's own country [, which built a sense that they] […] have much to learn as well as much to teach"[14]. Not only research-based knowledge counts as legitimate knowledge to policy making, but also practice-informed knowledge. Scientists and scholars are able to provide research and evidence-based knowledge; however, they may not succeed in communicating with stakeholders due to technical terms, which ends up excluding policy makers from debates. On the other hand, practice-informed knowledge deals with tacit knowledge derived from experiences of implementing policies and practices[15].

> *This emphasis on knowledge exchange led to a growth in interest in "mutual learning" as well as "mutual benefit". Drawing on this long tradition of supporting opportunities for learning in the "global South", either between regions or among countries within the same region, SSC has formed the foundation for a wide range of multistakeholder knowledge-sharing exchanges in the South.*[16]

Their willingness to learn from successful practices in the Region created an effervescent voluntary provision of policymaking experiences and implementations made available by Southern countries – "rather than from the deployment of transnational expertise in the observation and synthesis of other countries' experiences"[17]. This has led to a cycle of knowledge generation, transmission and use[18] for many purposes. For instance: research production; dissemination, diffusion, and implementation of policy; and evaluation of existing policy[19].

Research production has synthesised these "movements of a political object in time and space" in basically three traditions that are far from being technical, linear and rational: policy transfer, policy diffusion, and policy circulation[20]. Policy transfer refers to "a specific displacement of a policy from one jurisdiction to another" or between "a few political units" in "unidirectional

13. UNOSSC *apud* Constantine and Shankland, 2017, pp. 105.
14. Constantine and Shankland, 2017, pp. 105.
15. Jones et al., 2013.
16. Constantine and Shankland, 2017, pp. 106.
17. Constantine and Shankland, 2017, p. 105.
18. Jones at al., 2012 *apud* Janus, 2015.
19. Graham, 2008.
20. Porto de Oliveira and Pal, 2018, Porto de Oliveira, 2020.

movements"[21]. It is as a "process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting [...] is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system"[22]. Policy diffusion is "a collective adoption of a public policy" "that encompass several states, eventually from distinct continents", "that can be identified by their geographic proximity, such as Latin American states, or by a shared historical background, that can be political, institutional and/or ideological [...]"[23]. It is also a process "in which policies in one unit are influenced by concepts, proposals, policies or ideas from another unit"[24]. Policy circulation is "a longer and broader flow, in time and space, that can also imply back and forward policy movements" to "frame rather diffuse and multidirectional processes"[25].

In order to travel over the three above-mentioned traditions (transfer, diffusion and circulation), policy knowledge implies some kind of translation, which requires interpretation by those who are taking, receiving or implementing policies. During translation, it is expected that models are changed and adapted both on their material components (e.g. model, administrative arrangement, programme, standard, etc.) and on the abstract dimension (e.g. idea, ideological or political content, belief about the cause of a public problem, principles, etc.). Without translation, policies simply would not fit into diversified contexts, nor would be accepted by different groups[26]. "In the act of translation the "given" content becomes alien and est ranged; and that, in its turn, leaves the language of translation Aufgabe, always confronted by its double, the untranslatable – alien and foreign"[27].

In other words, cultural translation cannot untie power relations and asymmetries between languages, regions and people in order to describe, interpret and disseminate ideas and views[28]. This means that a translation process reshapes each political object in relation to the other – the one that is considered the traditional – and displaces this new political object "in the same critical act". "This emphasis on political representation, the construction of discourse, is a radical contribution to the translation of the theory"[29]. Therefore, this space of translation is a spot of hybridity: "[...] where the

21. Porto de Oliveira, 2017, pp. 16-19, 2020, pp. 22-30.
22. Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000 *apud* Kuhlmann et al., 2019, pp. 4.
23. Porto de Oliveira, 2017, pp. 16-19, 2020, pp. 22-30.
24. Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016 *apud* Kuhlmann et al., 2019, pp. 3.
25. Porto de Oliveira, 2017, pp. 16-19, 2020, pp. 22-30.
26. Porto de Oliveira and Pal, 2018.
27. Bhabha, 2007, pp. 231.
28. Costa, 2010.
29. Bhabha, 2007, pp. 53.

construction of a political object that is new, neither the one nor the other, properly alienates our political expectations, and changes, as if must, the very forms of our recognition of the moment of politics"[30].

Translation is also a stage of the flow of policies, called perception and translation, which precedes the stage of cooperation and conflict, and the stage of collective decision-making. Perception and translation is at play when actors that are going to receive the policy "acquire new knowledge of policies in other contexts and transform these into their own policy legacies" [31]. During the stage of perception and translation, the active role of receiver units "becomes tangible in emphasizing processes of perception, increased attention, deeper understanding, intellectual reception and reinterpretation"[32]. Nevertheless, it can also occur in the event of a more passive role of the receiver unit facing a more active, persuasive or powerful role of the giver unit, which can play a protagonist role on the stage of perception and translation because of "having implemented a successful policy due to hegemonic factors"[33].

Translation can also be taken as a strategy to persuade specific groups[34]. Agents who advocate a certain type of policy can produce different narratives to fit convenient principles or simplify a policy to boost its circulation. Knowledge is not apolitical[35] and "knowledge intermediaries" can be engaged not only in promoting policy learning[36], but also in indirect coercion[37].

These agents are coined by literature as "public policy ambassadors", "knowledge intermediaries", "policy entrepreneurs", "policy brokers", "epistemic communities", "advocacy coalitions" and "interpretative communities" in order to emphasize their role of advocating policy solutions through sharing of experiences, networks and resources[38]. These "intermediary policy spaces" are responsible for mutating and transforming policy ideas through the process of translation"[39].

> *Such partnerships or networks […] [are] engaged in a continuous process of translation and modification (Freeman, 2009) […].*

30. Bhabha, 2007, pp. 51.
31. Kuhlmann et al., 2019, pp. 6-7.
32. Kuhlmann et al., 2019, pp. 6-7.
33. Dobbin et al., 2007 *apud* Kuhlmann et al., 2019, pp. 8.
34. Porto de Oliveira and Pal, 2018, p. 211.
35. Stone, 2000.
36. Dobbin et al., 2007, Stone, 2000.
37. Dobbin et al., 2007, Porto de Oliveira and Faria, 2017.
38. Porto de Oliveira and Pal, 2018, Kingdon, 2011, Ingold and Varone, 2012, Haas, 1992 *apud* Jones et al., 2013, Sabatier, 1991 *apud* Stone, 2000, Acharya, 2004 *apud* Stone, 2012.
39. Stone, 2012, pp. 11.

[…] their collective interactions constitute structures of policy translation (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007). […] In conjunction with other dynamics, policy transfer/translation has the unintended consequence of fuelling transnational governance and giving shape and substance to new policy spaces.[40]

These structures of policy translation are called "knowledge actors", who work within networks. They act as "policy networks" – arrangements to promote exchange of information, debate, persuasion, and search for solutions and policy responses – and aim to disseminate information on innovative policies being adopted elsewhere. They represent "a soft, informal and gradual mode for the international diffusion and dissemination of ideas and policy paradigms". They can be seen as a channel through which organisations "can project their ideas into policy thinking across states and within global or regional fora", producing discourses, building consensual knowledge, and creating new policy arrangements for global public policy networks[41].

Networks are an organisational form with extraordinary capacities for innovation, managing risk, building trust, facilitating joint action and gathering information in a manner that flows around and between geographical, legal and institutional barriers. When networks include the active participation and involvement of decision-makers they have the potential to influence policy. […] Moreover, the interaction of official decision-makers (politicians and bureaucrats) with relevant stakeholders and experts, helps to reinforce the credibility and legitimacy of network participants in the formulation and implementation of policy.[42]

Policy networks engage its stakeholders through communication structures based on newsletters, databases, conferences and e-dialogues[43]. This communication apparatus is facilitated by the global spread of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)[44] and has been releasing information through websites, portals and gateways[45].

There is a lot of potential for using technology to lower cost and make knowledge exchange simpler for SSC[46]. Some of the potentials and benefits of these online platforms are: creating a market-place to connect supply and

40. Stone, 2012, pp. 13-14.
41. Stone, 2000, pp. 15-20.
42. Stone, 2000, pp. 15.
43. Stone, 2000.
44. Janus et al., 2015.
45. Narayanaswamy, 2013.
46. Socialprotection.org, 2020.

demand for knowledge expertise; being a knowledge base of good practices and evidences; building a community of practice made of policy makers, practitioners, experts, researches, etc.; undertaking online training courses; being an online code repository for software developers that work for public policy solutions. Nevertheless, they also face challenges, and one of the most elementary one is explained by Ian Thorpe, Chief of the Learning and Knowledge Exchange Section at UNICEF, during the webinar "Digital platforms as tools for enhancing South-South and triangular cooperation towards the SDGs": "We have a successful programme, but 'how do we capture and document that experience, so that other people can see if it is relevant to them, and then adapt that [experience] and use that [knowledge]?'"[47]. In other words, how can these digital platforms for SSC better capture and document public policy experiences, so that other countries adapt them to their realities and meet a real need? Or, what are the possibilities of knowledge translation in digital platforms for SSC?

Digital platforms for South-South Cooperation: the Brazil Learning Initiative for a World Without Poverty (WWP)

Policy networks have found even more potential for growth and dissemination with the help of information and communication technology tools (ICTs)[48], such as digital platforms aimed to strengthen the diffusion of social policies between developing countries, by providing knowledge, evidences and best practices through digital materials, webinars, discussion forums, online training courses, interactions on social networks, and so on. These online platforms benefit from technology to disseminate low-cost, accessible, inclusive and autonomous knowledge expertise to SSC. These initiatives are transnational and digital and are presented in bilateral and triangular cooperation formats, involving communities of practices made of state and non-state actors, such as international organizations, research centers and think tanks[49]. Some examples of digital platforms for SSC are the "SocialProtection.org", the "South-South Galaxy", the "South-South Global Thinkers", the "Evidence and Lessons from Latin America", the "Eco-System Based Adaptation Through South-South Cooperation", and the "WWP" [50] – which is this paper's main object.

47. Socialprotection.org, 2020.
48. Janus et al., 2015.
49. Socialprotection.org, 2020.
50. URLS <https://socialprotection.org/>, <https://www.unsouthsouth.org/south-south-galaxy/>, <https://www.ssc-globalthinkers.org/>, <http://ella.practicalaction.org/>, <http://www.ebasouth.org/> and < http://wwp.org.br/en/> (accessed: 10.01.2021).

The Brazil Learning Initiative for a World Without Poverty (WWP) was a digital platform, active from 2013 to 2017, whose main goal was to disseminate Brazilian poverty reduction policies and to connect its practitioners in order to develop their own capacities to deliver social programmes in developing countries. From 2011 to 2016, Brazil received 455 delegations from 107 countries for technical missions with the purpose of learning on some social policy issues, such as conditional cash transfers, food and nutrition security, social assistance, productive inclusion, and monitoring and evaluation. The majority of missions were from countries in Latin America and Africa. In view of the growing demand for knowledge sharing about Brazilian social policies, the Brazilian government and the World Bank created the WWP to fill the hitherto existing documentation and dissemination gap about these programmes[51].

The initiative was established in March 2013 by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by four partners: the World Bank, the Ministry of Social Development of Brazil (MDS), the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), and the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG). WWP was funded by the World Bank, becoming one of the bank's actions for promoting social development, addressing the goal of eradicating extreme poverty in the world, and approaching the "science of delivery"[52]. The roles of the IPC-IG and IPEA were to provide expertise on Brazilian and global social policy issues, giving technical inputs to decision making. The IPC-IG was also responsible for giving administrative support to hire the WWP team and to manage the WWP funds. The MDS was the main source of knowledge about the Brazilian social policies – many of the WWP publications were written and produced by Brazilian government officials[53].

The WWP's knowledge generation was settled by a complex inter-organisational governance structure in a matrix arrangement[54], "based on a mutually agreed work plan adopted by the partners […] [and composed by] different committees, which plan, debate and approve all activities"[55]. WWP's governance was composed by: a Board of Directors, in charge of coordinating strategic and policy-related activities; a Secretariat, for the formulation of technical directives and the work plan; an Editorial Committee, for

51. WWP, 2017.
52. A concept developed by the bank that consists of generating knowledge about the implementation and results of policies, and spreading experiences both nationally and internationally (WWP, 2017).
53. WWP, 2017.
54. Garcia and Cortizo, 2016.
55. WWP, 2017, pp. 19.

the definition of the editorial policy; a Technical Committee, for the elaboration of technical content; and, finally, a Communication Committee, for the communication and dissemination strategy. Each of these committees was expected to have two representatives from each partner of the initiative. This contributed to building a general sense of ownership among the institutions, especially due to the content's revision and validation processes[56].

The WWP website was a repository of knowledge made available in different formats – digital publications, videos, webinars, newsletters, etc. – and in four languages – Portuguese, English, Spanish and French. Even after the end of the initiative, in 2017, its website[57] remains online. There are 80 technical articles, each available in four languages, the content of which covers almost 30 different Brazilian social policies. In addition to the technical publications, which were the majority of knowledge products available on the WWP website, the digital platform also published 39 videos (series of short videos, series of case studies, event videos and training videos), held webinars and disseminated face-to-face events and information through monthly newsletters and the partners' social media channels. In 2017 (the last year of the initiative's operations), WWP publications registered more than 250,000 downloads – with the *Bolsa Família* Programme and the Unified Registry being the most searched topics –, in addition to 290,000 page views and 1,174 newsletter subscribers. According to its final report, these results were achieved thanks to the WWP's ability to link "the worldwide demand for implementation and 'on-the-ground' policy-related information" to "an array of different media", promoting "peer-to-peer learning experiences"[58].

The WWP knowledge generation started with the conduction of surveys to define themes of interest within the target audience. Three surveys were carried out, covering 132 participants from 61 countries at three international events held in Brazil in 2013 and 2014. Based on their responses, in 2014 WWP began its knowledge production by covering issues related to the Unified Registry, the conditionalities of the *Bolsa Família* Programme and the federal coordination of Brazilian social programmes[59]. Thereafter, the qualified technical bodies of the World Bank and the MDS began to research, adapt, create and coordinate the production of these technical contents. Experts of the thematic secretariats of the MDS wrote the majority of the

56. WWP, 2017.
57. URL http://wwp.org.br/en/.
58. WWP, 2017, pp. 63.
59. By 2015, other topics, such as monitoring and evaluation, federative coordination, productive inclusion and social assistance were included in the knowledge production.

content. These secretariats are the ministry branches in the coordination of the national social programmes and were very active in the WWP's knowledge production, validation and approval[60]. As knowledge production grew and became more demanding, it became necessary to hire full-time consultants. This reinforcement in the knowledge production team allowed WWP partners to better manage their tasks, avoiding overloads and reducing the risk of misunderstandings and interpersonal and inter-organisational conflicts. Within the scope of the work that was expected to be elaborated by the consultant there was more analytical and evaluative contents, such as logical models for social programmes, management instruments, mapping of flows and processes, result evaluations, and lessons learned[61].

After the knowledge production stage, carried out by MDS technical team in collaboration with experts from the World Bank and full-time consultants, the final content was sent first to the Technical Committee and then to the Editorial Committee for validation and approval. No material would be available in WWP website without the review and approval of all members of at least two committees (usually Technical and Editorial)[62]. With the content approved by the Editorial Committee, the products were sent to proofreading, and then translation and graphical design. After all these stages, the publication could finally be made available on the WWP website[63].

An evaluation carried out by WWP with 150 social policy managers and technicians in May 2016 revealed that 53.2% of them considered WWP publications suitable for their purposes. Another evaluation carried out in December 2016 with 10 representatives of international organisations and African governments showed that, for 90%, WWP materials were very good or excellent, mainly in relation to their relevance to the work, level of knowledge and clarity of information. Finally, a third evaluation, submitted between January and February 2017 to the 105 most frequent readers of the newsletter, pointed out that WWP's knowledge products were positively evaluated according to some aspects, for instance, relevance to improving the respondent's knowledge; relevance to the implementation of a similar programme in another country; knowledge level; clarity of information; level of detail; and addressing important issues. It also showed that 56.3% agreed that WWP knowledge products were relevant to the design, implementation and/or management of a similar policy, programme or tool in another country[64].

60. Garcia and Cortizo, 2016.
61. Garcia, 2018.
62. Garcia, 2018.
63. Garcia et al., 2014.
64. WWP, 2017, pp. 59-61.

Indeed, it was expected that WWP would be successful in documenting and disseminating knowledge about Brazil. Nevertheless, one common challenge for digital platforms like WWP is how they can better capture and document public policy experiences, so that other countries adapt them to their realities and meet a real need. Bringing this concern to the WWP, this study seeks to reflect on the knowledge translation process adopted by the Initiative about Brazilian social policies.

The WWP knowledge translation of Brazilian social policies

WWP knowledge products were based on the "know-how" and expertise of its partners in delivering systems and implementing programmes, with a focus on the "how to" of the Brazilian experience in social protection. Its technical contents were organised by three levels of knowledge, as follows[65]:

1. **Summary sheets**: it presented the broader features of a social policy or programme in a two-page publication divided into topics, for an immediate comprehension and a point of entry to each subject or policy addressed;
2. **Articles**: it detailed programme sheets and policy reports in a length from three to ten pages, providing in-depth information about policies and specific topics of programmes;
3. **Case studies**: it emphasised, over 20 to 30 pages, the details of social policies and implementation challenges, focusing on more practical results and more profound knowledge in order to facilitate the exchange of experiences.

They were also divided into seven thematic axes, as follows[66]:

1. **Unified Registry (*Cadastro Único*):** a tool for the identification and socio-economic characterisation of low-income families, with 27 million registered families, used for different social programmes and policies;
2. ***Bolsa Família* Programme:** one of the world's largest conditional cash transfer programmes, which reaches more than 13 million families and has conditionalities on health and education;
3. **Productive inclusion:** local initiatives that helped families to seek financial autonomy and to overcome vulnerabilities and improve their quality of life;
4. **Food security:** information regarding the Food Purchase Programme (PAA), which developed a market-place linking the government of Brazil and family farmers, and inspired the Food Purchase Programme

65. WWP, 2017, pp. 15-24.
66. WWP, 2017, pp. 25-28.

for Africa (PAA Africa); and the Cistern Programme for building concrete plate cisterns for storing water for household consumption and productive activities in the Semi-Arid Region;

5. **Social assistance:** information about the Unified Social Assistance System (SUAS), which is a government-run system that has been organising and funding social assistance services since 2005; as well as the Child Labour Eradication Programme (PETI) and the Continuous Welfare Benefit for the Elderly and Disabled (BPC);
6. **Monitoring and evaluation**: management of public policies in Brazil has became more complex and professional, seeking monitoring and evaluation of its programmes and services in order to support evidence-based knowledge production;
7. **Policy coordination**: integrated coordination at inter-sectoral and inter-federal level of the social policies within the Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan.

To assist in this knowledge generation, the WWP technical team developed a script composed of a set of topics that should be answered for any written content on social policies. These topics aimed to facilitate the comprehension of the so-called "how to" approach, which explains how the programme works or how to do something similar. They had to cover these: executive summary (what the programme is); goals; history and timeline; stakeholders and practitioners; management and execution; how it works; management instruments (processes, flows, IT system, other technologies and tools used); logical model of the programme; monitoring and evaluation of the programme; audits; social control; target audience and selection criteria; coverage; financing resources; legislation; results and impacts; lessons learned, challenges and potential; and additional information. Furthermore, WWP publications sought to be objective, didactic, illustrative (with the use of graphs, tables and flowcharts), relevant and updated, as well as avoiding any technicalities that could confuse or hinder the understanding of Brazilian policies by foreigners[67].

In order to provide more information to the qualitative analysis of this study, five semi-structured interviews were applied to professionals[68] directly

67. Garcia, 2018.

68. They are: Daniel Plech Garcia, public servant of the Ministry of Citizenship (at the time, MDS) and responsible for articulating the knowledge production of WWP under the MDS; Roberta Pelella Mélega Cortizo, public servant of the Ministry of Citizenship and technician responsible for the content elaboration of various WWP materials under the MDS; Claudia Regina Baddini Curralero, public servant serving on the Administrative Council for Economic Defense and manager of the WWP at the World Bank; Julia Segatto Barros, journalist and WWP communications consultant at the World Bank; and Marco Amorim Prates, journalist and WWP communication assistant at the IPC-IG.

involved in the knowledge production and, as consequence, the knowledge translation at WWP – members of the Technical, Editorial and Communication Committees. The answers obtained were synthesized and analyzed along the following passages of this work. All participants evaluate WWP knowledge production as high quality, positive and efficient. The prominence of high-skilled experts on Brazilian social policies and the mutual-learning environment encouraged by an inter-organisational governance structure were pointed as fundamental to guarantee the quality of the publications.

"Assemblage" ("the mix of ideas and interplay of interests") in the knowledge translation helps the construction of new architectures. As an unintended consequence, it fuels transnational governance and gives shape and substance to new policy spaces. Knowledge translation is, therefore, a substratum of the governmentality involved in policy transfer[69]. Not coincidentally, the first benefited from WWP knowledge translation was the Brazilian government itself, followed by the other WWP partner institutions. The material produced in the scope of the WWP served as a guide for public policy managers at the federal, state and municipal levels and even for the dissemination of the work developed by Brazil internally, which was considered by all respondents as a positive aspect of the WWP legacy.

All respondents agree that WWP knowledge translation was guided in order to facilitate the replication of content, ideas and processes in different contexts. According to them, the contents should stimulate understanding of other countries about the dimension of institutional, legal, legislative and political arrangements taken by Brazil in the consolidation of its public policies. "In knowledge production, it was very important for us to be able to address what matters and how we need to explain, so that they can understand what we did and see if it is appropriate to adapt to their reality", answered a participant.

Nevertheless, knowledge translation has partially fulfilled its purpose. Firstly, all participants agree that there was a lack of self-criticism about Brazilian social policies at the WWP knowledge generation process. They report that both the Secretariat and the Editorial Committee would encourage this because they were afraid of the political impact of admitting failures or exposing vulnerabilities in the implementation of Brazilian social policies. Respondents disagreed when naming the partner who would be most concerned with political repercussions: one participant cited the MDS, due to the negative impact it could have on the reputation of Brazilian policies; and another cited the World Bank, for fear of negative impact on the WWP. Some

69. Stone, 2012, pp. 14.

respondents reported cases of cutting information in some texts and in excerpts from videos because they understood that, politically, it could be negative for the government. Political contexts, including constraints on power and ability to absorb change, can shape and influence knowledge-policy interactions[70]. It is not only important to understand the meanings underlying policies and their translation when they are transferred from one place to another, but also to monitor what is lost in the translation process[71]. Participants agree that not all details of the implementation of a public policy need to be documented, especially those that concern the particularities of the country that implements the policy.

> *For example, it is necessary to explain that Brazil is a federative unit, so that the audience understands the role of states and municipalities; but there is no need to explain the thousand details of the operation, as each country will adapt to its reality. (excerpt from interview with a WWP staff).*

Secondly, some respondents believe that there should have been a greater effort to record lessons learned and mishaps in the implementation of social programmes, which would contribute even more efficiently to the transfer of policies to the countries of the South.

> *I think the lesson learned is very important to put. We need to show what worked, but also the difficulties, so that other countries can avoid making the same mistakes. This shows maturity in recognizing that we are learning from experiences. (excerpt from interview with a WWP staff).*

Thirdly, all respondents questioned the real impact that WWP knowledge translation had in stimulating the implementation of social policies inspired by the Brazilian experience in countries of the Global South. They complain about the lack of establishing dissemination goals, as well as a monitoring and evaluation strategy, for the WWP knowledge products – initiatives that could have made possible to map the success or not of knowledge transfer. "I think we ended up managing to produce more than disseminate. It is no use just producing; it is necessary to make the materials reach those who are interested, who can cause some transformation", said a respondent.

However, they differ on the understanding that the WWP would be responsible for ensuring the successful transfer of its knowledge. For some, the knowledge-receiving country is responsible for adapting the content provided to it to enable policy implementation. For others, it would be necessary to

70. Jones et al., 2013.
71. Porto de Oliveira and Pal, 2018.

have more knowledge exchange between Brazil and the other countries of the South through the WWP digital platform. It should, therefore, have become a more interactive environment, creating an epistemic community. Some even believe that if the WWP had evolved to document not only Brazilian experiences, but also those of other countries in the South, the initiative could have stayed active longer.

Is very common Brazilian experts offer technical assistance to different governments, but not concerned with mutual learning. "Although we understand transfers as a unilateral process, we must pay more attention to how the learning process can take place in both directions"[72]. In fact, according to the WWP final report, it was expected that the initiative would encourage the exchange of experiences between countries in the Global South[73]. However, the digital platform did not manage to move in this direction, having mostly adopted the unidirectional flow of information and low interactivity. There were occasional attempts to adopt bidirectional and multidirectional flows in the sharing of knowledge of social policies, through face-to-face events and webinars.

It is possible to state that WWP did not have enough time to achieve its objective of influencing the development of policy transfer initiatives inspired by the Brazilian experience within the scope of South-South Cooperation. The initiative ended in December 2017. One reason given by the respondents was the failure in obtaining a new financing fund, but the most decisive was the economic recession and the political instability that hit Brazil since 2014, which threatened the international image of Brazil as a protagonist in reducing poverty.

> *When WWP was created, Brazil was "the next big thing", and so the WWP speech was directed. However, [focusing only on the Brazilian experience] offered a great risk. After 2014, Brazil started to go into recession, the political situation was unstable, there was an impeachment and a very slow recovery in the post-recession years. The scenario changed a lot and all that discourse built on Brazil's leading role in the diffusion of social policies fell apart. In my view, this also contributed to the closure of the initiative in 2017. (excerpt from interview with a WWP staff).*

Analysis and final considerations

Based on the literature review, this study found that there is a research gap on knowledge translation within the scope of public policy transfer,

72. Porto de Oliveira and Pal, 2018, pp. 215.
73. WWP, 2017, pp. 13.

especially in the context of SSC. In addition, there is also a gap in empirical analysis on knowledge translation undertaken by digital platforms for SSC, such as the Brazil Learning Initiative for a World Without Poverty (WWP). WWP was a digital platform, active from 2013 to 2017, whose main goal was to disseminate Brazilian poverty reduction policies.

This is a challenging and full of potential subject that should be more explored by public policy and international relations researchers. One of these challenges is understanding the way these digital platforms for SSC capture and document public policy experiences and the possibilities for them to inspire other countries to adapt knowledge to their realities in order to meet a real need. Therefore, this study sought to answer the following main question: "how did the WWP translate the knowledge of Brazilian social policies?".

By focusing on the hypothesis that WWP failed in its main goal of reaching the target audience and transferring policies from Brazil to Latin American and African countries, this study interviewed five WWP staff members to understand the WWP knowledge translation process. It found that WWP content was produced by a team of high-skilled experts on Brazilian social policies, with the prominence of the World Bank and the MDS staff. The knowledge generation process was settled by an inter-organisational governance structure composed of three Committees (Editorial, Technical and Communication) – each of them with representatives of the four partners of the initiative (World Bank, IPC-IG, IPEA and MDS), who were in charge of producing, validating and approving the WWP materials. Therefore, ensuring the quality standard of WWP publications.

The content was generated according to one of the seven thematic axes, following different levels of knowledge, and based on a script composed of a set of topics that should be covered. The main concern of WWP knowledge translation was to facilitate the comprehension of the so-called "how to" approach, which explains how the programme works or how to do something similar.

Based on literature review and interviews with five WWP staff members, this study founded that despite all the effort made by WWP to translate knowledge of Brazilian social policies in a robust set of materials and publications, a lack of self-criticism and of documenting lessons learned threatened the translation of Brazilian social policies promoted by the initiative. These two factors were influenced by the fear of the political impact of admitting failures or exposing vulnerabilities in the implementation of Brazilian social policies.

We hope this work has enriched the reflection, from a perspective based on empirical and theoretical contribution from the South, about the challenge

of translating public policies for actors as heterogeneous as those involved in SSC and in an environment as plural, democratic, and innovative as the Internet.

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CHAPTER 11

The United Nations and the mainstreaming of South-South cooperation in policy transfer and development cooperation

Patrícia Nogueira Rinaldi

Introduction

International Organizations (IOs) have historically played an important role in policy transfer/diffusion due to their functions in the arena of development cooperation and aid. They work as ideational forums, policy agenda shapers, and agents of institutionalization (Dolowitz et al., 2020, p. 1). Since the 1970s, Southern countries have relied on the United Nations (UN) as the main intellectual and institutional forum for the articulation of a new paradigm of policy transfer/diffusion for development cooperation, based on equal relationship, self-reliance, free of conditionalities, and focused on their national demands.

Known as South-South Cooperation (SSC), this modality was institutionalized at the UN for the first time in 1978, through the adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (BAPA). In the following decades, the UN has supported the sharing of knowledge, technology and solutions, training, and expertise transfer among Southern countries.

In the period of 2000-2008, emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, among others, led the political demand to incorporate SSC as an integral part of the UN development agenda. With this context in mind, this paper will discuss the value-added of the UN in mainstreaming SSC in policy transfer/diffusion for development cooperation.

The main question addressed in this paper is: What are the main advantages and challenges of the UN as an agent of mainstreaming SSC? I argue that

incorporating SSC across the UN has presented a mixed record. On one hand, the UN has both the norm-setting power to place SSC as a priority in its policies and strategic plans for development; and the coverage power to institutionalize SSC practices and solutions in the field. On the other hand, political disputes between Northern and Southern countries and the attitudinal barriers of the UN Secretariat to SSC has made the mainstreaming of SSC largely unsystematic, and initiatives are usually implemented on an ad-hoc and case-by-case basis.

This paper is organized as follows: I will first present a brief historical background on the political engagement of Southern countries in the UN and their attempts to incorporate the main principles of SSC between 1960-1990. Then I will discuss the emergence of Southern powers in the 2000s and how they boosted a new engagement of the UN in the promotion of SSC. The value-added of the UN in mainstreaming the modality will be discussed in terms of its main advantages and challenges between 2000-2008. I conclude by arguing that adopting SSC policies for development cooperation is not a natural task for the UN, which means that normative, operational, and cultural adaptations are necessary to truly incorporate it as part of its regular work.

The political articulation of Southern countries in the UN

There is a consensus in the literature that the Bandung Conference in 1955 historically marked the political articulation of Southern countries globally. This was the first international summit that gathered African and Asian newly independent countries without the presence of Western powers and the Soviet Union. The participants sought to disengage their international insertion from the dynamics of the Cold War and to meet this purpose they formed the so-called Third World, which basically encompassed the rest of the globe: the former African and Asian colonies and, later, Latin American countries. As Prashad (2007, pp. xviii-xix) argues, "[t]he Third World project (the ideology and institutions) enabled the powerless to hold a dialogue with the powerful, and to try to hold them accountable".

In the 1960s, Third World countries started to focus on their economic development and fight for a less unequal global economic order[1]. To meet this purpose, they chose the UN to be the legitimate forum to discuss their

1. The post-War global economic order was based on a Keynesian perspective of state-centered economic planning and full employment. It was internationally combined with the liberalization of trade and a multilateral monetary and financial order under the BWI. This synthesis reflected the dominance of Western capitalist States, with a limited perspective and a narrow agenda on issues related to the former colonies. The idea of development cooperation was initially thought of as a way to support Western reconstruction. This changed with the influence of the Third World and the creation of UN agencies and funds specifically focused on the problems of developing countries.

development demands. There were three reasons for this choice: firstly, because the UN Charter legitimated their claims as it recognizes the duty of States to guarantee economic development to all. Secondly, because these countries had more influence in the UN decision-making process in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), as it is based on the principle of one country-one vote (and not in quotas, as in the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI)[2]). Thirdly, the intellectual and scientific work of UN agencies and programmes in the development field provided developing countries with policy-recommendations based on their specific conditions (Murphy, 1983, p. 62).

Due to the identification of the UN Secretary-General U Tant[3] with the Third World Movement, there were better conditions for the creation of new UN entities focused on development issues. In 1964, the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established as a forum where developing countries could articulate their demands concerning economic development and international trade. UNCTAD was also intended to be a provider of analyses and recommendations to support policymakers from developing countries to take decisions towards a more positive integration in the global economy (Toye and Toye, 2004, p. 5).

In the conclusion of this first conference, developing countries created the Group of 77 (G-77)[4], a political coalition to negotiate economic and development issues in the UN. The G-77 was also a reaction to the formation of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1960, an organization that represented the common interests of the Western developed countries. In this context, the establishment of the G-77 meant that "(…) developing countries were in a better position collectively to champion policies that aimed to change the distribution of benefits from growth and trade (…)" (Weiss, 2009, p. 273).

In the 1970s, the G-77 became a major force in calling for changes in the global economic order, especially after developing countries being severely affected by the drops in commodity prices, the chocks in oil prices, and the monetary instabilities of the gold-dollar standard. In 1974, they proposed a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the UNGA Special Sixth Session. Two documents were adopted by the Assembly: The Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (A/3201 (S-VI)) stated that equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest, and

2. Namely, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
3. U Tant was Burmese and assumed the role of UN Secretary-General from 1961 to 1971.
4. The name of the group was inaccurate from its very beginning: only 75 countries signed the Joint Statement, but the original name of the Group of 77 was kept due to its historic significance. Nowadays, the group incorporates 134 developing countries plus China.

cooperation among States should be the principles guiding the new order. While the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (A/3202 (S-VI)) translated the principles of the Declaration into measures to correct the economic asymmetries between rich and poor countries. Both documents were adopted without a vote. However, there were significant reservations from Northern countries, especially the US. They opposed the ideas of a redistribution of power in trade (especially the terms of trade of commodities), investments, and transnational corporations.

The NIEO proposal drew a new line between countries, known as the North-South divide. These lexicons do not truly correspond to a geographical division, but rather to a development gap: Northern countries are considered rich, industrialized, and developed, while Southern countries are considered poor, developing, or not developed in terms of industrialization. According to Weiss (2009, p. 272), although inaccurate, "North" and "South" have persisted as political expressions because they seem less value-laden or crude than non-industrialized/industrialized or rich/poor.

The first negotiations to specifically define and promote SSC across the UN emerged as part of the process of giving substance to the NIEO proposal, as an attempt of the Third World to find a political alternative to the North-South approach to cooperation for development.

The UN and South-South cooperation (1960-1990)

In the 1960s, one of the greatest achievements of the Third World was the creation of an entity responsible for coordinating all development activities run by the UN. The UNGA established the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1965 through its resolution A/RES/2029(XX). The UNDP mandate was to be the central funding and coordinator of all UN activities, programmes, and projects in the area of technical cooperation for development. Murphy (2006, pp. 3-4) highlights four components of UNDP's role in technical cooperation: i) hiring long-term-contract specialists to conduct development projects; ii) funding scholarships for professionals from developing countries so they could receive training abroad; iii) purchasing equipment and services; iv) hiring short-term-contract consultants with specific tasks within larger development projects.

With the creation of the UNDP, the UN consolidated itself as an agent of policy transfer/diffusion for development. It is important to highlight that the main development ideas, knowledge, and practices were drawn from the traditional or dominant North-South paradigm of development cooperation. This modality involves the provision of aid (especially in the form of official development assistance (ODA)) and technical assistance by Northern

countries (mainly by the Member States of the OECD) to Southern countries. While ODA was the most important financial tool used by developed countries to promote development in developing countries, technical cooperation initiatives transferred Northern knowledge, skills, and technology to Southern countries on a non-commercial basis.

However, by the end of the 1960s, developing countries raised three main criticisms concerning traditional North-South cooperation supported by the UN. First, they criticized developed countries for not meeting their ODA commitments. Second, most of the North-South initiatives presented a supply-driven approach, and the vertical donor-recipient relationship meant that the latter had little or no active voice in determining on which basis the cooperation would rely on. Third, in many cases aid was tied with certain requirements, such as the use of specialists and the buy of equipment from the donor country; or only disbursed under certain conditionalities imposed on recipient countries.

Besides, many of the development projects conducted by the UN presented insufficient or counterproductive results because they were based on wrong diagnosis or misperceptions of the real needs of recipient countries. Initiatives had little impact on the local reality, superficial training, and the absence of real knowledge transfer and capacity-building. According to Browne (2002, p. 8): "(…) the macro failure of aid has been the inability to render itself redundant. Half a century has witnessed over one million TC [technical cooperation] projects. Many of them have been strung end-to-end, repeating the same objectives, and targeting the same countries and beneficiary organizations. The most aided countries have generally remained so".

In the political and ideological context of the NIEO, Southern countries started to pursuit alternatives in the UN to the traditional North-South cooperation for development. They have sought to create a new modality of cooperation based on equal relationship, self-reliance, free of conditionalities, and focused on their national demands. Known as Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC), this modality was not only an attempt of Southern countries to question the core assumptions of North-South cooperation but also a strategic decision to institutionalize a new policy transfer/diffusion paradigm for development under the auspices of the UN convening and norm-setting power.

The Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (BAPA) – adopted as a result of the first UN Conference on TCDC, held in Buenos Aires in 1978 – was the first conceptual framework and practical guide to foster TCDC across the UN. The BAPA defined TCDC as:

> *(...) a multidimensional process. It can be bilateral or multilateral in scope, and subregional, regional or interregional in character. It should be organized by and between Governments which can promote, for this purpose, the participation of public organizations and, within the framework of the policies laid down by Governments, that of private organizations and individuals. It may rely on innovative approaches, methods and techniques particularly adapted to local needs and, at the same time, use existing modalities of technical co-operation to the extent that these are useful (United Nations Conference on Technical Co-Operation among Developing Countries, 1978, p. 6).*

The BAPA specified three strategic aims for TCDC: to promote the national ownership of developing countries over their development policies; to strengthen economic, social, and political interdependence among them; and to correct the asymmetrical power relations between developed and developing countries. However, the document highlights that TCDC should not be seen as a substitute for aid and the assistance offered by developed countries. The justification was that "[i]ncreased technical co-operation of the developed countries is required for the transfer of appropriate technologies and also for the transfer of advanced technologies and other expertise in which they have manifest advantages" (United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries, 1978, pp. 6-7).

Besides establishing a conceptual framework for TCDC as a complementary approach to North-South cooperation, the BAPA defined the main guidelines to institutionalize TCDC as part of all UN development actions in the field. Through the creation of the Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (SU-TCDC[5]), the UNDP started to give substance to the BAPA principles by first identifying best practices of TCDC and using its network of resident coordinators to build a communication system among developing countries. UN Member States would be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the BAPA every two years. For that, the UNGA established, through its Resolution 35/202, the High-Level Committee on the Review of TCDC in 1980 (HLC-TCDC).

Despite these normative and institutional advancements, the global economic scenario of economic crisis and stagflation in the 1980s affected the progress of TCDC in political and practical terms. As stated by the G-77 in an UNGA meeting about the implementation of the BAPA in the 1980s: "(…) many developing countries continued to face a difficult economic situation, which, in spite of their strong commitment, placed severe constraints on their

5. In 2004, the SU-TCDC was renamed SU-SSC.

ability to deploy the requisite resources needed to realize the full advantages of TCDC" (United Nations General Assembly, 1991, p. 12).

There were important achievements though. One significant initiative was the growth of the TCDC Information Referral System, known as INRES South. In 1989, approximately 4,000 stakeholders – among institutions from developing countries, UN agencies, and UNDP offices – made use of the Southern practices provided by the database. Additionally, the UN gave incentive to the recruitment of experts and the procurement of equipment from developing countries, which was not very common then (United Nations General Assembly, 1989, p. 8, p. 11).

In the 1990s, the HLC-TCDC adopted the New Directions Strategy on TCDC (TCDC/9/3) to cope with the problems related to globalization, such as poverty and the lack of competitiveness in global markets. The strategy focused on expanding cooperation among developing countries to other areas besides technical cooperation, such as exchange of knowledge and expertise on social policies and initiatives that could foster trade, investment, and financing. UNDP operationalized the New Directions Strategy by issuing its First Cooperation Framework for TCDC[6] for the period of 1997-1999. The strategic framework defined specific interventions in the following policy areas: "(…) poverty eradication; environment; production and employment; and trade, investment and macroeconomic management" (Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, 1996, p. 3).

Due to the expansion of areas for cooperation among developing countries, the UN started to replace the expression TCDC to South-South cooperation (SSC) to refer to broader cooperation networks among Southern countries. The official definition of SSC was presented in 1999 in the Secretary-General report A/54/425, as follows:

> *South-South cooperation is a broad concept. It is often perceived, in operational terms, as having two dimensions — economic cooperation and technical cooperation among developing countries. Generally economic cooperation refers to intra-South cooperation in trade, investment and finance. The term is also used to cover collaboration in other economic sectors, such as industry, technology and communication. Technical cooperation, on the other hand, refers to the building, pooling and sharing of capacities — human, institutional, technical and financial — to further enhance an enabling environment*

6. The UNDP Cooperation Framework for TCDC is a programming document that systematizes and shares the best Southern development practices to share them throughout the UN. Since 1996, the UNDP has set a new strategic framework every 4 years.

for socio-economic progress in developing countries. It can be said that both forms of cooperation are mutually reinforcing — technical cooperation helps create the necessary conditions for economic cooperation and economic cooperation provides the framework for technical cooperation" (United Nations General Assembly, 1999, p. 3).

For the HLC-TCDC, the expansion of new areas of cooperation was a result of increased social and economic differences among developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Tunisia were identified as pivotal countries, which meant that they were able to advance their development solutions and lead the promotion of SSC due to their capacities and experiences on the matter (High-Level Committee on the Review of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, 1995, p. 21).

By the beginning of the 2000s, these pivotal countries conducted a more robust process of incorporating SSC as a regular part of the UN development activities. A set of conditions allowed the political reemergence of the Global South and gave a new impetus to SSC in the 21st century.

The reemergence of South-South cooperation in the early 2000s

After a decade of adjustments to the volatile globalized economic environment, in the first half of the 2000s the world witnessed impressive socio-economic gains (although uneven[7]) in many developing countries. From 1999 to 2009, developing countries were the biggest contributors to world trade and their contribution to foreign direct investment increased from US$ 4 billion in 1985 to US$ 304 billion in 2007. Not to mention the deployment of new forms of financial and monetary cooperation among them, such as regional banks, exchange rate mechanisms, and payment and credit facilities (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 5).

In this context of economic recovery from the Global South, some developing countries became middle-income economies, gaining a more prominent status. Under the rubric of "emerging economies" or "emerging powers", countries such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, but also Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, among others, started leading new cooperation initiatives among its neighbors and other Southern partners, bringing SSC to the forefront of the international arena. According to Weiss and Abdenur (2014, p. 1750):

7. The distribution of economic growth in the early 2000s was asymmetrical. Many developing countries still suffered from structural deficits and could not meet the minimal targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The label of 'emerging powers' is neither carved in stone nor uncontroversial. Our use of the term refers to countries whose policy elites are able to draw on economic and other sources of power to project influence both within and outside their immediate neighbourhood and regions, and which play a substantial role in the call for global governance reform. While this and other categories – including 'global South' or the 'North' or the 'Third World' – are deeply problematic and contested, they reflect specific perspectives on development and historical experiences. As such, these constructs have gained currency within UN development debates. In other words, despite the analytical flaws of such 'clumps', in political debates about development they matter.

The consolidation of emerging powers gave them economic and political conditions to foster SSC through the transfer and diffusion of successful policy solutions, knowledge, and expertise in many areas of development, with real economic and social impacts. Acknowledged practices had as essence the enhancement of local capacity as well as following national development priorities on a non-commercial basis. For instance, in public health, Indian firms supplied affordable medicines and medical equipment to many Southern countries, especially in Africa (United Nations Development Programme, 2013 a, p. 52). Brazil was deeply involved with knowledge exchange and capacity building in the areas of agriculture, renewable energy, and programmes of social technology with conditional cash transfer schemes (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, 2012). South Africa aligned its Southern partnerships with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), focusing on building capacities in post-conflicted countries and giving support to investment in infrastructure (Besharati, 2013).

The expansion of such initiatives was supported through a significant increase in Southern financial assistance to multilateral and especially bilateral partnerships. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2010, p. 73): "SSC has recently grown rapidly, from US$8.6 (6.9% of global development cooperation) in 2006 to US$15.3 billion (9.5% of development cooperation) in 2008". However, the so-called Southern donors claimed on a different paradigm of foreign aid, criticizing the conditionality-driven and tied-aid from Northern donors and focusing on a demand-driven approach[8]. They even refused the term donors or aid, preferring the expression partners and partnerships.

8. It is important to consider that there are some exceptions to this. For instance, some initiatives from China included tied loans to the purchase of Chinese services and goods.

As a result of this context, the early 2000s witnessed a reemergence of the NIEO spirit. Led by emerging powers, the Global South demanded greater participation in the normative aspects of policy transfer/diffusion for development cooperation through the consolidation of SSC as a paradigm in the field. Weiss and Abdenur (2014, p. 1752) affirmed that "[r]ather than be subjected to norms that they perceive as being 'handed down' by traditional donors and international organisations dominated by industrialised economies, the emerging powers seek to actively participate in and even transform the global norms-setting process in the development cooperation arena".

In order to attain such political goals, the Global South once again looked for the UN as the main forum to consolidate the principles and ideas of SSC, to codify Southern knowledge and expertise, and to institutionalize the modality through best practices and lessons-learned. This process was known as mainstreaming SSC across the UN.

The value-added of the UN in mainstreaming SSC (2000-2008)

Emerging powers have shown great appreciation of the UN. Even though the majority of SSC initiatives in 2000-2008 happened outside the UN, these countries were vocal supporters of mainstreaming the modality across the UN and relied on the organization to be a facilitator of Southern initiatives.

For the UN, "[m]ainstreaming means making an idea practical by integrating it into everything the organization does" (United Nations Development Programme, 2013 b, p. 27), whereas mainstreaming SSC means "(…) assessing the current corporate policies and practices, raising the awareness of staff about the benefits of SSC and where necessary embark into capacity development activities" (United Nations Development Programme, 2013 c, p. 39).

Two characteristics of the UN facilitated the process of mainstreaming SSC. The first one is that the UN is unique in the sense that it has a powerful multilateral approach, working as a universal forum and agenda shaper for development policies. The second characteristic is its power of operationalizing policy transfer/diffusion as a result of its institutional presence in the field.

The UN multilateral approach was essential to the strengthening of SSC in the 2000s because it allowed negotiations on the issue to unravel on a universal basis, involving not only Southern countries, but also all UN Member States in the process. The UN was perceived by Southern and Northern countries as an honest broker. Recalling that developing countries understood SSC as complementary, and not a substitute for traditional cooperation, the universality of the UN system gave more international adherence to the mainstreaming process.

The multilateral and universal approach of the UN added value to SSC in two areas: norm-setting and advocacy. The UN was the forum per excellence in setting principles, norms, and framework strategies to better define the concept and standardize the practice of SSC. The UN was also responsible for including SSC as part of its global development agenda and spreading the knowledge on SSC to its Member States and its entities as an important tool to solve development problems in the 2000s.

Two initiatives in this period confirmed the importance of the UN in the strengthening of SSC. In terms of advocacy, the World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1) – the final document of the 2005 World Summit, in which UN Member States gathered in New York to speed up the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – presented two crucial decisions to the process of mainstreaming SSC. Firstly, the outcome officially recognized SSC as an effective tool for the implementation of the MDGs. With that, the World Summit Outcome consolidated the UN's role as a policy agenda shaper for SSC. Secondly, the Outcome created the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), a new space for discussing the global architecture of development cooperation under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The DCF would work as biennial high-level meeting open to participation of different stakeholders, such as civil society and private sector representatives, with the objective of reviewing the normative and policy coherence of the UN operational activities for development, including SSC. In the meetings, different stakeholders from the Global South could exchange experiences and lessons learned in formulating and implementing SSC initiatives and engage in conversation with other development cooperation actors from the Global North (United Nations General Assembly, 2005, p. 10; p. 33).

As put by Dolowitz et al. (2020, p. 5), IOs "seek to identify and frame policy problems and propose solutions to them in the form of ready-to-use policies and policy agendas". In terms of norms and standard-setting, the High-level United Nations Conference on SSC, held in Nairobi in 2009, played a crucial role. The conference intended to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the BAPA by invigorating the mainstreaming of SSC across the UN. The Nairobi Outcome (A/RES/64/222) was the main policy document guiding this process in the following decade. The definition of SSC was updated to include different forms of economic, social, cultural, environmental, and technical cooperation between two or more developing countries on a bilateral, regional, subregional or interregional basis. The definition also comprised the sharing of knowledge and experience, technology transfer, training, and financial and monetary cooperation. When it comes to principles, the Nairobi Outcome reaffirmed the ones stated in the BAPA document, but it emphasized

the ideational aspect of SSC as a partnership among equals based on solidarity, in opposition to ODA:

> *We reaffirm that South-South cooperation is a common endeavour of peoples and countries of the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their common objectives and solidarity, and guided by, inter alia, the principles of respect for national sovereignty and ownership, free from any conditionalities. South-South cooperation should not be seen as official development assistance. It is a partnership among equals based on solidarity (United Nations General Assembly, 2009 a, p. 3).*

Another characteristic of the UN that facilitated the process of mainstreaming SSC was its power to operationalize policy transfer/diffusion, as a consequence of its coverage, capacity, experience, and institutional memory in the field. Nowadays, the UN development system encompasses more than 30 organizations, such as funds, programmes, offices, agencies, commissions, and research and training organizations. Together, these many parts of the system execute operational activities for development, which account for about 60% of the UN's total annual spending. Besides, the UN has the largest network of operational offices with great field experience in developing countries. Only UNDP has a presence in more than 170 countries (Browne and Weiss, 2013, p. 2).

Because of the coverage and experience of the UN on the ground, the IO added value to the mainstreaming of SSC in two areas: matchmaking; and implementation and support. In terms of matchmaking, the institutional capacity of the UN allowed a better systematization of the ground knowledge in terms of lessons learned and best practices. By doing that, the UN improved the delivery of SSC solutions by matching the best Southern suppliers' expertise with the real needs of the demanders. The mandate of the SU-SSC[9] in this period was to become a Southern knowledge management center, systematizing and facilitating the match-making between Southern experts and demanders to achieve the MDGs. Further, the SU-SSC supported other UN agencies and staff to deploy a SSC strategy and provided advisory services to Member States.

In terms of partnership and support, the UN operational coverage brought potential partners together and facilitated the use of SSC in the implementation of development projects. UNDP played a crucial role in promoting policy-programme shaping and operationalization of SSC. In its Second

9. In 2012, the SU-SSC was renamed United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC).

Multi-year Funding Framework (2004-2007), UNDP defined SSC as one of the drivers of development effectiveness, among other five ones[10]. This decision had a great impact on the ground, as it required country offices to engage themselves in the promotion of SSC as a means of implementing development policies, especially the ones aligned with the attainment of the MDGs (United Nations Development Programme, 2003, p. 14).

Despite the achievements of defining SSC and placing it as a priority in the UN development agenda, translating it into practice was not systematic, and initiatives were mainly implemented on an ad-hoc and case-by-case basis. This mixed record showed that it was not an easy task to mainstream SSC throughout an IO as complex as the UN, so it is necessary to highlight the main difficulties in this process.

Main challenges in mainstreaming SSC across the UN

Since the adoption of the BAPA, the UN has conducted a complex set of actions for the mainstreaming of SSC. The IO has kept international dialogue on policy development and framework; adopted strategic plans and programmatic activities; supported research, analysis, and knowledge management; promoted platforms for collaboration and capacity development; devised financing and resource mechanisms; and adopted means of implementation, evaluation, and follow-up.

However, as a 2007 UNDP evaluation about its contribution to SSC in the last 30 years showed, its achievements felt short of the needs and expectations of Southern countries: "Case studies show that other United Nations organizations are actively involved in South-South cooperation, yet in many countries, coordination of United Nations system-wide efforts to prioritize South-South cooperation in national development agendas remains ad hoc and inadequate" (United Nations Development Programme, 2007, p. x).

In the case of SSC, two factors posed major challenges in how the UN performed its mainstreaming actions in the period of 2000-2008. The first one was the difficulty faced by Southern countries of truly contesting North-South cooperation as the dominant paradigm in the UN. The second one was attitudinal barriers of the UN Secretariat towards SSC.

Even though mainstreaming SSC across the UN mostly encompassed giving support to technical cooperation among developing countries, it is obvious to say that negotiations were not carried out in a mere technical

10. The other five key drivers of development effectiveness were: "(a) building national capacities; (b) promoting national ownership; (c) advocating and fostering an enabling policy environment; (d) promoting gender equity; and (e) forging strategic partnerships" (United Nations Development Programme, 2003, p. 14).

perspective. The discussions about SSC were highly politicized, involving heat debates between Southern and Northern countries about the configuration of the development cooperation landscape. As put by Esteves and Assunção (2014, p. 1781), "at the beginning of the 2000s, development agents had to deal with an increasingly contested field. Both the donor positions and the practices of donorship were disputed. In addition, the fundamental goals of development policies and the ways to achieve them became problematic".

At the UN, this contested field was seen in the different negotiation positions of the G-77, on one hand; and of the 24 major donor countries that are part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), on the other. The DAC was created in 1961 with the mandate of managing the provision of ODA by Western donors. Currently, the DAC is a central actor in the definition of standards and principles for development cooperation and the monitoring and reviewing of aid commitments.

For the DAC, the main role of the UN in the area of development cooperation is to support aid effectiveness. This concept was outlined by the DAC at the Paris High-Level Forum in 2005, and it encompassed five principles for making aid more effective in terms of value for money: the ownership by recipient countries of their development agenda; the alignment of donor countries with the national objectives; the harmonization of the donor countries actions, to avoid duplication; the focus on measurable results delivered by recipient and donors; and mutual accountability (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2015).

During negotiations in the UNGA and the HLC-SSC in the 2000s, DAC countries raised their concern that the incorporation of SSC could imply higher costs for the UN without necessarily resulting in gains of efficiency. From their perspective, SSC was mainly based on rhetorical principles and lacked a systematic approach to monitoring how Southern countries deliver their commitments and to evaluating the main impacts of Southern solutions on local development. That is why they would only support the mainstreaming of SSC across the UN if it were based on aid effectiveness principles (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2008, p. 17).

Even though important Southern countries – such as Brazil, South Africa, India, and China – endorsed the Paris Declaration, they only did so in their capacity of aid recipients. For the G-77, it was impossible to mainstream SSC across the UN based on the aid effectiveness principles because they were founded on a vertical donor-recipient relationship, which was contested by the SSC paradigm. Besides, the G-77 argued that SSC involved practices and solutions that were qualitatively more complex than the disbursement of aid.

This dispute between the DAC and the G-77 was not solved in the Nairobi Conference in 2009, showing that the first challenge in mainstreaming SSC refers to how it can be inserted in the contested field of cooperation for development as a paradigm on its own terms, resisting to the pressure of the DAC to align it with its principles of aid effectiveness. As put by the delegation of China during the negotiations of the Nairobi Outcome, mainstreaming SSC across the UN was about supporting Southern capacity-building for development, instead of "(...) focusing solely on [the OECD agenda of] good governance or combating corruption at the expense of more urgent issues such as poverty reduction and development" (United Nations General Assembly, 2009 b, p. 3).

Besides this normative challenge, the implementation of the UN decisions on SSC also faced problems. In its 2007 evaluation report, the UNDP identified that its work in promoting SSC was not able to deliver proper results. The agency recognized that most of its initiatives were a result of individual leadership and lacked a proactive corporate approach (United Nations Development Programme, 2007, p. x).

This challenge was directly related to the attitudinal barriers of the UN Secretariat to the incorporation of SSC. Attitudinal barriers are defined as pre-established behaviors, attitudes, and worldviews that make it difficult or prevent the incorporation of an idea or practice. The UN development system was historically built on a North-South cooperation perspective. It means that the UN has operated with the general idea that its agencies and programmes must own development solutions (generally emulated from developed countries) to be implemented in developing countries.

In the case of SSC, the first attitudinal barrier is the fact that most of the UN staff lacks knowledge about existing human and material capabilities in Southern countries. There is a preconceived notion that specialists from developing countries are poorly qualified for UN work or that equipment and services lack quality or technological advancements. This resulted in low hiring of specialists, equipment, and services from developing countries, even in cases where qualified resources were available locally.

Since the 1980s, the UN has taken measures to overcome these barriers, but even today most UN staff in the field lack knowledge about the reality of developing countries. As put in the report "Promotion of South-South cooperation for development: a thirty-year perspective" (A/64/504): "Organizations used to implementing projects that simply required knowledge of developing country logistics now needed to understand their economic, social, historical and cultural realities [of Southern countries]" (United Nations General Assembly, 2009 c, p. 15).

Due to these attitudinal barriers, there is no consensus about the degree of involvement of the UN Secretariat in the mainstreaming of SSC. Part of the Secretariat believes that it should not be a responsibility of the UN to actively engage in SSC and that the role of the IO is only to support SSC by request of Southern countries in the field. On the other hand, many UN officials believe that it is a mandate of the Secretariat to systematize Southern practices, establishing connections between stakeholders and supporting UN entities to include SSC in its national development policies.

Therefore, adopting SSC is not a natural task to the UN, which means that normative and operational adaptations are necessary to truly incorporate it as a regular part of the UN work.

Conclusion

When it comes to policy transfer/diffusion for development cooperation, many studies on the issue have focused on the work of the OECD and the BWI. This makes sense since Northern countries have prioritized these organizations as the institutional core of development cooperation and aid. Yet, if we intend to apprehend the views from the Global South about this issue, it is crucial to include a study about the role of the UN.

I argued that the UN system is unique in the sense that it has a powerful norm-setting and advocacy roles, and since the 1970s, Southern countries have relied on this organization to define and promote SSC as a new paradigm in the field of development cooperation. Guided by the principles of solidarity among developing countries and national ownership, the operational capacity of the UN helped to consolidate SSC through the transfer and diffusion of knowledge and expertise originated from the diverse realities of the Global South.

The 2000s witnessed an expressive boom of SSC initiatives led by emerging powers. These countries tried to reform the UN development system by engaging in development policy and norm-setting processes, using the acknowledged practices of SSC as a functional instrument to level the playing field in relation to the power of donor countries in the contested field of development cooperation.

Despite important normative and institutional achievements, I argued that translating the idea of SSC into practice has been largely unsystematic. Even though the UN has historically supported the agenda of developing countries, the organization remains a Northern institution concerning the source of development ideas, the composition and mentality of its staff, and the decision-making process. The UN still needs to learn the value of SSC, improve its knowledge and understanding about the functioning of successful SSC initiatives (which are mainly articulated outside the UN),

and built up the capacity to better identify and roster Southern policy solutions.

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 was an important landmark in the advancement of mainstreaming SSC across the UN. Southern countries expected that the implementation of the SDGs could lead to a new development cooperation landscape in which SSC would have a greater role and importance. Future research must analyze how this new global agenda has helped Southern countries to improve policy orientations on mainstreaming SSC across the UN.

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