

Analysis

Governing failure: development, aid and audit in Haiti

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This paper analyses practices for monitoring, tracking and assessing the international aid and reconstruction efforts in Haiti in an attempt to 'build back better' from the devastation of the January 2010 earthquake. We suggest that aid and reconstruction efforts filter through an international network of development organisations. This network also acts as a governing auspice, overseeing the transformation of Haiti from a 'failed state' to a strong democratic state. The central governing mechanism in this reconstruction effort involves the embedding of the ideas and practices of audit within Haitian political and civic culture. We reveal how, in Haiti, this culture of audit monitors aid and reconstruction through biopolitical technologies such as benchmarks and performance indicators, and through the constitution of calculable and accountable

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entities. More than a means of implementing disaster recovery, audit culture is a technique of biopolitical governance that aims to transform Haiti's state, civic institutions and citizens into entities accountable to an international development agenda.

Introduction

On 12 January 2010 Haiti experienced the largest urban natural catastrophe in recorded history when a massive earthquake crippled the country, killing 200,000, injuring 300,000 more and displacing 2.3 million people.¹ The earthquake also resulted in the deaths of thousands of civil servants and the destruction of much of the country's political, economic and social infrastructure. 'Many Haitians, when they speak of the earthquake, refer only to 'before' [...] in 35 seconds they lost so much; friends, family, homes, schools, and churches and their visions of the future.'² In step with the scale of the Haitian catastrophe, the humanitarian response was one of the largest ever mounted. It involved an international network of development organisations monitoring the distribution of aid to Haiti.³ With a substantial fraction of Haitian civil society reduced to displaced persons living in poverty in large camp settlements, international authorities were determined not just to rebuild Haiti but to build back a new and transformed Haiti.⁴

Designated a 'failed' state,⁵ characterised by flawed governmental and civic institutions, Haiti is also considered unfit to manage aid and reconstruction efforts without international governance and oversight. With much of Haiti's political and civic infrastructure in disarray, international development authorities seized the opportunity to establish new partnership arrangements with the international aid organisations at work in the country. The internationally driven Haitian development agenda would focus on promoting a governance strategy to ensure that aid and development are performed in accordance with donor expectations. To accomplish this aim, a culture of audit is being embedded in Haiti. The culture of audit aims to govern aid and reconstruction while at the same time enabling the transformation of Haitian government, its civic institutions and its citizens into accountable entities.

Our paper examines the efforts of international development organisations to rebuild Haitian social, political and economic infrastructure through a culture of audit. While ideas and practices associated with audit culture have been disseminated widely within liberal societies as a strategy of liberal government, what we develop in this paper is a

critical analysis of audit culture in Haiti in order to better understand what is at stake in disseminating audit cultures on an international scale.

State failure and audit interventions

From the late twentieth century to the present day, political violence, poverty, social and economic instability and limited improvements in the quality of life remain ongoing struggles for the people of Haiti. Political discussions point to the country's stagnant economy, exclusive social structure and incompetent leadership as reasons for the stasis, while others stress the historical foreign occupation, primarily by the United States, and years of military rule as central causes. Despite intervention efforts from the late twentieth century to the present, there has been little relief from the political violence, poverty and instability faced by the Haitian people. International development organisations now consider Haitian poverty and political and social instability as evidence of a broad 'failure' of the Haitian state.⁶

While some assess failure in a narrow manner, seeing failure as the inability of the state to provide security, that is, to maintain a monopoly on violence within their territory,⁷ international development organisations see failure broadly. In cases like Haiti, failure is a problem of instability linked to the inability of state institutions to deliver core administrative, judicial, political and security services to the majority of its people, especially its poor.⁸ The economic, social and political instabilities underscoring Haiti historically have been of concern to the international development authorities. Haiti is targeted for development and economic improvement under a humanitarian intervention logic that aims to establish Haiti as a 'strong' democratic state.

State failure is more than just a local, endogenous concern. Due to perceptions of increased global complexity, interconnectedness and reduced territorial insularity, state failure is now seen to incubate the most serious threats to regional and international order, including: poverty, HIV/AIDS and other pandemic diseases, drug trafficking, organised crime and piracy, as well as ecological disasters, insurgent social movements and global terrorist organisations.⁹ Failed states are not only responsible for drawing essential resources (including international aid) away from their neighbours; flow-over or contagion effects of failure are also likely. Due to the increasing porosity of national borders resulting from global interconnections associated with social, economic and political life,¹⁰ failure, that is, the 'disorder and sheer entropy of a failed state', can 'spread

to its neighbours and eventually the wider region'.¹¹ As Chandler emphasises, failure provides 'an ever-expanding platform for global threats to gain a foothold, to develop, and then expand at the risk of the entire globe'.¹²

Anticipated flow-over effects (especially the unregulated movements of people and goods) construct failed states as both a threat and a legitimate object of intervention.¹³ International efforts to insulate the world from the threat of failed states on its borders are increasingly measuring security less in terms of the maintenance of force monopolies and more in terms of making populations undergoing development more predictable and manageable.¹⁴ Population or 'human security' objectives include 'freedom from fear and freedom from want, safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life whether in homes, jobs, or in communities'.¹⁵

Buttressed by the urgent need to ward-off anticipated global disorders, international intervention efforts now approach the problem of aid and reconstruction differently. The organisation of the reconstruction response and the design of prophylactic measures need to be equal to the scale of the problem, that is, not merely to redress local catastrophes resulting from natural disaster and conflict,¹⁶ but to redress the problem of state failure and its corresponding global complications. Development initiatives now see the problem in terms of human security with commensurate solutions tied to restructuring state institutions. As Best argues: 'IMF and World Bank staff have targeted the domestic institutions of emerging markets because they believe that it is their weaknesses, not those of the financial markets themselves, that have caused recent instabilities'.¹⁷ Such endeavours involve international development organisations reaching ever further into the sovereign enclaves of aid recipient countries in an effort to shape domestic institutional aims and practice.

Viewed as a failed state, Haiti is deemed unfit not only to govern itself but also unfit to partner with international organisations in governing aid and reconstruction efforts directed at its institutions.¹⁸ Failure, in this sense, has the additional connotation of rendering the state unable to perform development functions.¹⁹ With partnering opportunities curtailed, the failed state is subjected to a new kind of international aid, one that is closely coupled with development efforts, and increasingly governed through audit. Haiti, like other failed states, has limited capacity to resist these, among other international governance mechanisms. This is because, in addition to supplying much needed aid, these mechanisms come replete with various other incentives such as trade privileges, debt-forgiveness and integration into international organisations.²⁰

The aim to remake Haiti has been coined 'building back better' by Bill Clinton (the UN Special Envoy to Haiti), a phrase that has come to signify the initiatives of international development organisations in Haiti. Haiti, like many other so-called failed states, has experienced, to varying degrees, the Development Decades of the UN. During the years 1960–2000, UN organisations would adopt successive, co-ordinated International Development Strategies for each decade (UN 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990). These development strategies required particular knowledge to render failures thinkable and actionable through techniques such as statistics and accounting. The UN development strategies in particular display the liberal technology of audit as a means of structuring expectations that form part of the broader implementation of 'audit culture'.²¹

This audit culture now permeates international development efforts, and is particularly salient among the international development organisations in Haiti. Providing aid to the poor is one of liberalism's preferred instruments for governing those deemed unfit for self-government.²² Rendering poverty in failed states knowable is deemed essential to making poverty thinkable in relation to designing successful and therefore actionable reconstruction initiatives. Audit culture serves as both means and ends for these international efforts. It offers the means for identifying failure and the standards of success for development organisations and for populations that receive international aid.

Audit culture refers to a condition in which the logics and techniques of accountancy are central in the governance and management of human conduct.²³ While auditing logics and techniques are derived from financial audits, they are deployed in contexts far removed from the world of financial accountancy.²⁴ More than a neutral measure of conduct, audits attempt to shape conduct (relationships, practices and habits). We see audit as an emergent, transposable set of practices that developed in tandem with liberal government. Liberal government is also limited government. That is, liberalism sets for itself the objective of limiting state intervention into civic affairs (and, in this case, the civic affairs of other societies) while at the same time maximising governmental capacity to shape those affairs.

This seeming paradox of governing without the state (or states) governing too much, that is, of maximising limited government, is resolved by developing the self-governance capacities of civic entities. This is to say that liberalism invents strategies to govern at a distance. In order to govern at a distance, governmental authorities 'would have to discover or develop ways to act on events, places, and people that are unfamiliar and a long way away'.²⁵ It is within this (liberal) problematic that audit emerges as a technique, or

technical means, to act on the problem of maximising limited government. It also signals a transformation in regulatory style where the intention is to regulate target organisations indirectly and 'from below'.²⁶

The aim of audit is not simply to measure conduct, but to shape and transform the environments into which it is introduced with the imperative of 'making them auditable', of making conduct fit to measure as 'auditable performances' and of promoting systems which make auditing possible,²⁷ that is, to transform civic affairs into an array of accountable institutions and practices with the aim of maximising control. Audit is an intellectual technology of governance that serves to render existence calculable and amenable to intervention,²⁸ with the implication that it is more than just an accounting exercise. The embedding of audit culture serves to shape the way people perceive themselves and conduct themselves in relation to 'standards', external 'benchmarks', 'performance indicators', 'ratings', 'targets' and 'pillars of success'.²⁹ Audit not only gives power and authority to number and abstract modelling but has also begun to structure social expectations in such a way as to influence new market arrangements and create new principles of organisation.³⁰

We view audit as a functional response to governing what is thought to be a complexly interconnected and, therefore, increasingly risky world. At the same time, audit also serves as a technical solution to the problem of deploying and actualising the ideas of liberal government in diverse domains.³¹ Our examination traces this emergent practice as another way in which liberalism becomes technical and reterritorialises distant governmental domains.³² Technologies of audit are being used more frequently as a result of growing concerns about quality assurance, operational risks and crises of trust. As we argue below, the mobilisation of audit culture in Haiti is prompted by an attributed crisis of trust related to civil society as a sphere of autonomy and autonomously developed regulatory practices governing civic affairs. Waning confidence in the steering and self-regulating capacities of civil society institutions and practices, coupled with diminishing faith in its intellectual, economic and political leadership, has led to demands for the mobilisation of mechanisms to identify and fortify civic institutions that are deemed problematic.

The process of 'building back better' in Haiti involves a style of international aid and development that is supported by audit technologies and audit management protocols. This is because state failure as conceived within a culture of audit (assessed in terms of the failure of civic institutions to promote self-governance) has rendered Haiti ill-equipped to

manage aid and reconstruction efforts on its own. With an analytical focus on audit culture, the following sections analyse the prominent and wide-reaching mechanism for monitoring, tracking and assessing attempts (on behalf of an international network of development organisations) to actualise president Clinton's slogan 'build back better' in Haiti. As we demonstrate, through an examination of the policy documents framing aid and development efforts (which include national programmes and action plans, UN strategic frameworks and Haitian Reconstruction Fund project portfolios), aid efforts filter through a culture of audit. This culture pervades the network of aid organisations operating in Haiti and shapes programmatic efforts, intentions, goals and local cultural practices. Haitian citizens are encouraged to improve their living conditions by embracing these international development efforts and the audit culture that shapes them into knowable and accountable populations.

Auditing for democracy and development

The lack of democratic process is increasingly understood to be symptomatic of state 'failure'. Democratic deficits are seen to be pervasive in Haiti and are marshalled as evidence to explain the failure of aid efforts in the country in the past. As Montinola explains, democracy is touted as increasing the value of aid: the impact of aid on government stability increases with the recipient country's level of democracy, since government's responsiveness to conditionality should increase with the recipient's level of democracy.³³ That is, as levels of democracy increase recipient countries meet more aid conditions. 'Conditionality is nothing more than a clear definition of what is meant by 'appropriate policy environment' in specific programs, providing a direct link between policy performance and the continued flow of financial assistance.'³⁴

Haitian institutions are targeted by international development efforts because they fail to measure up to the minimum standards of democratic process as defined by the UN. Whereas the UN Economic and Social Council defines democracy as a state in which the people have control of the government ruling them, the UNDP argues that 'for politics and political institutions to promote human development and safeguard the freedom and dignity of all people, democracy must widen and deepen.'³⁵ International organisations that advocate international development initiatives often adopt the view that in order to improve the efficacy of aid, assistance should be provided to those countries recognised as democratic or in the process of becoming democratic. This is

because the value of aid is intimately tied to the degree to which it helps recipient countries maintain power and the impact of aid on political stability increases concurrently with levels of democracy.³⁶

Despite Haiti's variegated history, the country (along with other poor countries) struggles to realise the UN's democracy benchmarks. In its effort to 'widen and deepen' the reach of democracy, international development efforts have leveraged the disruption of the 2010 earthquake to implement long-planned reforms to Haitian governing institutions³⁷ and to bring them in line with strong state democratic standards. Various forms of post-earthquake aid (including monetary aid, humanitarian aid, military aid, medical aid and governmental aid) are made conditional on the development of accountability mechanisms linked to audit. And, a culture of audit is endorsed as a means for managing the international aid effort and for ensuring the successful democratic development of Haiti.

Failure to address undemocratic aid management processes is seen to be capable of undermining aid efforts. As the UN Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti claims, 'aid coordination is a major challenge in Haiti necessitating innovative aid management tools be put in place'.³⁸ Processes such as conditionality, accountability and performance management and aid typing are means by which international development initiatives attempt to control flows of aid to and within Haiti. Aid conditionality 'allows donors to attach goal attainment criteria to aid such that if countries do not resolve an issue or problem the donor may withhold funds'.³⁹ For example, in order to receive funds to assist displaced persons, Haiti is required to build a number of temporary shelters for those rendered homeless as a result of the earthquake.

Accountability and performance management processes are mechanisms by which international development organisations hold Haiti accountable for its aid spending, requiring Haiti to provide detailed information regarding budgets and projected costs. Aid typing initiatives aim to ensure the auditability of sourcing practices by requiring host countries to purchase their aid and reconstruction services, technical assistance and goods from donor countries. For example, USAID funds for Haitian medical supplies come with the stipulation that these medical supplies are purchased from US manufacturers. Aid management performances are seen to provide necessary infrastructures of democratic practice that serve the 'building back better' agenda for Haiti.

The implementation of an audit culture in development projects represents a 'transition in government authority from direct control and supervision to indirect power relations'.⁴⁰

Techniques of biopolitical governance, like audit, are likely to be implemented in social, political and economic processes that are deemed as failures. Audit enables various governing actors, such as international development organisations, to render populations calculable, to see problems like poverty and the mobility of vulnerable groups in terms of calculation and quantification,⁴¹ and to make populations knowable and accountable.⁴² Premised on biopolitical techniques of managing recipient populations, biopolitical aims are acted upon through the establishment of auditable aid management performances on the part of populations receiving aid.

Haitian citizens are expected to enact auditable performances and to shoulder the burden for failing to do so. In Haiti, something as elemental as food consumption has been rendered calculable through a reliance on rates of malnutrition within the population. Performance on this dimension could be assessed by tallying the total number of people eating a meal on a regular basis. But specific indicators are more likely to be deployed to measure the performance of key civic institutions, such as, the number of meals provided by educational institutions to children in their care as a means of assessing the nutritional performance of the education sector; 562,000 school meals were provided to children in Haiti in 2010.⁴³ As a method of verification, audit displaces notions of goodwill and informal relations of trust. It formalises accountability by structuring (institutional) domains of practice to make them both visible and verifiable to independent parties.

Some writers suggest that the application of standardised, cookie-cutter audit-development strategies serve only to provide a homogenised picture of the poorer regions of the world.⁴⁴ Focussing on measures of optimal accountability and verification may also blind international development efforts to local initiatives that lack standardised measures. For example, the Haitian Reconstruction Fund (HRF) attempts to harmonise, steer and calculate the development projects of the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and major contributing countries which provide the largest source of flexible finance for the Haitian reconstruction.⁴⁵ Further, the 'Haiti Six Months After' document attempts to divide crucial aspects of development, and Haitian society, into measurable clusters of health, economics, sanitation, children, sex/gender, community life, security, education, agriculture and politics.⁴⁶ These ostensibly cohesive development strategies demonstrate little knowledge of the overlap of these clusters or their integration within Haitian civil society.⁴⁷

Many Haitians have spoken-out against the ignorance of the international development organisations: 'before taking action the IDC should observe life in our neighborhoods.'⁴⁸

Rather than 'engaging in discussions with Haitians about their struggles, humanitarian development efforts seek their legitimacy instead through the 'cultural stamp of accountability'.⁴⁹ When Haitians do obtain a seat at the development table, too often their stories become a tool of instrumentalisation for obtaining more funding (providing heart-wrenching stories at donor conferences) or acting as a ruse of participation at the level of funding decisions never seriously factoring into development discussions. As Shore argues, audit provides virtually no room for citizens' voices to be heard in any meaningful sense.⁵⁰ While the Haitian Action Plan calls upon everyone 'to play a role in [...] the reconstruction',⁵¹ the role of Haitian citizenry is to make themselves into the accountable subjects of an external gaze imposed through audit culture.

Auditing development clusters

As a failed state with an international trust deficit, the 'success' of development aid in Haiti is now inextricably linked to its auditability.⁵² In the days following the earthquake, or what aid experts called the 'emergency phase', the volume of aid in terms of resources, funds and volunteers flowing into Haiti required large-scale aid co-ordination. This aid co-ordination effort was complicated by the destruction of Haiti's political, communication and economic infrastructure. The UN organised a conference in the weeks following the earthquake to secure aid assurances from donor countries and to work out a plan for the co-ordination of aid organisation efforts on the ground in Haiti. Paul Farmer, the UN Deputy Special Envoy to Haiti, highlighted some of the issues raised in the conference:

(M)ost seemed willing to admit, at least behind closed doors, that the aid machinery itself was flawed and that Haiti was particularly vulnerable to these flaws. Almost none of the billion dollars already spent on rescue and relief went to the public sector. Government employees and infrastructure had been dealt a rude blow and it was difficult to move resources through broken conduits. Delegates agreed that the Haitian government needed to lead the charge. However, finding a way to include Haitians from all social strata in discussions about Haiti's future was going to be a bone of contention in the coming year.⁵³

The UN document 'Haiti Six Months After' provides a detailed plan for the audit organisation of international aid in Haiti.⁵⁴ The document outlines the phases, targets, gaps, challenges, achievements and statistics for the international aid effort. Following the

logic of audit, aid funds and resources are clustered together according to areas of assistance: shelter, health, education and so on. The UN occupies the position of gatekeeper; however, a variety of international development organisations (such as the Red Cross, World Health Organisation and USAID) work within the cluster system according to their area of expertise. Each cluster represents an area in which the UN monitors and assesses aid within Haiti. The cluster system is meant to avoid aid duplication and thereby increase aid effectiveness.⁵⁵

Each cluster in the system outlines the targets and achievements of international development organisations. The food and shelter cluster defines food and shelter provision as, for example, the requirement to provide waterproof cover and food preparation infrastructure to people in Haiti. Evidence of successful performance management includes the fact that 70,729 tents and 168,840 kitchen sets were distributed by May 2010 and that benchmarks were surpassed: 'the distribution of emergency shelter items are in excess of 100% of the baseline for the affected population'.⁵⁶ In line with the goal of enhancing human security, 125,000 temporary shelters were built by mid-2011.⁵⁷

The prevalence of audit technologies in international aid disbursement is in turn immersed in a logic of biopolitics. The nutrition cluster targets specific 'nutritionally vulnerable' elements of the population with extensive feeding programmes to prevent mortality and morbidity associated with malnutrition. The cluster has successfully treated 1,500 severely malnourished children, over 500,000 children aged 6 to 59 months, and pregnant and breast-feeding woman have received supplementary food.⁵⁸ A major challenge for the education cluster is that 90 per cent of Haitian schools are in private hands and require fees. With the aim of building strong democratic governance in Haiti, the education cluster supported 80 per cent of schools affected by the earthquake by providing free education (at the elementary level) for all citizens.⁵⁹ In this regard, democratic governance is associated with strong state infrastructure, such as state-led educational institutions. This also aligns with the overall goal of redressing state 'failure' by enhancing state-centric institutional capacity.⁶⁰

The early recovery cluster was also formed in response to Haitian state 'failure'. The 'early' recovery initiative also involves the development of long-term reconstruction plans. This cluster aims to strengthen Haitian leadership, to build governing capacity through the development of Haitian social services and augment collaboration with a wide range of partners including members of the HRF and international donor countries.⁶¹ In addition to 'building back better' Haitian civil services by promoting strong state-centric

institutions, the early recovery initiative also endorses plans to privatise some of these services. As an auditable development goal, the IMF has called for reductions in the number of state employees through the privatisation of social services.

In 2011, this resulted in a Haitian 'anti-privatisation' campaign, one that aimed to draw attention to the 'structures of domination and dependence that have been reproduced and reinforced by the constellation of agencies'.⁶² Haitian resistance centres on the international monopoly on Haitian development aid: 'International aid must come, but Haitians must stay on the front lines. Foreigners should come help us but not exploit us; [...] reconstruction should not be an opportunity for some to fill their pockets'.⁶³ While aid dependency is an acknowledged condition of Haitian life at the moment, there is also a local sense that, in civic affairs, something distinctly Haitian should endure.⁶⁴

The emphasis on benchmarks, targets and specific performance indicators depicted in the clusters of the 'Six Months After' programme are characteristic of the calculative technologies of audit culture. The cluster system authorises international development organisations to manage and review the distribution and progress of the international aid effort in Haiti while simultaneously integrating 'strong' state development goals and practices in order to better manage Haitian civic affairs. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, has praised the UN for its work in managing aid in Haiti: 'as we move from emergency aid to long term reconstruction what we envision is a wholesale national renewal, a sweeping exercise in nation-building on a scale and scope not seen in generations'.⁶⁵

With a focus on producing and disseminating audit information to international development organisations,⁶⁶ the cluster system has also stimulated significant criticism for dissociating Haitians from the information needed to make decisions around reconstruction and development.⁶⁷ With a surfeit of NGOs staking out responsibility for discrete cluster initiatives, co-ordinating development plans remains a central concern. As the UK Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Co-ordination explains:

*In most of the clusters established, cluster coordinators continue to struggle [...] and this lack of capacity has meant that several large clusters have yet to establish a concise overview of needs and develop a coherent response plan [...] This is leading others to doubt the ability to deliver.*⁶⁸

The 'Six Months After' programme also exposes the Western-centric ways in which international development efforts problematise Haitian society. Key policy statements

operationalise the goals of assisting, enabling and supporting the Haitian people, by getting them to work: ‘we must enable people to work as fast as possible [...] again and again those in camps tell us that if they can earn a wage they can take charge of their own recovery.’⁶⁹ They also claim to support the government of Haiti by addressing state ‘failure’ ‘to ensure that all Haitians have a chance to shape their future.’⁷⁰ This suggests that development priorities centre round the twin liberal concerns of economy-building and state-making. Insofar as these problems persist, and Haiti is cast as a failed economy and state incapable of managing its own reconstruction, the continuation of governing practices by international development organisations are assured.

Governing the crisis

Following the earthquake, the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was the organisational body responsible for ensuring that the Haitian Government had a voice in the reconstruction process. While the IHRC was largely composed of Haitians members, international development organisations maintained a strong presence within the organisation with the UN Special Envoy (Bill Clinton) co-chairing the Commission with the then Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellarive. The IHRC was created in large part to ensure that the reconstruction would operate in full accordance with the Haitian Government’s short-term and long-term reconstruction plans.⁷¹ The role of the Commission was not to lead the reconstruction, but rather to align donor finance and facilitate projects and programmes that fall within the Government of Haiti’s reconstruction plans. The IHRC was also to provide an infrastructure of transparency to reassure donors that funds were not languished in corrupt or inept bureaucracies and to hold donors accountable to their pledges.

The Commission found new ways of tracking, in real time, the implementation of projects via audit technologies such as benchmarking and performance indicators.⁷² ‘The IHRC was to provide a platform for [...] enhancing trust and inspiring what was termed donor confidence.’⁷³ The IHRC needed to be swift and nimble as the rules of the road for development assistance needed to be rewritten. As such, the IHRC created the ‘National Action Plan’ for recovery which, still largely indicative of an audit culture, attempted to prioritise Haitian-led reconstruction efforts. According to the Action Plan, ‘formal and constructive talks have made the IHRC aware of the expectations of international partners and allowed [the IHRC] to explain their choices for the future.’⁷⁴ This inclusive

consultation of Haitians is unique to the Action Plan and absent from international organisation aid management approaches whereby development organisations are accountable to international donors.

Despite successfully establishing the National Action Plan, the IHRC was scrutinised, at the local level, by Haitians who failed to see an effective inclusion of Haitians in the discussion and implementation of development plans and, at the international level, by development aid organisations that failed to identify the effective management of aid in Haiti. In response to a March 2010 Haitian Government request, the IDB, the UN and the WB, along with contributing donors (such as Canada, United States, Australia, Brazil and Spain), established a multi-donor fund called the Haitian Reconstruction Fund (HRF).⁷⁵ The HRF was to support the 'National Action Plan' for recovery (enhance the role of the Haitian Government) while placing the International Development Association (IDA) of the WB as trustee for the fund (enhance aid management by increasing international monitoring and evaluation). The HRF would oversee the financing arrangements of the Haitian reconstruction effort, whereby, donors enter into an administrative agreement with the IDA as trustee.⁷⁶ Partner entities will work with one or more of the implementing agencies (the UN, WB or IDB) following the rules and procedures of the partner entities to undertake reconstruction and development.⁷⁷

The HRF would become the aid authority for Haiti, effectively displacing the IHRC. While the Haitian Government would head the HRF steering committee, HRF reconstruction funds (the largest source of finance for Haitian reconstruction) became ensnared in a complex bureaucratic governance organisation which has been termed a 'republic of NGOs'.⁷⁸ The international reconstruction of Haiti has enrolled an unprecedented number of NGOs and, rather than the Haitian state, this republic of NGOs is now primarily in charge of the country, running it like an international administrative enterprise specialising in humanitarian response and transformation.⁷⁹ This organisation of NGOs, under the auspices of the HRF, would take responsibility for implementing the Action Plan.

Aid control by key development organisations means that objectives like capacity-building, that is, undertakings to enable Haitians to assume ultimate responsibility for building development projects, are diminished in favour of accountabilities.⁸⁰ Once again, the development programme seems to be designed to ensure that the freedom of action of the Haitian government and Haitian civil society are severely constrained by a culture of audit. Local Haitian organisations (such as the International Movement 4th World, the

Haitian Farmer's Union and Haitians Helping Haitians) contend that the view of Haiti as a veritable graveyard of development projects has less to do with a failed civic culture and everything to do with Haiti's place in the world.

The Action Plan embarks on a 10-year development strategy for Haiti's political, economic and social governance.⁸¹ The Action Plan outlines five pillars of reconstruction efforts: institutional rebuilding, social rebuilding, economic rebuilding, territorial rebuilding, and building an enabling environment. These five pillars comprise the country's Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). Where the cluster system utilises technologies of audit to cluster aid funds and resources around international development organisation areas of expertise, the ISF focuses on goals of reconstruction that must be met if the development aid granted to Haiti is to be successfully implemented: the institutional rebuilding pillar emphasises the need for the Haitian state to provide public services particularly for vulnerable groups; the territorial rebuilding pillar emphasises the ability of the state to respond to disasters and develop territorial plans based on population analysis; the social rebuilding pillar emphasises the need to reduce disparities and provide social services in an equitable manner; the economic rebuilding pillar emphasises developing new and sustainable economic opportunities for Haitians and; lastly, the enabling environment pillar emphasises maintaining secure conditions conducive to political stability.⁸² Effectively tracking the implementation plan is an important part of the ISF process and is in line with the international development effort to ensure accountability and monitor Haiti's progress towards a 'strong' democratic state.⁸³ International development goals take precedence over Haitian plans. Only when Haiti is deemed to have achieved a 'strong' state status will the governance by a republic of NGOs convert to state governance.

The aim of the Action Plan is to turn disaster into opportunity and to make the country an emerging 'strong' state by 2030.⁸⁴ To redress the concern for the flow-over effects of Haitian state 'failure', the reconstruction will be marked by: 'a fair, just, united and friendly society living in harmony with its environment and culture; a modern society characterised by the rule of law, freedom of association and expression and land management.'⁸⁵ The Plan also emphasises 'a society with a modern, diversified, strong dynamic, competitive, open and inclusive economy based on land', also seen to be indicative of 'strong' state agendas. Essential ingredients for these developments include:

a knowledge based society with universal access to basic education, mastery of qualifications based on a relevant professional training system, and the

*capacity for scientific and technical innovation fed by a modern and efficient university system, in order to create the new type of citizen the country needs for reconstruction.*⁸⁶

This desire to create a new type of citizen indicates that the current Haitian citizenry is not suitable for development plans nor responsible or knowledgeable enough for self-government initiatives required by the vision for Haiti's future.

Despite Haitian pleas for international development efforts to respect Haitian leadership, we are witnessing what Farmer terms the 'bone of contention' in the reconstruction of Haiti: how to include, or not, Haitian citizens in Haiti's development.⁸⁷

Pleas for Haitian inclusion are countered by the esteem of experts and expert knowledge within international development organisations regarding the management of aid. The tension between local inclusion and expert knowledge has been played out in different ways. The development of the IHRC was supposed to ensure Haitian voices were heard. The failure of the IHRC to effectively utilise Haitian plans for the future led to the establishment of the HRF which subsumed the remnants of the IHRC into its steering committee and further ensnared Haitian voices in the depths of audit and accountability.

According to the HRF:

*The employment and supervision of consultants and the procurement of goods and works financed by the contributions shall be the responsibility solely of the Partner Entity [the UN, WB or IDB] and shall be carried out in accordance with its applicable policies and procedures.*⁸⁸

In other words, the partner entities, rather than Haitians themselves, are responsible for monitoring and evaluating activities financed by HRF funds in accordance with transfer agreements.

Boasting of lower costs and the promise of an enduring partnership with Haiti through 2017, the HRF provides the largest source of flexible finance for the Haitian reconstruction with US\$381million allocated for reconstructions projects.⁸⁹ The HRF objective is to 'support the mobilisation, coordination and allocation of resources in the form of contributions to improve basic living conditions and the capacity of the Haitian government.'⁹⁰ HRF monies flow through the three primary partners (the WB, IDB and IMF) with each applying their own audit calculus for the management of funds. The primary partners in the HRF focus on minimising the risks associated with Haiti's so-called failed state by building governance and institutional capacity; the WB focus is on

improving investment opportunities and the climate of business in Haiti; the IMF focus is on lending money to the Haitian state to kick-start development programmes; and the IDB concerns itself with cancelling all of Haiti's outstanding debts.⁹¹

The three partners are in turn answerable to the steering committee, led by the Haitian government, which is responsible (in principle) for the evaluation of project performance.⁹² However, a closer look at the structural arrangement of the HRF reveals the limited capacity of the Haitian government to act on HRF agreements. At a rather superficial level, the government of Haiti sees early-stage proposals for HRF funding and initially chooses to endorse, or not, such proposals. The partner entities then set a project budget so that a fully developed proposal may be developed in accordance with partner entity (UN, WB or IDB) standards.⁹³ The government of Haiti provides the final approval of funds to a partner entity or trustee; however, partner entities and the implementing agencies rather than Haitians themselves implement, supervise and complete the activity on the ground.⁹⁴ According to the HRF, it is the trustee [the IDA of the World Bank] that conducts an audit of the funds according to [the World Bank's] rules and regulations.⁹⁵

A large portion of the HRF mandate is devoted to audit protocols; 'regular reports will be made to the steering committee and partner activities will be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the financial regulations, rules and directives of each partner entity.'⁹⁶ Of the total US\$381million in funds contributed to the HRF, the steering committee has made cumulative funding decisions totalling US \$278.95 million for 17 projects,⁹⁷ with 44 per cent channelled through the UN, 40 per cent channelled through the WB and 16 per cent channelled through the IDB.⁹⁸ For each of the projects funded, the HRF outlines the general objectives, performance indicators and targeted thematic outcomes indicative of the types of audit technologies to secure successful HRF project completion.

The HRF provides a platform from which the international financial sector manages and controls the aid funds in Haiti, subsequently ensuring the funds circulate amongst international development organisations rather than the Haitian state or citizens themselves. For example the World Bank, the administrator of the neighbourhood housing reconstruction project, did not disburse a single dollar for the project in 2011—one year after the HRF was established—and the IDB has yet to disburse any aid from the HRF.⁹⁹ According to the Centre for Economic and Policy Research the HRF is little more than a bank where donors have stashed over US\$100 million in unused aid funds.¹⁰⁰

The primary goal of aid management is the co-ordination and coherence of international development aid organisations and their strategic plans. A major consequence of the culture of audit within this international development effort is that the capacity of Haiti's government and civil society are severely limited in the process. Our analysis of the major players in international development and the pervasive culture of audit mobilised to ensure the aid machinery operates successfully reveals the incongruity of audited aid and Haitian goals for development. While audit is said to ensure the harmonisation and accountability of development aid, our analysis illustrates repetitive, overlapping and externally validated development projects in Haiti. The culture of audit ensnares Haitian development aid in a 'republic of NGOs'. This governance structure is far removed from being accountable to those it intends to serve. This is because they are deemed to be unaccountable (as citizens of a 'failed' state) and therefore in need of accountability measures which will render them calculable and accountable to international development efforts.

Conclusion

The republic of Haiti has suffered decades of instability earning Haiti a reputation among international development organisations as a 'failed' state. 12 January 2010 marked a turning point in Haitian history when a massive earthquake destroyed millions of lives and livelihoods and crippled the country's infrastructure. The fateful event also served as a leverage point for international organisations to redouble their efforts to rebuild the Haitian state and an international organisation of state and non-state actors has positioned itself as Haiti's development 'experts'. Enacting a form of governance at a distance, the international effort has, in effect, established a republic of NGOs to take over responsibility for governing both the distribution of aid and the development of the Haitian state and civic affairs.

A central problematic for the international development effort is that Haiti is seen to have failed at self-governance and so requires significant international influence and leadership. To this end, the rebuilding effort encompasses the restructuring of political authority and civil society infrastructure in the image of a strong democratic and accountable state. The aim is also to effect the constitution of new accountable Haitian citizens. The central tool of this governing effort is the deployment of a culture of audit. Including an array of calculative devices (benchmarks, performance indicators) and calculative practices (biopolitical

measures), the goal of a culture of audit is to ensure that Haitian aid allocations and distributions are made accountable to major donor states and development organisations. This is done to ensure that aid and restructuring redress not only the short-term consequences of dire seismic activity but also the longer-term and potentially far more dire global problem of state failure. As a way to govern state failure, the international development effort plans to make Haitian society and its citizens accountable to the authority of international development expertise. Whereas audit cultures are often deployed within democratic societies to make authorities accountable to their citizens, deploying audit culture on a global scale has an ulterior implication of making citizens accountable to non-democratic governing auspices, in this case, to international authorities via a 'republic of NGOs'. One of the key consequences for Haitian citizenry and Haitian sovereignty is exclusion from authoring the reconstructive blueprints of their future.

Endnotes

1. UNDP, 'Haiti Six Months After', 3.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.; UN, 'Integrated Strategic Framework'.
4. UNDP, 'Empowering Haiti', 3.
5. Klitgaard, 'Addressing Corruption in Haiti', 5.
6. Haitian international aid efforts involve a network of organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, led by the United Nations, the Haitian Reconstruction Fund (formerly known as the Haiti Recovery Commission) which includes the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and major donor countries that have as a concerted aim the provision of various social, political and economic services to the country.
7. Eriksen, 'State Failure in Theory', 230–233.
8. Buss and Gardener, 'Why Foreign Aid', 2–4; Ezrow and Frantz, 'Revisiting the Concept'.
9. See Fukuyama, 'The Imperative of State-Building', 16; Miller, 'The Case for Nation-Building'.
10. See Duffield, 'Getting Savages to Fight', 143.
11. Global Policy Forum, 'Globalization'.
12. Chandler, *International State-Building*, 124.
13. Massumi, 'National Enterprise Emergency', 153.
14. Duffield, 'Getting Savages to Fight'; Ilcan and Lacey, *Governing the Poor*.
15. UNDP, 'Reaffirming Human Development', 17.
16. Not only are poverty and underdevelopment associated with conflict, conflict itself is regarded as complicating poverty and deepening underdevelopment. See Dillon, 'The Security of Governance', 79.
17. Best, 'Ambiguity, Uncertainty and Risk', 367.
18. Shuller, 'Seeing like a Failed NGO', 68.
19. Ezrow and Frantz, 'Revisiting the Concept', 1324.
20. See Chandler, *International State-Building*, 53.
21. Shore, 'Audit Culture and Illiberal Governance'; Strathern, *Audit Cultures*.
22. Rojas, 'Governing Through the Social', 97.
23. Shore, 'Audit Culture and Illiberal Governance', 2.
24. Ibid., 279. See also Ilcan, 'Paradoxes of Humanitarian Aid'.
25. Miller and Rose, *Governing the Present*, 33–34.
26. Power, 'The Audit Society'.
27. Vannier, 'Audit Culture and Grassroots'; Shore, 'Audit Culture and Illiberal Governance'; Power, 'The Audit Society' and 'Counting, Controlling and Calculations'.
28. See Brisson-Boivin and O'Connor, 'The Rule of Law', 518.
29. See Shore, 'Audit Culture and Illiberal Governance', 281; Power, 'Counting, Controlling and Calculations'.
30. See Ilcan, 'Privatizing Responsibility', 218; Larner and LeHeron, 'Global Benchmarking', 214.
31. See also O'Connor and de Lint, 'Frontier Government' on the reterritorialisation of liberal 'frontier' mentalities and practices beyond national borders.
32. For a discussion of the international rule of law as a technology of international governance in Haiti, see Brisson-Boivin and O'Connor, 'The Rule of Law'.
33. Montinola, 'When Does Aid Conditionality', 361

34. IMF, 'The IMF's Enhanced', 1.
35. UN Economic and Social Council, 'Session Five', 6.
36. Montinola, 'When Does Aid Conditionality'.
37. See Brisson-Boivin and O'Connor, 'The Rule of Law'.
38. UN Economic and Social Council, 'Session Five', 6. Historically, the IMF has attempted to address the issue of aid co-ordination and aid management in its provision of financial assistance on concessional terms to low income member countries since the mid-1970s, first through the Trust Fund, and then through the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of the 1980s which was replaced by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in the 1990s. See IMF, 'IMF Concessional Financing', 1.
39. Buss and Gardner, 'Why Foreign Aid', 186.
40. Vannier, 'Audit Culture and Grassroots', 282.
41. Ilcan, 'Privatizing Responsibility'; Ilcan and Lacey, *Governing the Poor*, 65; Ilcan, 'Paradoxes of Humanitarian Aid'.
42. See Scott, *Seeing like a State*.
43. UNDP, 'Haiti Six Months After'.
44. See Duffield, 'Getting Savages to Fight'.
45. HRF, 'A Partnership'.
46. UNDP, 'Haiti Six Months After'.
47. For more information on the Cluster Approach in humanitarian context, see Ilcan and Rygiel, 'Resiliency Humanitarianism'.
48. International Movement 4th World, 'Unheard Voices'.
49. Satterwaite, 'Indicators in Crisis'.
50. Shore, 'Audit Culture and Illiberal Governance'.
51. IHRC, 'Haitian Action Plan', 6.
52. See Macnamara, 'Haiti—An Opportunity', 67.
53. Farmer, *Haiti After The Earthquake*, 90.
54. UNDP, 'Haiti Six Months After'.
55. For more on the Cluster Approach especially in relation to the governance of refugees, see Ilcan and Rygiel, 'Resiliency Humanitarianism'.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. See Brisson-Boivin and O'Connor, 'The Rule of Law'.
61. UNDP, 'Haiti Six Months After'.
62. Edmonds, 'Beyond Good Intentions', 440.
63. See International Movement 4th World, 'Ayiti Demen', 'Yon Vwa Pou Pep La', 'Unheard Voices' and 'The Hidden Side'.
64. See Farmer, *Haiti After the Earthquake*, 225.
65. In Farmer, *Haiti After the Earthquake*, 155–156.
66. Ibid.
67. Satterwaite, 'Indicators in Crisis', 79.
68. In Farmer, *Haiti After the Earthquake*, 145.
69. UNDP, 'Haiti Six Months After', 3.
70. Ibid.
71. IHRC, 'Fact/Fiction', 1.
72. Farmer, *Haiti After the Earthquake*, 156.
73. Ibid., 157.
74. IHRC, 'Action Plan', 4.
75. HRF, 'Introduction'.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., our emphasis.
78. Farmer, *Haiti After the Earthquake*, 210.
79. Ibid., 99.
80. See Belasco et al., 'FY2010', 91.
81. IHRC, 'Action Plan'.
82. UN, 'Integrated Strategic Framework'.
83. Ibid., 10.
84. IHRC, 'Action Plan', 9.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Farmer, *Haiti After The Earthquake*.
88. HRF, 'Governance'.
89. HRF, 'A Partnership'.
90. Ibid.
91. See World Bank, 'Working for a World'; IMF, 'Haiti and the IMF'; and IDB, 'Haiti Project Highlights'.
92. HRF, 'A Partnership'.
93. HRF, 'Governance'.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. HRF, 'A Partnership'.
97. These projects include refunds and financial management, disaster management and risk reduction, sustainable development in the south, educational sector reconstruction, earthquake prevention plans for the north and support for six camps. For a full list of projects, see HRF, 'portfolio', available at: www.haitireconstructionfund.org/portfolio.
98. HRF, 'Financing Arrangements'.
99. CEPR, 'Inside the Haiti Reconstruction'.
100. Ibid.

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